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DEDICATION 
 
 
in memory of my father 
 
 
 
 
Weaker and weaker, the sunlight falls 
In the afternoon. The proud and the strong 
Have departed. 
 
Those that are left are the unaccomplished,  
The finally human, 
Natives of a dwindled sphere. 
 
— Wallace Stevens (“Lebensweisheitspielerei”) 
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
In Defense of the Political: Housework and Policework in the Post-Civil Rights Era 
 
by 
 
Philip Anselmo 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Comparative Literature 
 
University of California, Irvine 2019 
 
Professor Eyal Amiran, Chair 
 
 
This dissertation argues that concerns about labor, productivity, and social mobility are 
inextricable from anxieties about the gendered and racial reconfiguration of the reigning political 
reality as it was contested in the last years of the Civil Rights Movement and the decade after. 
This claim is supported through material analyses of films, congressional hearings, theoretical 
essays, and television broadcasts from the period (roughly 1967-1983). Methodologically, the 
work of analysis is informed by object relations theories of care and defense and political and 
social critique from the post-Marxist emancipatory tradition of critical theory. In contrast with 
more traditional studies of post-civil rights era literature, this dissertation sees its objects in 
relational terms as sites of facilitation and frustration where sociopolitical anxieties about the 
nation, the home, and the state of work are worked through — or not. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“This small non-time-space in the very heart of time, unlike the world and the culture into 
which we are born, can only be indicated, but cannot be inherited and handed down from the past; 
each new generation, indeed every new human being as he inserts himself between an infinite past 
and an infinite future, must discover and ploddingly pave it anew.” 
— Hannah Arendt1 
 
“There is much more continuity between autonomically appropriate quanta and the waves of 
conscious thought and feeling than the impressive caesura of transference and counter-transference 
would have us believe.” 
— W.R. Bion2 
 
“The absolutely inward nature of matter, as it would have to be conceived by pure 
understanding, is nothing but a phantom [Grille]; for matter is not among the objects of pure 
understanding, and the transcendental object which may be the ground of this appearance that we 
call matter is a mere something of which we should not understand what it is, even if someone 
were in a position to tell us.” 
— Immanuel Kant3 
 
“Sensuous knowledge is a different kind of materialism, neither idealistic nor alienated, but an 
active practice or passion for the lived reality of ghostly magical invented matters. Sensuous 
knowledge is receptive, close, perceptual, embodied, incarnate. It tells and it transports at the same 
time. Sensuous knowledge is commanding: it can spiral you out of your bounds, it can hollow out, 
with an x-ray vision, the seemingly innocuous artifacts of the master. To experience a profane 
illumination is to experience a something to be done.” 
— Avery F. Gordon4 
 
 
 
 
1 Between Past and Future, 13. 
2 Two Papers: The Grid and Caesura, 56. 
3 Critique of Pure Reason, 286. 
4 Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination, 205. 
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General Project Introduction 
My dissertation began with a simple question: Why does the problem of civil rights in the 
United States force a reconfiguring of the way the state imagines its relationship to an insistently 
heterogeneous populace? Situating this question in the context of the post-civil rights era (roughly 
1967 – 1983), I show the ways in which literature and film, both popular and minor, figure the 
structural violence of a nation whose hegemonic forms of social representation were in crisis. 
While scholars attentive to the historical context of civil rights and political reactionism often 
privilege a binary aesthetics in which a culture of hegemony is opposed to a counter-culture of 
resistance,5 I argue that, in its overdetermination, a novel or a film offers a space for the working 
through of political anxieties otherwise at odds with its aesthetic intent.6 Furthermore, this refusal 
 
5 Much of the film and genre analysis of the 1970s and 1980s can be said to more or less abide by such a distinction 
— and I show several places where the work on melodrama, in particular, often insists on an almost ontological 
separation of popular and true art. One prominent example is the work of Laura Mulvey, whose canonical theory of 
the “male gaze” was applied with critical force to the category of “narrative cinema,” while her own work as an 
“experimental” filmmaker laid claim to a theory and praxis outside of and in resistance to the ideological norm. In 
“Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (1975), she writes, invoking the Brechtian influence that was prevalent in 
many of the early works of Screen Theory: “The first blow against the monolithic accumulation of traditional film 
conventions (already undertaken by radical film-makers) is to free the look of the camera into its materiality in time 
and space and the look of the audience into dialectics, passionate detachment”  (844). This is not to call out Mulvey’s 
work, by any means, and much of the early film theory that was invested in ideology critique would eventually reckon 
with its problematic distinctions and (perhaps) utopian defenses. We might also note here Fredric Jameson’s attempt 
to evade this problematic and overcome the implicit binary of good art/bad art in his use of the concept of allegory. I 
will take a closer look at an example of his work from this period in the final chapter.  
6 As I explain in the subsequent methodological introduction, I turn to the language and theory of object relations 
psychoanalysis to inform my analysis of objects so conceived. 
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to separate out the political (as well as the economic) and the aesthetic results in an understanding 
of the cultural object that sees it, primarily, as a site of facilitation and mediation.7 As a result, my 
objects include: television news broadcasts, feature films, documentary film, essays, and their 
source material (where relevant), but also congressional hearings, political philosophy, 
psychoanalysis, and genre theory. The point is not to read one from the first series of more 
traditional objects of cultural analysis according to the prescribed methods of those from the latter, 
although the methods of, say, psychoanalysis are often informative of the analytical perspective I 
bring to bear on, say, political and economic theory.8 As will become clear in the following 
chapters, I am as interested, for example, in the defensive and prescriptive desires that manifest in 
 
7 Influenced by the work of Jacques Rancière, which is central to much of the work of this dissertation, Asma Abbas 
convincingly articulates the relational conception of these two supposedly disparate categories of experience/analysis. 
She writes:  
In every pathos that we offer up to liberal society can be found a clue to our lost senses — senses 
that have lost their way, forgetting where to look, what to look for, how to smell, how the dead call 
on us, how being tickles, how freedom tastes, what love sounds like, what intimacy suffering allows 
and asks for, and where a memory enters us. The limits of the political, then, are not reliant on 
epistemic assessment but are experienced relationally and aesthetically as a question of the nature 
of our very being — the degree to which our senses contest the imposed modes of the presence and 
absence of suffering is the degree to which we are political. (4) 
8 At its liberal origins, in the work of Adam Smith, for example, the discipline of political economy was as invested 
in questions of exchange, production, and profit as it was in matters of desire, conduct, and judgment. We do not need 
to ascend to the detailed study of the homologies of Freudian theories of mind and Marxian theories of production 
found in the work of Jean-Joseph Goux, for example, to understand the many ways in which the problem of value — 
or evaluation, perhaps more accurately — blurs the boundaries between interiority and exteriority. 
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theories of melodrama as I am in melodramatic works themselves. The question may inevitably 
arise then: Why these specific objects? If I want to look into post-civil rights cinematic 
representations of crime, why would I choose The Friends of Eddie Coyle (1973) and not The 
Godfather (1972)? If I am undertaking something of an historical analysis, looking to the places 
where political conflict, social desire, and economic anxiety coalesce, how do I decide which 
objects are most representative of those phenomena with which I want to engage? In brief, all of 
the objects analyzed here are engaged — sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly — with the 
historically-specific problem of the concept of labor after civil rights; and, further, this problem 
must be understood in relation to the continued struggle against oppression and exploitation as it 
had manifested at this time. Housework, under-employment, policework, and the labor of crime, 
but also the production of legislative norms, the discursive labor of constructing an image of the 
nation, and the theoretical work of enforcing or disputing the reigning ontologies of political and 
social reality as they inform said image — these problems converge in the wake of a civil rights 
movement that reached a paroxysm of bodily expression in 1967 and 1968 in the form of the urban 
uprisings. What I find in The Friends of Eddie Coyle that I do not find in The Godfather, then, 
does not constitute a judgment on the aesthetic or political use-value of one or the other — nor am 
I interested in resurrecting (or maintaining) the good art/bad art distinction I criticized above. In 
fact, these two contemporaneous crime films can both be said to be about the labor of crime. What 
most fascinates me, instead, is how the former escapes or frustrates so many of the generic 
constraints that still animate the latter; and not only how it does this but what forces and phenomena 
become visible when this happens. Something similar is happening in all of the films that are 
analyzed here. For example, A Woman Under the Influence and Bless Their Little Hearts both 
frustrate traditional avenues of melodramatic identification in ways that expose or — if this is not 
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a labor of critical unveiling, and I do not think it is — foreground those sites of conflict in their 
overdetermination by anxieties over politics, economics, race, gender, and their relation to an 
elusive conception of law and right in a nation whose structural wrongness had been called into 
question in such spectacular ways. At the same time, these films wrestle with the problem of labor 
in the United States, where the categories of labor and value can be seen to coalesce in assertions 
of moral prescription and social necessity, appearing here in the figures of the affectively-
overwrought housewife and the under-employed patriarch. Asking what gets to count as work also 
asks who gets to count as valued in a clearly impoverished ideology of domestic economy. Any 
honest answer to such questions only sets us up to ask: what are we to do with all of those who fall 
so clearly outside of this exclusive hierarchy of value organized around the historically-constituted 
category of the productive laborer. My contention is that the federal response to the urban 
uprisings at the end of the 1960s, in its obvious anxieties over de-segregation and the reconfiguring 
of a manifestly exclusive system of political representation, illustrate how the democratic 
recognition of actual (which is to say, institutionally enforced) civil rights became entangled with 
worries about the implicitly exclusive structure of labor as value. 
Returning to my initial question, there are several assumptions that I would like to 
emphasize before going further: first, it must be made clear what it means to say that civil rights 
is a “problem;” second, the very notion of a reconfiguring of the relationship between state and 
populace has consequences for the way we conceive the empirical content of the political; third, 
to what extent is the insistence on heterogeneity specific to this historical moment, and, if it is not, 
what about this moment is different — either in terms of how the insistence manifests or how this 
populace comprehends its particular difference. Civil rights is a “problem” when it forces a 
reigning and hegemonic conception of political democracy to contend with its inherent 
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contradictions and its structure of exclusion. The problematic of civil rights fits within the tradition 
of what Nick Hewlett calls the “emancipatory tradition” of post-1968 French political philosophy, 
exemplified in the work of Alain Badiou, Étienne Balibar, and Jacques Rancière. “By adopting the 
view that freedom is closely linked with freedom from oppression, advocates of the emancipatory 
tradition set themselves apart from liberals, who tend to conceive of freedom as absence from 
interference” (1). As will become clear, this project is indebted to the political theory of Balibar 
and Rancière. It might also be said, following Rancière, that one of the primary reasons civil rights 
is a problem is because it enacts — in theory and praxis, in speech and action — the confrontation 
between what he calls the logic of the police and egalitarian logic, a meeting “that is never set up 
in advance” (Dis-Agreement 32). By police logic, Rancière means a specific “order of the visible 
and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is 
understood as discourse and another as noise” (29).9 On the other hand, egalitarian logic gives rise 
to what he names politics as such, which is “antagonistic to policing: whatever breaks with the 
tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined by a presupposition 
that, by definition, has no place in that configuration — that of the part of those who have no part” 
(29-30). I argue that the urban uprisings of 1967-1969, as an emphatic and material expression of 
the problem of civil rights, fulfill such a logic of the political in the endeavor to contest the reigning 
order of the visible/sensible and force a re-ordering of bodies and things. I will revisit this 
argument in detail in the first chapter, but it should be clear how this first assumption informs the 
second: namely, that any political — in the precise sense Rancière gives to this term — 
contestation of the order of what can be seen and said will have consequences for the way we 
 
9 This conception of police-as-logic is integral to my analysis of policework in the third chapter, where I make use of 
this broader political philosophy to ground an aesthetic and empirical analysis of policing.  
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conceive the empirical content of the political. As for the third assumption implicit in my opening 
question, it is my contention that the material analyses of the films, hearings, essays, and 
broadcasts that follow will make clear how we are to understand, contextually, the shape and force 
of this historically-specific configuration of the heterogeneous populace. If I am successful, this 
dissertation will show how concerns about labor, productivity, and social mobility are inextricable 
from anxieties about the gendered and racial reconfiguration of the reigning political reality as it 
was contested in the last years of the Civil Rights Movement and the decade after. In Rancière’s 
terms, the post-civil rights era, as I understand it, was an exemplary moment for examining and 
analyzing the effects of a sustained and impactful clash between police logic and politics. Each of 
the three chapters of the dissertation engages with an aspect of this broader problematic. 
 
Methodological Introduction — From Trauma to Defense 
In an article largely concerned with the interpretive stakes of diagnosing psychological 
trauma in a clinical setting, Alan Bass poses the question: “Why does American psychoanalysis 
seem to have bypassed the civil rights movement altogether?” (274). After remarking on the 
readily available (even obvious) “description of transmission of trauma in second generation 
Holocaust survivors,” he asks why this “theory of unconscious processes [has not] been 
generalized to include racial persecution in the US” (275). Indeed, for some years, the literature of 
trauma studies10 — grounded in a reading of Freud’s early work on the “war neuroses” and his 
 
10 See, for example, Balaev, Balint, Caruth, Comay, Cruz, Herman, LaCapra, and Sklar. In the volume, Trauma: 
Explorations in Memory, edited by Caruth, the category of “trauma” ascends to the status of a conceptual hermeneutic 
in itself, evident in the collection’s first entry, where Shoshana Felman asks: “Is there a relation between trauma and 
pedagogy?” (13). 
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later metapsychological theory in Beyond the Pleasure Principle — focused almost exclusively on 
the Holocaust and its aftermath. In the years since Bass’s article, however, a number of academic 
works on the subject of trauma, slavery, and racism have taken up his question — notably, and 
more recently, Michael Rothberg’s Multidirectional Memory and Gabriele Schwab’s Haunting 
Legacies.11 At times, however, a designation of trauma often inaugurates a work on collective 
suffering as its categorical sine qua non, offering a descriptor of experiences otherwise deemed 
incapable of description: “traumatic” names both event and effect in its performance as 
disclaimer12 and diagnosis. In much of the contemporary work that makes use of the concept of 
trauma, the psychoanalytic theory of the experience has often been abandoned in favor of 
methodologies more suited to the disciplinary origin of the study — whether sociological, clinical, 
 
11 In a sustained engagement with the Algerian revolution, Rothberg has made explicit the connections between “the 
Holocaust and colonialism,” a “solidarity” which had previously been separated and institutionalized “as autonomous 
realms of history and discourse” (267). Gabriele Schwab brings trauma theory into a more robust methodological 
framework that also draws on the psychoanalytic writings of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok and their use of such 
concepts as “psychic haunting” and “the crypt” (Haunting Legacies 4). In complicating the sociological image of 
trauma as a kind of metonymic designator of historical suffering, Schwab pursues a more nuanced analysis of the 
cryptic in the “[t]raumatic silences and gaps in language” that “express trauma otherwise shrouded in secrecy or 
relegated to the unconscious” (4).   
12 Jeffrey C. Alexander and Elizabeth Butler Breese open the edited collection, Narrating Trauma: On the Impact of 
Collective Suffering, with these lines: “This book deals with social suffering; with exploitation and violence; with war 
and genocide; the massacre of innocents; and intense and often gruesome religious, economic, ethnic, and racial strife. 
These formidable topics do not in themselves render our book distinctive. What distinguishes the contributions that 
follow is how they approach social suffering’s causes and effects.” (xi). 
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historical, or literary.13 Something of Freud’s estimation of the experience remains, however, in 
the way that “trauma” acts as a placeholder for an event constituted by an excess of reality, where 
“reality,” in a sort of concession to the Hobbesian vision of the world, is equated with suffering 
and injustice. In colloquial terms, we might speak of an experience that was, owing to its excessive 
degree of violence, too much to process, resulting in a subject who has been traumatized. As 
disclaimer and diagnosis, however, “trauma” more accurately describes the relational position of 
a subject outside of the violence in their perception of the victim of a traumatic event. Thus, in 
trauma studies, we often find ethnographic and historical accounts of those traumatized others, 
where the description provides not only a means to categorize often disparate experiences of 
collective suffering (ethnic cleansing and domestic violence, for example) but as a way of 
measuring the distance between the one who describes and the one who endures, between, in other 
words, the agent and the patient. Jeffrey C. Alexander and Elizabeth Butler Breese may exemplify 
this relation when they describe trauma as “cultural work” even as they adopt it as an interpretive 
framework for the study of “intense and often gruesome religious, economic, ethnic, and racial 
strife” (Eyerman, et. al. xiii, xi). We might ask, instead: What is the function of description in the 
work of a sociocultural analysis of trauma? How might we contextualize an event that, while it 
may ostensibly be described as traumatic, allows for the difference of individual experiences 
without losing sight of the impact of collective experience? Alexander and Breese pose as their 
response to such a question a focus on the cultural narrating of trauma, how it becomes a social 
representation and how that representative form bridges individual and collective experience. In 
their own words, they want “to trace the manner in which these [traumatic] causes and effects are 
 
13 Alexander and Breese, for example, argue: “To transform individual suffering into collective trauma is cultural 
work” (xiii). See, also, the sociological work of Ron Eyerman or the “healing focused” work of Joy DeGruy. 
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crucially mediated by symbolic representations of social suffering and how such a cultural process 
channels powerful human emotions” (xi). In this methodological introduction, I pose a different, 
albeit related, question: What happens when the perception of trauma, whether in the past or future, 
necessitates a response on the part of a subject (or community or nation) even where the capacity 
for response is outpaced by the demands of representation? Further, how might an analysis of 
discursive and aesthetic modes of representation account for this response-ability14 as that which 
articulates an appeal to an imagined collective and how those very modes call such a collective 
into being on behalf of its perceived imperative to respond? As I show, the collective figure of the 
urban police force in the American post-civil rights era is imagined and represented — just as it 
imagines and represents itself — as embattled by an almost quotidian experience of traumatic 
relation to the broader populace. In the pathologization of the nation’s poor, black others, the labor 
of policework makes use of the logics of trauma (with its too-muchness of the qualitatively bad 
 
14 Looking back on the Los Angeles riots/rebellion of 1992, Nahum Dimitri Chandler asks: “How can we speak of the 
massive violence that preceded what has been called the rebellion or riots in the streets of Los Angeles? How can we 
speak of the violence of a beating that had occurred before it had occurred?” (1). Such questions “desediment” (his 
term) an otherwise established historical trajectory, opening up the interpretative (and experiential) primacy of 
causality as the measure of the truth of history as representation. “We cannot pretend to speak of these things,” he 
argues. “In the face of incommensurability — I call this entire ‘thing,’ long before the beating itself and yet to come, 
the disaster — in the face of such, we cannot speak, as in depart from or arrive at truth. We can only respond, make a 
choice — a decision — in short, judge, in other terms, be responsible. We must act as if we were responsible. For, we 
will, always, be responsible” (4-5). 
11 
 
stuff) to justify its own brutality and a perpetuation of the kind of violence15 it has necessarily 
blinded itself to in order to work. 
My interest in trauma is not motivated by a desire to intervene in an already established 
field, nor am I proposing an alternative or corrective to what I perceive as a misuse of the concept. 
What interests me is that in its transposition from the discipline of psychoanalysis into works of 
social and cultural history, the concept often accrues a moral value it does not possess inherently 
in Freud’s theory of the mind. In other words, were we to speak, as I have above, about the trauma 
of policing the Bronx in the 1970s, when the New York City borough was notorious for its high 
rate of crime, the moral value of the concept becomes unspokenly ironized. I am interested in this 
ambiguity of the term and what it means for an analysis of the post-civil rights era as I conceive it 
— to be more specific: I wonder if there might be a structural inconsistency in the notion itself that 
refuses to allow for its use relationally to describe a moment of broad social crisis, due in large 
part to the inherent moral tenor the concept acquires as soon as it is applied to situations of 
historical specificity. Before pursuing this question, I would like to look further at the various ways 
the discipline of psychoanalysis has defined and made use of trauma to make sense of what I would 
call structures of overwhelming. 
In The Language of Psycho-Analysis, Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis offer this 
definition of trauma: “An event in the subject’s life defined by its intensity, by the subject’s 
incapacity to respond adequately to it, and by the upheaval and long-lasting effects that it brings 
about in the psychical organisation” (465). While the more general emphasis on the intensity of 
the event, the incapacity of response, and the duration of its effects are common to most of the 
 
15 See the previous footnote. The violence that is inexplicable within the praxis of policework is that which Chandler 
describes as having “occurred before it had occurred” (4). 
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academic work in the field of trauma studies (as well as its more popular representations), the 
inclusion here of matters of psychical organization marks a point of specification particular to 
more exclusively psychoanalytic investigations of trauma. “In economic terms,” the definition 
continues, “the trauma is characterised by an influx of excitations that is excessive by the standard 
of the subject’s tolerance and capacity to master such excitations and work them out psychically” 
(465). The economic theory originates in an understanding of the traumatic event (a specific, 
datable event) in terms of the “non-abreaction of the experience,”16 where “abreaction” signifies 
the “[e]motional discharge whereby the subject liberates himself from the affect17 attached to the 
 
16 Laplanche and Pontalis further specify that the traumatic experience here understood “remains in the psyche as a 
‘foreign body’,” hence the term, abreaction, which, much like abjection, signifies a maintenance of the boundaries of 
a coherent self, a proper identity (466). Although both terms concern the threat of invasion, abreaction describes the 
process of expelling a “foreign body” that has taken up residence in the self, while abjection describes the rejecting of 
a disavowed part of the self. Julia Kristeva describes the experience of the abject through the example of recoiling 
from a piece of rotten or spoiled food: “‘I’ want none of that element, sign of their desire; ‘I’ do not want to listen, ‘I’ 
do not assimilate it, ‘I’ expel it. But since the food is not an ‘other’ for ‘me,’ who am only in their desire, I expel 
myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself within the same motion through which ‘I’ claim to establish myself” (3). In a 
another project, I would like to revisit the discussion on abjection in the first chapter informed by this distinction 
between abjection and abreaction and how it exposes different dynamics in the object relations of American racism. 
17 As André Green notes, the concept of the affect in psychoanalysis is inconsistent. In Freud’s earliest work on 
hysteria, “the quota of affect” is contained in the concept of “cathectic energy” — it is, thus, an economic determinant 
(12). In the shift to the later topographical theory, however, affect relates to the inherent dualism of psychic 
organization where, no longer opposed to the representation/repressed as that which is “suppressed,” it (as, say, 
anxiety) “is subject to the same splitting” (of, say, repression and disavowal) (55-57). Affect, in Green’s estimation, 
describes any discrete point along the spectrum of pleasure/unpleasure, and as such is capable of any number of 
relations to the processes of psychic organization. 
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memory of a traumatic event” and thus avoids a pathogenic response (466, 1). In a sense, in this 
earliest formulation, “trauma” names the origin of psychic pathology; origin, in brief, of the 
symptom. Without abandoning this earlier economic theory, Freud’s development of trauma in 
later works both broadens and specifies the significance of the concept in light of his later emphasis 
on psychic topography and defense. A renewed focus on the economic model in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle leads him back to the metapsychological theory of the “living vesicle” that is 
shielded “against stimuli from the external world” and that protects the receptive “cortical layer” 
beneath that will become consciousness, which he first developed in “Project for a Scientific 
Psychology” (32). “We describe as ‘traumatic’ any excitations from outside which are powerful 
enough to break through the protective shield” (33). Although Freud specifies that the receptive 
cortex is also subject to “excitations from within,” which provoke “feelings in the pleasure-
unpleasure series” and from which it is not shielded in the same way, trauma is, by definition, 
“external,” even here where it is already internal (32, 33). In the moment of the breach, 
There is no longer any possibility of preventing the mental apparatus from being 
flooded with large amounts of stimulus, and another problem arises instead — the 
problem of mastering the amounts of stimulus which have broken in and of binding 
them, in the psychical sense, so that they can be disposed of…. An ‘anti-cathexis’ 
on a grand scale is set up for whose benefit all the other psychical systems are 
impoverished, so that the remaining psychical functions are extensively paralysed 
or reduced. (33-34) 
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Such a traumatic episode, a forced experience of too much external stimuli, gives rise, in Freud’s 
theory, to the compulsion to repeat, the effort afterwards (Nachträglich)18 to “master the stimulus” 
which had failed in the initial breach (37). Trauma, then, names both the event of the breach and 
the retrospective efforts of mastery. Six years later, Freud modified this theory yet again in 
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, where, as Laplanche and Pontalis point out, the “simplified 
model of the vesicle … no longer holds” (469). Without naming “traumatic neurosis proper,” 
Freud posits an overwhelming of the ego by a surge of “automatic anxiety,” inaugurating a state 
of helplessness and again marshalling the forces of psychic defense (469). In this instance, 
however, “the ego is attacked from within — that is to say, by instinctual excitations — just as it 
is from without” (469). Here, Freud takes the example of the infant separated from its mother — 
whose absence, experienced as a threat to its capacity for survival, triggers anxiety as “a rescuing 
signal” — to articulate a slightly different theory of the “traumatic situation” (138, 166). A focus 
on the specific affect of anxiety19 allows him to expand his earlier theory of external trauma to 
encompass both “physical helplessness if the danger is real and psychical helplessness if it is 
instinctual” (166), a distinction that was not allowed in Beyond the Pleasure Principle because the 
internal or instinctual danger there was transformed, by the defensive process of projection, into 
 
18 Laplanche has written extensively on this complicated and sometimes misunderstood concept. In his essay, “Notes 
on Afterwardsness,” he distinguishes three ways that Freud uses the term: first, in the sense of “further” or 
“secondary,” where “it relates secondary consciousness to a primary one;” second, where it signifies “the direction of 
time from the past to the future;” and its third usage which “inverts it from the future towards the past” (261). He is 
especially interested in this latter usage and makes use of it to explain the relational third term in his interpretation of 
Freud’s seduction theory of consciousness. 
19 See Green 59ff.  
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an external stimulus and so subject to the shield of the vesicle (Beyond 32-33). Once again, in the 
later work, Freud renews an emphasis on the retroactivity of the experience, where the helplessness 
of a trauma in infancy is already a repetition of the “birth trauma” (138).20 “A danger-situation is 
a recognized, remembered, expected situation of helplessness. Anxiety is the original reaction to 
helplessness in the trauma and is reproduced later on in the danger-situation as a signal for help. 
The ego, which experienced the trauma passively, now repeats it actively in a weakened version, 
in the hope of being able itself to direct its course” (166-67, my emphasis). Of particular interest 
to the present study, and what remains most consistent in these theories despite the differences in 
Freud’s formulations, is the emphasis on response in the figure of afterwardsness 
(Nachträglichkeit). For Freud, the figure of trauma as a moment of psychological impasse — that 
which cannot be mastered which must be mastered — presents the opportunity to speculate on the 
nature and function of defensive response to the perception (or anticipation or projection or 
fantasy) of danger. As a reckoning with an event or affect retroactively (nachträglich), repetition 
of the traumatic experience, both as an unassimilable quota of affect and its re-enactment in 
representational form, suggests a model of translational response. Agency is shared between the 
ostensible subject and object, and passivity — of the overwhelming event which can only be what 
it is and the self whose defenses are not sufficient enough to prevent being overwhelmed by it — 
itself acquires an agency it was not previously seen to possess. In Laplanche’s terms, there is no 
interpretation, no retro-action, without a “message” possessed of its own motive and agency 
(Essays 265).  
 
20 It is here where we find the famous line: “There is much more continuity between intra-uterine life and earliest 
infancy than the impressive caesura of the act of birth would have us believe” (138). 
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A relational and non-deterministic understanding of trauma as that which necessitates a 
response allows for an approach to the responsive mode of aesthetics (both textual and visual) that 
need not reduce the object to either symptom or ideological prop. In a rhetorical analysis of the 
cultural object, cognizant of the intentional as well as the accidental in the relational play of 
meaning and genre, attending to the tenor of defense opens up the vicissitudes of form to the mutual 
influence of the sender and receiver of the message. For example, the legislative genre of the 
congressional hearing may be seen as simultaneously instituting a discourse, enacting a (national) 
community of interest, and authorizing a structure of relation between citizen and state, all while 
it is caught up in the responsive labor of interpreting a series of events that cannot be made to fit 
the epistemological strictures of its genre.21 The dissonance between interpretation and its 
accidental effects brings us into proximity with the field of compromised relations and acts of 
coercion that constitute the fraught moment of the impasse, a moment which renews the need for 
response. The federal response to the sociopolitical demands contained in the struggle for civil 
rights22 inaugurates such a moment, one that, I argue, continues to demand and elicit response.  
 In the work of D.W. Winnicott, the psychological concepts of agency, defense, and 
organization manifest in an analytical language that privileges environment and relation. As if 
taking his cue from Freud’s final theorizing of trauma, Winnicott returns to that prototypical scene 
of care, the holding environment of mother and infant,23 in his own articulation of the experience. 
 
21 See my comments in the first chapter on the congressional disavowal of state violence with which the hearings 
begin and upon which the foundation of its response is established. 
22 A response that can be seen in both the Kerner Commission’s diagnosis of widespread institutional racism as well 
as the legislative denial of those findings and an insistence on black guilt. 
23 Winnicott’s description must surely be influenced by Freud’s term of the “infant in arms” in Inhibitions (138). 
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It is the smooth operation of this environment that ensures the development of a functioning 
psyche, and it is its failure that guarantees the disintegration of that psyche. Building on Freud’s 
increasing emphasis on the temporality of the danger-anxiety relation, Winnicott writes: 
The feeling of the mother’s existence lasts x minutes. If the mother is away more 
than x minutes, then the imago fades, and along with this the baby’s capacity to use 
the symbol of the union ceases. The baby is distressed, but this distress is soon 
mended because the mother returns in x+y minutes. In x+y minutes the baby has not 
become altered. But in x+y+z minutes the baby has become traumatized. In x+y+z 
minutes the mother’s return does not mend the baby’s altered state. Trauma implies 
that the baby has experienced a break in life’s continuity, so that primitive defences 
now become organized to defend against a repetition of ‘unthinkable anxiety’ or a 
return of the acute confusional state that belongs to disintegration of nascent ego 
structure. (Playing 131) 
For Winnicott, disintegration, or perhaps more accurately un-integration, is primary,24 and the 
labor of the caretaker (which here amounts to no more than not being away for too long) must 
reckon with the constant threat of a failed integration. In this period of “nascent ego” formation, 
the holding environment does not impart anything like knowledge; there is, in fact, no content 
being imparted whatsoever — aside from the almost monolithic presence of the maternal imago,25 
 
24 “It may be assumed that at the theoretical start the personality is unintegrated, and that in regressive disintegration 
there is a primary state to which regression leads. We postulate a primary unintegration” (Through Paediatrics 149). 
25 It is worth noting, however, that even this monolith begins in a state of unintegration, as so many affective and 
perceptual fragments: “In regard to environment, bits of nursing technique and faces seen and sounds heard and smells 
smelt are only gradually pieced together into one being to be called mother” (Through Paediatrics 150). 
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which possesses a set duration before it must be recharged, as it were, by the real thing. Prior to 
any state of knowing, of the very posture to know which must already possess the capacity for 
discerning between objects, Winnicott sketches this moment when potential is all there is, when 
what is learned is the very capacity to learn. For this to happen, the caretaker need only to ensure 
continuity, to provide the environment within which integration can take place.  
In addition to the emphasis on structure, integration, and organization, Winnicott considers 
the traumatic effect of a “break-up” of “a personal continuity of existence,” which, in his terms, 
leads to an experience of “madness” (Playing 131). Winnicott’s unique contribution to the theory 
of trauma can be found in his reflections on this lapse in self-continuity which persists even after 
the infant has recovered from the damaging effects of the mother’s absence once she returns. 
Despite the “cure” of the mother’s return, and despite the frequency of breaks in continuity caused 
by subsequent x+y+z absences, the temporal breaches may never be repaired, merely recovered 
from. At the same time, and in something of a deviation from the Freudian theory, Winnicott sees 
a possibility of structural repair following a trauma; what remains is the discrete moments of 
separation with their attendant experiences of madness. Curiously, however, it is these temporal 
lapses in continuity that provide the opportunity for the practice of what Winnicott calls 
symbolization whereby “the separation … is not a separation but a form of union,” a practice of 
object use that inaugurates a form of life “apart from illness or absence of illness” (132, 133). In 
this view, there is no pathologization of trauma per se precisely because it does not (as long as the 
absence is not indefinite) inhibit an eventual integration of ego structure. It is in these ideas of 
reparability and care, that carry so much weight in Winnicott’s theory, that I see a way of moving 
beyond the structural limitations of trauma as a descriptor of psychosocial experience or, perhaps 
more accurately, a way of mobilizing its structural logics without being snared by a de facto moral 
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prescription. Melanie Klein makes her own use of Winnicott’s “emphasis on the unintegration of 
the early ego,” and claims that the “tendency towards integration alternates with a tendency 
towards disintegration, a falling into bits” (Envy 4). She correlates this “greater or lesser 
cohesiveness of the ego at the beginning of postnatal life” with a “greater or lesser capacity of the 
ego to tolerate anxiety” — which, for her, is “constitutional” (4 n.3). What may appear to be 
ambiguous or, at least, approximate efforts to describe phenomena that inherently refuse 
quantitative certainty — i.e., greater or lesser — seem almost necessary when we consider how 
much this image of “postnatal” life refuses anything like a ground or beginning. As we see in 
Klein’s own juggling of Winnicott’s plastic description, in place of a thing — ego, unconscious, 
preconscious, subject — there is a “tendency,” already unsettled, between integration and 
disintegration. 
Although the mother-child relation is the prototype of all object relations, as well as the 
primal scene of care, the mother is not an originary imago that repeats in substitutional form in all 
other relations; to describe this as the prototypical relation merely says that all object relations 
(especially those of the transformational kind) are of a type: they are all aesthetic, facilitative, and 
aimed at an affective assurance prior to that particular species of interferences that make up the 
stuff of knowledge. In the object relations narrative of development, prototypical relation is 
atmospheric: a surround, in the etymological sense of that which overflows and surpasses, that 
which contains without, however, constraining or delimiting. This is in part why acts of 
representational identification (metaphoric insinuation) that collapse the ontogenetic and the 
contemporary carry the danger of becoming “fanatical,” according to Christopher Bollas (27). 
Identification arises from a certainty on the part of the object-seeker that what is sought will fulfill 
the promise demanded of it, whether this is coerced through acts of substitution that deny the 
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interval its capacities of differentiation or through an insistence on “total environmental 
transformation” that disallows contrary structures outside of the subsumption by the collective 
(Bollas 27). Care facilitates the internalization of an aesthetic: within the “holding environment” 
of maternal care, the “baby is protected against impingements which might lead him to replace 
being taken care of with precocious mental processes that interrupt and dissolve being by means 
of premature thought and vigilance” (34). According to this model of care, thought manifests as 
intrusion, as disruption, in a scene more exclusively affective and potential; in this environment, 
cognizance of a self apart from environment threatens the very constitution of that self: thought is 
untimely at the birth of relation. Michael Balint uses the German word arglos to describe “this 
special atmosphere of the new beginning period,” in which “an individual feels that nothing 
harmful in the environment is directed towards him and, at the same time, nothing harmful in him 
is directed towards his environment” (135). Of course, the individual who is doing the feeling here 
is the analysand who has regressed to the experience of the arglos environment, characterized as 
it is by what Balint calls a “mix-up” between self and other or between self-other (as a composite 
figure) and environment. Winnicott describes this scene as “comparable to the digestive process” 
and “comparably complex.” In this prototypical moment, the “mother holds the situation, and does 
so over and over again, and at a critical period in the baby’s life. The consequence is that something 
can be done about something” (Through Paediatrics 263). The remarkably plastic consequence 
“that something can be done about something” involves a Kleinian working through of 
ambivalence, or better a working through to ambivalence, a gradual sorting out and interrelating 
of the primary affects of love and hate through the systolic and diastolic rhythms of the holding 
environment and its uncountable iterations. As Alan Bass notes, Winnicott “does not think about 
the temporalization or spatialization of either internal or external reality. As a manifestation of 
21 
 
primary reality, the ‘limiting membrane’ is processive, is never achieved once and for all. 
Environment is everything that makes boundary formation possible” (193). For all of these 
theorists, the subject of the experience is no subject at all: for Bollas, the baby at the center of the 
scene of care is indissociable from its surround and yet incapable of the capacity for repetition and 
mise-en-scène that constitutes the proper staging of the self; for Balint, the arglos environment is 
an experience only through regression, through an almost reflexive evocation of the prenatal state 
he describes as a harmonious mix-up when “there are as yet no objects, only limitless substances 
or expanses” (67); lastly, for Winnicott, the holding environment, which he also names the 
“facilitating” environment, allows for experience without, however, precipitating an actual 
experience: the prototypical scene of care creates the space for possibility and maintains this space 
but it stops short of granting the agency or material for the conversion of that possibility into an 
actuality. 
Outside of the quasi-mythic experience of the holding environment or Balint’s pre-natal 
“harmonious mix-up,” the scene of care remains accessible solely through regression; in its strict 
psychoanalytic conception, “care” describes a set of processes and practices that are exhausted 
within a set duration (what we might grossly encompass by the term “infancy”) and which form 
the locus of a non-determining primary mode of relation. Primordially, care very much is the 
facilitation of the capacity to relate, and once this potential is realized (as potential) the work of 
care is concluded only to re-emerge in experiences of transferential regression. So Bollas writes 
“that in the transference,” the analysand re-activates in a way the primary mode of care in his 
relation to the “transformational object,” which is to say in relation to  
the analyst as the environment-mother, a pre-verbal memory that cannot be 
cognized into speech that recalls the experience, but only into speech that demands 
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its terms be met: unintrusiveness, ‘holding’, ‘provision’, insistence on a kind of 
symbiotic or telepathic knowing, and facilitation from thought to thought or from 
affect to thought. (24-25) 
Such is the lexicon of care: unintrusiveness, holding, provision, symbiosis, facilitation, affect. It is 
largely the project of this dissertation to show how this very same lexicon describes the 
sociopolitical forms of desire and anxiety that characterize the post-civil rights era. What Bollas 
names the “transformational object” is that which promises, or that which is demanded to promise, 
such a cluster of experiences. At the risk of overly schematizing the argument, it could be said that 
the transformational object is that which is sought as the impossible cure for trauma: the 
metaphorical leap back in time that is also a leap back in psychic organization that passes off all 
responsibility onto the environment which was responsible for the labor of organization in the first 
place. In the quest for the transformational object, then, the analysand shows no interest in analysis 
per se, no interest in the “content” of interpretation but a desire for “relief,” which is gained from 
the “voice,” from the analyst as presence, as surround, and from the “structuring experiences” 
facilitated by interpretative discourse prior to its registration as discourse; the transformational 
object is sought out as process, as an affective prop to knowing, without the object-seeker looking 
to go so far as knowing, and in fact frequently manifesting an outright hostility to knowing. Bollas 
writes: “Interpretations which require reflective thought or which analyse the self are often felt to 
be precocious demands on the patient’s psychic capacity, and such people may react with acute 
rage or express a sudden sense of futility and despair” (25).26 The scene of care that inheres in the 
 
26 This hostility to knowing is related to what Alan Bass describes as the problem of “concreteness and fetishism” in 
clinical experience, where knowing is used as a processive lock on the labor of interpretation and the deliberation of 
meaning. He writes: 
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promise of the transformational object is coveted explicitly for its capacity to shelter from 
knowledge, sought out in regressive formations almost as if at the behest of the pleasure principle; 
what the transformational object is expected to transform is nothing short of everything, it is 
expected to do over the facilitation of the capacity to relate, which is why Bollas describes as 
“fanatical” those who believe in the power of an actual object, always a representation, to achieve 
the expected transformation. 
 
Plan of the Work 
 In this dissertation, the methods and insights of object relations psychoanalysis are brought 
to bear on an analysis of the sociopolitical landscape of the post-civil rights era. Where a desire 
for care — or for the transformational object — shows up as, say, handling or facilitation, and the 
focus shifts from a context of trauma to one of defense, we can see how the political becomes 
overdetermined by the categories of experience to which it is traditionally opposed: necessity and 
work. Even in a discursive space that thrives on antagonism, ideals are named not merely as objects 
in need of defense but as the objects that will facilitate passage through the perceived danger — 
such as when a United States legislator calls for the defense of the nation against the “threat” 
manifested in the unrest of black Americans when it becomes embodied and vocalized in a way 
 
When the patient says, ‘I know that you’re mad at me for being late,’ the temptation is to attend to 
the content in the second half of her statement. One then would think about the possible meanings, 
especially transference meanings, of her fantasy of the analyst’s anger at her for being late. To do 
so, however, would be to ignore the negative hallucination that dominates her consciousness when 
she says ‘I know….’ Her ‘knowledge’ expresses her compelling defensive need to make sure that 
whatever fantasy she imposes upon the analyst can be taken as a reality in a way that brooks no 
alternative, no difference in apparent meaning. (37) 
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that challenges the very discourse of the nation. In every chapter of the dissertation, I find moments 
that illustrate this relational desire for the experience that experience itself has foreclosed. In the 
congressional hearings on the urban uprisings, the language of legislators and officials betrays a 
paranoid-schizoid conception of urban space in their need to maintain a psychic vision of the nation 
that continues to operate with the abject outside and at the margins. Gina Rowlands’s portrayal of 
Mabel Loghetti in A Woman Under the Influence acts out the breakdown in the midst of her labor 
as wife and mother where it is precisely this housework that is supposed to maintain the domestic 
as the site of environmental surrender — where the affective needs of the family are met without 
question. It is this same space of holding and facilitation that appears as an impossible horizon in 
the post-civil rights black neighborhood of Watts in Bless Their Little Hearts. And in 
representations and theories of policework from the 1970s, we can see an almost hyperbolic vision 
of the police as those who are called upon to provide an impossible experience of care. Rather than 
the now banal assertion that policing is about the prevention of crime, the discourse of policework 
as it took shape at this time was more focused on the affective labor of “colonial occupation” and 
the need to maintain the space of the district in predominantly aesthetic terms. In every example I 
provide, the logics of the transformative object and the search for facilitation are seen to take 
precedence over the usual narratives of desire that privilege the subject-predicate dichotomy of 
interpersonal psychology. Object relations psychoanalysis is useful for me precisely because of 
this theory of desire that is not a desire of/for an object, and not even a desire of/for a specific 
experience but the desire for a facilitation of experience. 
In the first chapter, I argue that insofar as the discourse of the state appealed to an 
homogeneous American identity as both natural and right, it undermined its justification of force 
as a non-violent response to the real violence of civil dissent. Most of the chapter centers on an 
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analysis of a series of hearings conducted by the United States Congress, beginning in 1967, which 
sought to address the “riots” that were taking place in more and more American cities at the time. 
In these hearings, we find a bureaucratic production of knowledge that is simultaneously a 
spectacle of American governance; it is notable, I argue, for the symptomatic and systematic ways 
that a discourse on state violence, confronted with an impasse forced by civil rights, describes and 
defends itself. When United States legislators appeal to the doxa of “law and order” as what 
sustains the fertile ground of American freedom — and its double, American enterprise — they 
rely on the authority of the social contract whose gendered and racial construction ensures all of 
the reality, in Hannah Arendt’s terms, goes to one group (property-owning, white men) at the 
expense of others. In this chapter, I also look to two television broadcasts on the urban uprisings 
to illustrate the visual representation of the bureaucratic and paranoiac logics of abjection that 
inform the reigning conception of the political at this time. This also serves to transition to my 
focus on a pair of feature films in the second chapter. 
In the second chapter, I argue that the response to the political problem of civil rights can 
be seen to manifest in a crisis of the domestic that was represented and worked through in films at 
the margins of the Hollywood mode of production. I analyze two works of cinematic realism with 
a focus on how they import tropes from melodrama which serve as sites of breakdown, preventing 
the films from serving as traditional objects of moral cathexis. As I indicated in the methodological 
introduction above, I want to move away from the psychoanalytic concept of trauama as the 
primary category of description for analyses of collective suffering. My focus on the domestic 
drama of A Woman Under the Influence and Bless Their Little Hearts allows me, instead, to shift 
the focus onto the concepts of defense and care. In the first chapter, the political anxieties of 
congressional legislators were seen to manifest a defensive mode of response to the problem of 
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civil rights that could somehow be rectified by imagining the structural necessity of abjection 
(segregation) to constitute a space and experience of care. In the second chapter, however, we find 
a sociopolitical landscape that is bereft of such an experience — and where the concept of labor 
might traditionally promise a way out or way towards a mode of facilitation, instead, it emerges in 
league with the forces of frustration and exhaustion that otherwise saturate the space of the 
domestic at this time. 
In the third and final chapter, I turn to representations of policework and crime as they are 
imagined in legislative discourse, in genre studies of police fiction, in sociological and 
anthropological theories of policing, and in two films: a documentary about the South Bronx police 
force and a feature film about career crime in Boston. Although the police were seen as a force in 
opposition to the unsanctioned manifestations of civil rights at the end of the 1960s, opening the 
way to calls for and justifications of the militarization of police, the discourse on quotidian 
policework in the post-civil rights era was mostly concerned with problems of community relations 
and the logistics of policing borders and boundaries. In my analysis of how policework is 
represented at this time, I show how the aesthetics of policing leads to a policing of aesthetics: 
order maintenance and the immunization of social space. Several narratives emerge from different 
spectatorial positions that ascribe a similar function to policework — whether it is the object of an 
aesthetic representation in a work of fiction or of an institutional reflection from within.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Domestic Crisis — The Making of a Post-Civil Rights Era 
 
Chapter Introduction 
This dissertation began in an effort to locate and theorize the origins of the 2007 global 
financial crisis, to discover how and why the “home,” in particular, became the overdetermined 
object at the center of that crisis, and how its de-materialization — and simultaneous financial 
obfuscation — fueled the speculative boom that brought about the crash.27 It was clear early on 
that the so-called “subprime” home loan, a derivative of the even more ubiquitous “mortgage-
 
27 With the financial crisis in mind, Philip Goodchild suggests a different antagonism that animates and undermines 
contemporary capitalism: “In the contemporary global economy where 95% of finance capital is invested in currency 
speculation, bond speculation, and financial packages, the traditional exploitation of labour by capital is significant 
but not central” (133). Instead, he posits “a more fundamental class difference,” which he identifies as that between 
“householder” and “speculator,” a relationship defined by the asymmetry (and inequality) of desires: for subsistence 
and profit, respectively. As the sub-prime crisis made clear, a stock-market crash does not “weaken the position of 
capital with respect to labour, but the contrary.  
The ultimate result of the imbalance between the speculator and the householder is a progressive 
shift of wealth towards finance capital, as we have seen in recent years, and a consequent increase 
in relative power in exchange. This progressive shift of power may continue beyond the level at 
which all subsistence needs for all householders are fulfilled, for finance capital has no interest in 
the fulfillment of need if more effective profits can be made elsewhere. (135) 
Although Goodchild argues here that finance capital may well abandon subsistence needs for more profitable sectors, 
his analysis raises a question about the relationship between speculation and subsistence. Could this be the endgame 
for finance capital: the utter instrumentalization of subsistence for profit? 
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backed security,” was almost single-handedly responsible for “Wall Street investment banks and 
brokerages haemorrhag[ing] $175 billion of capital in the period July 2007 to March 2008” 
(Blackburn 63). It should not be contentious to claim a profound, even structural, relationship 
between civil rights, housing, and American capitalism, even if the political optimism of the 
1960s28 put into place the very mechanisms that enabled finance capital’s spectacular hemorrhage 
and rationalized its subsequent bailout. As Christopher Bonastia notes, in 1968, “Civil rights 
agencies in education and employment were discovering ways of using governmental powers to 
chip away at the racial caste system” (93). Those same agencies, backed by courts that were 
“largely enthusiastic” of the reforms, worked to influence two of the era’s most defining pieces of 
legislation: the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 — 
both significant revisions of their earlier counterparts. In many ways, the revised laws — which 
sought to defend against housing discrimination, increase the production of homes, and, most 
significantly, make home-ownership a more viable (read, affordable) option for more people — 
were seen as a step forward in the federal government’s effort to desegregate the nation. 
“Nevertheless, housing did present difficulties that did not exist or were not as severe in other 
areas,” such as education and employment (95).29 
 
28 “Despite the obstacles that HUD faced, there was ample reason for optimism early in the Nixon Administration. At 
several junctures between 1969 and 1972, HUD appeared to be building the momentum to help forge elementary 
changes in segregated residential patterns” (Bonastia 96). 
29 Unsurprisingly, as many statistics show, the impact of the 2007 economic crisis was felt most severely by the 
historically exploited and oppressed. The Center for Responsible Lending reported, for example, that for every 10,000 
loans issued between 2005 and 2008, the number of foreclosures in 2007-2009 was 790 for African Americans, 769 
for Latinos, and 452 for non-Hispanic whites (Bocian, Li and Ernst 2). 
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The links between the contemporary “economic crisis” and the years following the Civil 
Rights Movement — its own kind of “political” crisis — were enough to warrant a comparative 
study. What most interested me, however, was a seeming indissociability of the political and the 
economic in the form of the so-called crisis moment; and, moreover, that the “optimistic” 
legislative revisions at the end of the 1960s were caught up in this very determination of these two 
categories, one by the other. What constituted the most progressive moment in legislating civil 
rights, in a decades-long effort to make equality law, were economic solutions to the problem (as 
it was perceived) of political inequality: the mortgage-backed security and the extension of 
insurance to multi-family housing developers. This lends irony to Bonastia’s observation that 
education and employment, as sites and objects of civil rights reform, were more bureaucratically 
manageable than housing. In fact, the “housing problem” was the easiest of all to solve, as long as 
we take the cynical view that what counted as a solution was a more equitable distribution of the 
national burden of debt and a more definitive exposure of the nation’s racial minorities to 
exploitation by finance capital. Within only a few years of the 1968 revisions to the HUD Act, the 
“well-intentioned changes created an environment that invited corruption” (Bonastia 132). Teams 
of realtors working together with Federal Housing Authority (FHA) appraisers would get families 
to sell their homes cheaply (often by “warning white residents in a declining neighborhood of 
impending racial transition”), secure an FHA guarantee on the mortgage, get an inflated appraisal 
submitted, make only cosmetic improvements, then re-sell the property (132). “Eventually, the 
mortgage would go into serious default, the private lender would foreclose on the property, and 
HUD would be required to pay the lender and take possession of a property with no willing buyers” 
(133). 
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My project ended up involving three fundamental assumptions which have required 
varying degrees of evidence and analysis to support. First, the demonstrations and uprisings of the 
Civil Rights Movement — especially those of the second-half of the 1960s — were as much about 
a contestation of American political ontology as they were about specific issues or instances of 
inequality.30 In other words, as if in response to Sen. John L. McClellan’s claim, in 1967, that the 
“riots cannot be justified,” those who took part in the uprisings were not only calling attention to 
the psycho-social and material effects of discrimination in housing, education, and employment 
but also to the very logic that allows for such a claim to be made in the first place — contesting, 
namely, that there are genres of response to injustice that cannot count as (legitimate or justifiable) 
response (United States, “Riots” 6).31 If we refuse this logic, however, and we see the urban 
 
30 Such a contestation of democratic political ontology is not, of course, confined to this specific historical moment. 
See, for example, Jacques Rancière’s examples from revolutionary France, cited below. 
31 As an example, we can look at the claims made by Houston Mayor Louie Welch on the “problems” that subtend the 
possibility of urban rioting. (And it is worth noting that this very syntagm, “urban rioting,” was used to signify the 
“unjustifiable” manifestation of black unrest so condemned by Sen. McClellan.) 
Helping to meet the needs of nearly 300,000 Negro citizens is a problem that consumes 
approximately 40 percent of my time as mayor of Houston. If this sounds as though it is a 
disproportionate amount of time to spend on the problems of a minority group in a city with a 
population of 1,250,000 then the reason is that the problems are tougher and defy neat solutions. 
        The problems are all those inherent in rapid urbanization, in an increase in Negro populations 
of 65 percent from 1950 to 1960, in 196,603 Negroes with family incomes of less than $4,000 a 
year, in nearly 50,000 housing units that are substandard and occupied largely by Negroes, in an 
unemployment rate that is about three times higher among Negroes than white people. These should 
be enough to suggest that Houston is like any other large city in terms of having the explosive 
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potential for trouble if housing, jobs, schools, and a large Negro population are underlying factors 
in riots (United States, “Riots” 24). 
It is unclear how Welch has arrived at such a specific “percentage” of time that “Negro” problems require of him but 
the number is itself telling. Clearly we are meant to feel the imbalance that 24 percent of the population requires 40 
percent of mayoral time, as if democratic governance should have a strict 1:1 ratio of percentage-of-the-populace to 
unit-of-governing-time. The reasons why this minority group — of 300,000 people — have caused this imbalance in 
governing, according to Welch, is the relative difficulty of the problems: harder problems require more work and more 
work means more time. There is a danger, however, that this common sense logic will obscure the irrational and 
violent foundation of the claims that are being made here — although, it might equally be said that the very rhetoric 
of politics as problem and governance as solution is itself a way of averting a kind of danger. We only have to say 
whose danger we are talking about, and what it threatens — I attempt to do this below, in the third part of this chapter. 
From the first line quoted above, we are almost compelled to ask: Why are the needs of citizens a problem? There are, 
of course, many ways to approach this question. Welch even provides a reasonable response when he ascribes the 
problem to “rapid urbanization” and a precipitate increase in the city’s black population. In this pragmatic view, need 
is a problem because of logistical constraints: the city simply was not equipped with the people and resources 
necessary for their adequate housing, employment, and education. If this is how we conceive the contested political, 
social, and economic landscape of the civil rights era, we must, like Welch, take “black Americans” as themselves 
constitutive of the “problem” — “an underlying factor in riots.” In other words, there would not be a problem if this 
particular group of people had not showed up in such numbers in a city that was unprepared for them. There is a 
consistent logic that informs McClellan’s claim that the “riots cannot be justified” and Welch’s claim that the black 
population of Houston is both a cause and the object of the “problem” faced by the city, a problem that itself threatens 
in its “explosive potential” to become a riot. In this view, “black America” was both something to be feared and 
something to be managed — and this latter precisely because it was feared — precisely because it could not possess 
a subjective legitimacy of its own (see, for example, Frantz Fanon on “negrophobia” in Black Skin, White Masks, 
154ff.). At the same time, those whose dissent could not be justified were also disadvantaged if not outright excluded 
from ascending even the lowest rungs of the American political hierarchy, already kept out by prejudicial mechanisms 
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uprisings/riots as not merely justifiable but adequate to the exclusionary politics that informed 
civil rights reform — even at its most progressive — we are led to my second assumption: the 
American government could not provide a political solution to the problem of civil rights.32 The 
urban uprisings should count as ample evidence of this failure (i.e., in demonstrating the very need 
for revision at the same time as they dramatized the nation’s readiness to intervene, militarily, 
when the struggle for black rights literally took to the streets): the landmark civil rights legislation 
had already been passed by this time, and the subsequent revisions to that legislation merely sought 
different means for previously stated ends.33 What was most interesting about these differences 
was their anti-political logic. The only way the legislature found to address the challenge posed 
by the radical demands of civil rights discourse was to redress inequality through economic 
intervention: the market solution. The narrative that justified the specific revisions to housing 
legislation, for example, went like this: if it was more difficult for black Americans to achieve the 
American Dream of owning a home, this was because it was harder to acquire the mortgage loan 
needed to purchase the home because of the prevailing income disparities; therefore, the solution 
 
of “representation” and a juridico-bureaucratic regime of political mediation to which most Americans were still 
denied access. 
32 I say “could not” instead of “did not” to emphasize that the legislature was bound by its own constraints on what 
counts as freedom and by the intransigence of its laws which were built not to encourage but to stifle change. As James 
Baldwin puts it: “All governments, without exception, make only those concessions deemed absolutely necessary for 
the maintenance of the status quo; and if one really wishes to know how this Republic esteems Black freedom, one 
has only to watch the American performance in the world” (27). 
33 Bonastia’s work (op. cit.) illustrates how any effort at progressive legislative change had to take place at the 
bureaucratic level of governance. Any attempt at direct democratic action could not in-itself yield change in a 
sociopolitical landscape wholly mediated by institutional organizations of power and redistribution. 
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was to make banks more willing to lend to those who were more likely to default on those loans, 
and the way to do this was through the mortgage-backed security (for single-family housing) and 
an extension of publicly-backed risk insurance (for multi-family housing developers). This first 
chapter undertakes to prove these first two assumptions through an analysis of primary source 
documents related to the urban uprisings of 1967 and 1968, along with an analysis of television 
broadcasts of the riots, which are seen to illustrate the antagonisms and anxieties about this political 
impasse as they are mediated by visual representation. My analysis of these news reports at the 
end of this first chapter serves as the transition to the third primary assumption of this dissertation, 
and the one that occupies my attention in the second and third chapters. The third primary 
assumption that informs the analytical foundation of this project maintains that the aesthetic 
experience of cultural objects both facilitates and frustrates the modes of psychic defense that 
emerge in response to the contested political anxieties in this post-civil rights era. This is the 
primary reason I make use of object relations methodologies in my analysis of film, television, and 
literature — and why genre theory and social theory are read in tandem as making space for the 
working through of similar anxieties.  
 
Contesting the Political 
 In order to understand what I mean when I say that the urban uprisings (as the bodily 
manifestation of radical civil rights) were a contestation of American political ontology, it is 
important to understand the difference between how we theorize and describe “the political” and 
how it is experienced and imagined. My point, however, is not to indict such a difference as 
difference nor to measure the actual against the ideal. What most interests me, rather, is the way 
that theories of “the political” — often posited as a sphere or mode of collective existence distinct 
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from, say, the social and the domestic — move, sometimes inexplicably, between genres of 
description; in other words, it is not always clear whether the phenomenon being described is a 
category, an ideal, an act, or a way of being. Jacques Rancière is especially useful to such a 
discussion for his insistence that politics is “an activity” and not “a specific realm” restricted to 
those “beings whose own business and destination it is to engage in politics” (Dissensus 206).34 
As we will see, however, even in the classical conception, which marks out the political as just 
such an exclusive realm, theories of politics remain theories of action. The difference between 
Rancière’s materialist articulation of politics and democracy and the classical theories, which he 
sees exemplified in the work of Edmund Burke and Hannah Arendt, may seem, as he claims, to 
pivot on this distinction between space and action as the category by which we are to deploy the 
 
34 It is worth reproducing the full quote here, as Rancière is explicit in his opposition to Hannah Arendt, whose 
conception of the political bears much in common with the actual practice of politics of the American government 
during the civil rights struggles: 
I take as my explicit target Arendt’s notion of ‘political life,’ that is, her opposition between politics 
and the social. I object that it is precisely an anti-political logic, the logic of the police, that marks 
off a specific realm reserved for political acts in this way — which is ultimately to say for beings 
whose own business and destination it is to engage in politics. As I understand it, politics is, on the 
contrary, an activity that retraces the line, that introduces cases of universality and capacities for the 
formulation of the common, into a universe that was considered private, domestic or social. The 
police/politics opposition, then, puts into question every principle that marks out positive spheres 
and ways of being. (Dissensus 206-207) 
When Rancière says that politics “retraces the line,” he understands, in my view, that politics, as well as what he calls 
police, is a perpetual boundary formation, contestation, and negotiation. Cf. Étienne Balibar on borders and boundary 
formation below. 
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concept. What we find, however, is that theories of politics are always at least implicitly interested 
in activity, and, further, that the points of difference — between the classical/liberal and the 
postmodern/Marxist theories — hinge instead on who gets to possess the potential for such 
properly political activity but also on the temporality specific to political engagement, according 
to which the agent of political activity might be seen now as a defender, now as a challenger to 
what has already been established as the right to act. In Rancière’s view, the contestation of what 
I am calling political ontology by the forces of civil rights is the very definition of “politics,” and 
should be seen in contrast with the actions of the state which are, in his terminology, determinations 
of the police. What he calls politics, then, is something that has been immanent, in differing 
degrees, to democratic theory and action throughout its history; what changes is the particular 
identities that disrupt the prevailing understanding of the universal and often force it to be re-
imagined.35 As Rancière notes, at the time of the French revolution,  
[w]omen were denied the rights of citizens on account of the so-called republican 
principle which states that citizenship is the sphere of universality, while women’s 
activities belong to the particularity of domestic life. Women were deemed to 
occupy the sphere of the particular and, as a result, could not be included in that of 
the universal. Lacking a will of their own, they could not be political subjects.36 
(56-57) 
 
35 This re-imagining, as Rancière and Étienne Balbar both show, is both a conceptual and a material re-tracing of new 
boundaries. 
36 This critique of classical (liberal) democracy proceeds by exposing such binary oppositions as that between the 
willful (active) and the will-less (passive) subject — which then extends to, say, the space of citizenship and the space 
of domesticity, where the former is only accessible by those active subjects and so not those whose lives are determined 
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Women such as Olympe de Gouges, however, “blurred the boundaries” between these supposedly 
separate spheres of citizenship/universality and domesticity/particularity (57). In arguing that 
“since women were qualified to mount the scaffold, they were also qualified to mount the platform 
of the Assembly,” de Gouges challenged that categorical divisions that kept women out of the 
 
by (i.e., in thrall to) the latter. Affirmative categories that are foundational to democracy’s political ontology — or, at 
least, the way that ontology has been inscribed and narrated throughout the Western scientific canon — are shown to 
be in a determinant relationship with their supposedly negative counterparts/opposites. A category such as “active” 
thus serves as a logical a priori by which certain exclusionary regimes of power justify — to themselves and to those 
whose exclusion makes the regime possible — their schemas of oppression. As we will see in the second chapter, 
Silvia Federici’s feminist critique of “housework” takes issue with the ways that even Marxist theories of social 
organization continue to rely on such obfuscations, thus maintaining “domesticity” as a space apart from proper 
political action and thought. Denise Ferreira da Silva has perhaps gone furthest in pursuing this critique via the 
category of “race,” making use of the opposition she establishes between the “transparent ‘I’” (“Man, the subject, the 
ontological figure consolidated in post-Enlightenment thought”) and the “affectable ‘I’” (“The scientific construction 
of non-European minds”) (xv). See Toward a Global Idea of Race, where Da Silva locates the primary antagonism in 
Reason’s transition from Cartesian cogito to Kantian “I” — when the transparent subject was brought into vertiginous 
contact with its own affectability: 
My excavation of the founding statements of modern thought identifies philosophical formulations 
that reproduce Descartes’s outline of self-consciousness as the only existing being to enjoy self-
determination — the ability to alone decide on its essence or existence — which requires the bold 
articulation and disavowal of the ontoepistemological relevance of extended things, that is, bodies. 
I then identify how this formulation of self-determination is threatened when two framers of modern 
science deploy a version of reason, universal nomos, the constraining ruler of the ‘world of things,’ 
that opens up the possibility of rewriting man as subjected to outer determination, namely, as an 
affectable thing. (xxxviii) 
Da Silva’s theory of race is integral to my critique in this dissertation. 
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political sphere proper (57). In this example, “politics” arises out of a discursive challenge to what 
might be called a misuse of reason, where we understand this faculty as a producer of universal 
values: the argument mounted by de Gouges indicts such production for its analogical 
inconsistency. We know, however, that politics is not merely discursive for Rancière. It is also 
aesthetic, and in being so, ontological: “Consensus means precisely that the sensory is given as 
univocal. Political and artistic fictions introduce dissensus by hollowing out the ‘real’ and 
multiplying it in a polemical way” (149). It is through a contestation of the “real” — itself a 
construction based on consensus (which is never without its own originary violences) — that 
certain activities (discursive and aesthetic) may be recognized as political; thus, political activity 
is inherently subversive. In these terms, the “riot” may be seen as the preeminently political act, 
especially in its visual representation on television, where the bodies-in-dissent are literally seen 
to be contesting the supposedly consensual space of the city.37 
American governance in the first half of the twentieth century operated according to a 
notion of the political consistent with the classical view that Rancière seeks to upend by shifting 
the conceptual focus from politics-as-realm to politics-as-action. It is analogous to Hannah 
Arendt’s spatial theory of the political sphere as a space apart, walled-in, exclusive, and wholly 
distinct from the private, which is ruled by necessity.38 When Arendt writes that “the political 
 
37 I will return to this idea, in particular, in the last section of this chapter, when I analyze two television broadcasts of 
the riots in Los Angeles and Detroit. 
38 I am interested in how the concept of necessity shows up in political theory and why it is so frequently and 
exclusively attributed to domestic life if not outright named as its defining quality.  In what ways are body and mind 
reified here? We speak of bodily necessities — but in this view, the body cannot escape necessity which is how we 
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realm rises directly out of acting together,” she, too, makes use of a notion of politics as 
activity/action, with a significant difference: here, the action is foundational, grounding rather than 
subversive. Thus, while “the wall of the polis and the boundaries of law” circumscribe “public 
space,” they also close it off (198).  In such a conception of the political, segregation may be seen 
to conform with the very dictates of political formation: as Arendt notes, this properly political 
space “does not always exist, and although all men are capable of deed and word, most of them do 
not live in it” (199). However, being deprived of this political existence means no less, for Arendt, 
than being “deprived of reality” (199). One of the functions of segregation, then, where the 
distinction between peoples constitutes a condition of possibility for the political, is to grant to an 
exclusive group (of property-owning white men, say) if not the right then at least the power to 
determine the boundaries of that reality which are coterminous, as Arendt explains, with the 
boundaries of law. When the American legislature faced the compulsion to put a legal end to 
segregation as both institution and practice, it was forced into a contradiction with its own motives, 
its own principles of exclusion from which its powers over reality were derived. In Arendt’s terms, 
the political itself is at stake where its reconstitution by a different acting together threatens to 
remake its boundaries39 — hence the defensive response of legislators whose discourse of law and 
order sought to undermine alternative claims to the political while also insisting that those claims 
 
are to understand its functions apart from the contingencies of reason that shape public/political life. Politics can also 
be seen here as an escape. Curiously, if not ironically, it is a necessary escape. 
39 For Rancière, however, it is precisely this contestation of boundaries that defines politics. “Political dispute is that 
which brings politics into being by separating it from the police, which causes it to disappear continually either by 
purely and simply denying it or by claiming political logic as its own. Politics, before all else, is an intervention in the 
visible and the sayable” (36-37, my emphasis). 
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had already been fulfilled. When the ostensible gains of civil rights legislation failed to remedy 
the injustices of racial segregation, however, the urban uprisings exposed the structural violence 
(of law and order) that maintained those boundaries. In contesting the space of the city, then, the 
uprisings contested the exclusive political “reality” of the nation; and the conflicts over property, 
circulation, and access made evident that urban space itself was shaped by that socioeconomic 
antagonism.40  
In response to the threat posed by the urban uprisings, the discourse that took shape in the 
legislative hearings asserted its exclusive right to draw and maintain the limits of the political, in 
effect closing off any justifiable challenge to the state’s monopoly on violence in the name of law. 
Because “the riots cannot be justified” and because any action outside of its determination by law 
forfeits its place within the law’s space of consent, any “philosophy” of the apolitical other, any 
praxis of knowing that stakes a claim to the territory of the political, necessarily falls outside the 
purview of knowing (United States, “Riots” 6, 2).41 However, the very insistence on this 
 
40 As James Baldwin described it, the very act of a black American going to that part of the city (“downtown”) which, 
prior to the legislative end to segregation was off limits, was both an act of contestation and a visible demonstration 
of the racial component of economic disparity. “For those who could — narrowly — afford it, going downtown was 
not so much a mark of status as a kind of vengeful, triumphant obligation” (24). I will return to this text in more detail 
in Chapter Three. 
41 As da Silva has shown, the very claim to self-determination made by the knowing (rational) subject has been its 
own object in need of defense in order to maintain the necessarily-segregating power of knowledge promised to the 
active subject: destined to be the subject of history. 
From the very beginning, then, the prerogative of the mind as a knowing thing would rest on a 
postulated intimacy with the logos (reason and word), but it was rather late in its trajectory … that 
self-determination would be added as the rational thing’s exclusive (moral) attribute. Precisely the 
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infrangible space apart of political reality was forced to come to terms with the violence of a public 
that visibly and overtly challenged the phenomenological boundaries of lived space — hence 
challenging the state’s right to say what can and cannot count as political (i.e., justifiable). Rancière 
might say that civil rights was the social response become-political — or the very eruption of 
politics — in opposition to the police: “The essence of the police lies neither in repression nor even 
in control over the living. Its essence lies in a certain way of dividing up the sensible” (36). In 
discourse and in action, civil rights both instantiated a new paradigm of politics as action — in its 
attempt, as Rancière would say, to effect a new distribution of the sensible — at the same time as 
it contested the Arendtian closure of an exclusively political space where the “complaints” of black 
Americans could not be counted42 because they did not conform to the legal and discursive dictates 
of that space. In response, American legislative discourse denied the legitimacy of this new 
paradigm while it simultaneously effected a closure of the political in its appeal to the absolute 
ideals of law and order whose defense became the sole imperative of the investigative hearings on 
the uprisings that I analyze below. Only that which sought to pursue law and order, then, warranted 
the right to violence and the right to determine the boundaries of the political. Étienne Balibar 
claims that “to mark out a border is, precisely, to define a territory, to delimit it, and so to register 
the identity of that territory, or confer one upon it. Conversely, however, to define or identify in 
general is nothing other than to trace a border, to assign boundaries or borders” (76). In these terms, 
 
need to secure this exclusive attribute, I argue, has occupied modern philosophers since the 
refashioning of reason as the secular ruler and producer of the universe, as an exterior (constraining 
or regulative) force, threatened to transform the mind into such an other thing of the world. (40) 
42 For Rancière, such “complaints” are emphatically democratic: “The one who belongs to the demos, who speaks 
when he is not to speak, is the one who partakes in what he has no part in” (32). 
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the legislative discourse that took shape in response to the urban uprisings — affirming for itself 
the exclusive rights granted to the defender of law and order — adopted a logic of self-
identification whereby the boundaries of the political and the boundaries of the justifiable were 
made coextensive. Although the governing class maintained the pretense of territorial sovereignty 
over the ideal space of the political, and the material space of public life, instead of invoking an 
imperial right to expand the borders, to redraw the boundaries of the city or the barriers between 
races, state power walled itself in, effecting an apparent separation between the desires of the 
nation and the desires of capital.43 Our interest in the American city, these legislators appeared to 
say, is an interest in the prosperity and well-being of its people. Their actions made clear, however, 
that this ostensible interest in the security of urban life was inseparable from maintaining the 
municipal borders and barriers between races and classes which guaranteed the commercial and 
 
43 There is more to be said about the particular form of imperial identity whose practices of self-identification through 
the tracing of boundaries — geographical as well as psychosocial — pursues a logic of exclusion at the same time as 
it reserves the right to redraw such borders for the purposes of accumulation, say. If, as Balibar claims, the very 
practice of defining is one of tracing borders, there is, nevertheless, an imperial supplement that operates above and 
beyond that more fundamental practice, extending those limits without being bound to the constraints of a continuity 
(of lines or logics). As Melinda Cooper shows, however, where the interests of the state are coextensive with the 
interest of capital, there is a concerted effort made to maintain limits and boundaries, both those that restrict the 
“realization of wealth” and those that ensure social stratification. She writes: “In its efforts to overcome all quantitative 
barriers to the generation of wealth, Marx observed, capital transgresses all established forms of reproduction — that 
is, all customary or religious strictures on the organization of gender, all status-like constraints on social mobility and 
all national restrictions on the circulation of money. But is it not also compelled to reassert the reproductive institutions 
of race, family, and nation as a way of ensuring the unequal distribution of wealth and income across time?” (16). 
42 
 
speculative interest of the capitalist state.44 In its devotion to the defense of the ideals of law and 
order, the federal legislature affirmed its right to military intervention wherever the “unjustified” 
actions of black Americans threatened its exclusive right to the space of the city at the same time 
as it gave to the real estate developers and financial speculators the power to reorganize that space 
through directly economic means.45 As this chapter argues, the urban uprisings not only exposed 
the ideological foundations of this ostensible logic of defense and security but, in the very 
contestation over the space of the city, challenged the racialized conceptions of property, 
circulation, and access. 
Despite the political gains of the civil rights era, institutional segregation remained largely 
intact at the end of the 1960s. Efforts to focus the national discussion on the growing disparities 
of wealth and opportunity — the problem of what the Kerner Report described as “two societies, 
one black, one white — separate and unequal” — triggered a more entrenched paranoiac response 
 
44 We might turn again to Baldwin here for his insight into the connection between ghetto construction and the interests 
of the capitalist state. Writing in the 1980s but looking back to the early years of the post-civil rights era, he notes: “It 
is terribly boring to have to say it — again — but it is the White flight and not the Black arrival that alters, or 
demolishes, property values. This arrival and departure is pure heaven for financiers and speculators: a ghetto is a 
great source of great profit” (35). 
45 For more on this, see my comments (earlier in this chapter) on the revisions made to federal housing and civil rights 
legislation — amended and authorized by many of the same legislators who were a part of these hearings on the riots 
— which opened up both the residential home mortgage and collective housing to less risky forms of speculation and 
investment. In particular, the creation of the residential mortgage-backed security and the extension of the Federal 
Housing Authority’s insurance guarantees — both introduced in the revision to the Housing and Urban Development 
Act of 1968 — enabled “capital” to maintain racial segregation while the “state” could be seen to act in the name of 
freedom and equality and, thus, hold onto its image as the defender of civic life. 
43 
 
from those who literally wrote the agenda (National Advisory Commission 1). When federal 
legislators took up an investigation into “the grave national crisis created by urban rioting,” they 
implied that the threats to life and property were new or at least had become dangerous to the 
extent that they could no longer be ignored (United States, “Riots” 1). Much of the state discourse 
on the riots invoked notions of individual security, especially in its appeal to those urban denizens 
whose fear could be mobilized to support the inevitable calls for militarization and mass 
incarceration. More often than not, however, the anxiety of response was aimed at the threats to 
property. In the legislative documents on the subject, as well as the journalistic coverage of the 
riots, there is a consistent focus on the cost of property damage and the disruptions to commerce; 
on looting, price gouging, and hoarding; and on the logistical issues of moving goods in and out 
of the city once the routes of circulation have been closed or the city itself quarantined. Claims 
that the riots were the crisis ignore, however, that for most black Americans at the time, even where 
there was a pretense of racial integration, urban life was a constant state of crisis,46 and the 
uprisings were a way of making this manifest. If we understand the riots as an economic argument 
motivated by racial segregation and impoverishment, we must recognize that any claim that the 
urban uprisings constituted a “national crisis” conceives the nation in terms that are exclusively 
racial (white) and economic (property-owning). In this context, then, the very use of “crisis” must 
 
46 Of course, the very claim to a constant state of crisis could be seen to dilute the concept of crisis which ought to 
signify an acute event, a violent disruption of the normal state of affairs. And perhaps this is the point: that the 
segregation and impoverishment of black Americans was the normal state of affairs, that the structural violence of a  
suffocating social order defined daily existence for so many. When federal legislators thus spoke of the “crisis” of the 
riots, they were not wrong; it was, rather, a matter of failing to recognize — or merely disavowing — that what was 
in crisis was not the functioning of a just social order but an oppressive regime of social stratification empowered by 
racial antagonism. 
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be seen as a defensive response which exposes the desire to preserve a socioeconomic structure 
which secures the psychic and material advantages of a governing class and its beneficiaries 
through the impoverishment and exploitation of a segregated populace. In other words, the “crisis” 
of the riots cannot be abstracted from its context, cannot be analyzed without consideration of the 
ongoing resistance to racial integration and how that resistance is integral to the contest over public 
space in the American city. 
A federal discourse on the riots emerged at this time in legislative hearings and bureaucratic 
state documents which attempted to characterize the riots as a violent threat to law and order and, 
in this, to propagate an image of the nation as an object in need of defense. However, the very 
terms by which this discourse constructed its objects — law, violence, crisis, and, especially, the 
public — reveal the ideological desires of a governing class anxious over its loss of control of 
political space, where this latter is understood as the exclusive territory of determinative 
governance. While the dissertation as a whole plans to pursue these conflicts where they manifest 
in the cultural mediations of the social/public and the domestic/private, this chapter remains 
focused on the politics of urban space: in the imagined borders of neighborhoods and municipal 
jurisdictions, in the public street as a route of circulation and as a liminal site of patrol and 
resistance, and in the representation of the city as a topographic or a demographic distribution of 
bodies. I argue that, in this post-civil rights era,47 the contestation over public space exemplified 
by the urban uprisings was determined by racial antagonisms which, in turn, were part of the 
broader socioeconomic injustices that shape our understanding of what has historically counted as 
 
47 I am using this periodization of “post-civil rights” to indicate the years immediately following the landmark acts of 
legislation through and into the early years of what has since been described as the early years of American 
neoliberalism — roughly 1967-1984. 
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political life (or simply: living) in a nation that owed its very existence on structures of segregation 
and exclusion. If, as Rancière argues, politics is “an intervention in the visible and the sayable,” 
the demonstrations and uprisings at the end of the 1960s constituted just such an intervention in 
the way they occupied urban space. In order to prove this claim, I will analyze the discourse on 
race and violence that emerges in a series of legislative hearings on the riots conducted by the 
United States Senate. I am especially interested in this discourse where it worries over the “crisis” 
of the nation and the “threats” to domestic well-being attributed to the riots but rather transparently 
effected by the very prospect of desegregation itself.48 In the next section, “Contesting Crisis,” I 
analyze several moments from those legislative hearings in order to establish the three primary 
functions of the defensive discourse that fought to justify the effects of a segregated nation at the 
same time as it was challenged to put an end to such divisions. First, legislators claimed on behalf 
of the state the exclusive right to determine political discourse in an effort to immunize the space 
of the political from the contagion of the abject other, here figured most prominently by the 
resident of the black ghetto. Second, legislators routinely disavowed state violence which also 
served to delegitimize any oppositional form of violence — in other words, only the latter actually 
counted as violence. Third, nearly all of the officials called to testify at the legislative hearings 
perform the same systematic abjection of the black ghetto via a paranoiac constitution of urban 
space. With the space of the political in quarantine, the anxieties loosed by the perceived threats 
 
48 Following James Baldwin, I choose the term “desegregation” rather than “integration” here to emphasize the issues 
of rights and access and to distinguish between . He writes of the civil rights struggle that “the Black demand was not 
for integration. Integration, as we could all testify, simply by looking at the colors of our skins, had, long ago, been 
accomplished…. The Black demand was for desegregation, which is a legal, public, social matter: a demand that one 
be treated as a human being and not like a mule, or a dog” (22). 
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of civil rights show up in an aesthetics of law and order, one characterized by curation, 
management, objectivity, and a neutralization of affect. Of course, these ideal aesthetic forms 
become, in turn, distorted by the influence of such anxieties which are not so easily contained and 
dispelled. 
 
The Problem of Civil Rights 
On November 1, 1967, the United States Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
commenced a series of hearings “on one of the most disturbing internal problems which has faced 
our country in recent years ….: the grave national crisis created by urban rioting” (United States, 
Riots 1). The purpose of these hearings, which would span more than two years and nearly 6,000 
pages of “evidence” and “testimony,” was to discern the “immediate and long-range prevention” 
of “civil disorder” and achieve “the preservation of law and order and domestic tranquility within 
the United States” (1). The hearings began with a focus on specific incidents of rioting in the cities 
of Houston, Nashville, Newark, Chicago, and Detroit, shifting to a more abstract investigation of 
“militancy, extremism, and violence,” followed by a more sustained engagement with “campus 
disorders,” and concluding in August, 1970, on the subject of “bombing and terrorism.”49 The first 
fifteen parts of the hearings — beginning with the shootout between Houston police and students 
 
49 This trajectory of the hearings warrants its own consideration, and it says much about how the state views any act 
that could be seen to undermine the rule of law as an “extreme” threat to its existence. If the actions of the governing 
class are to be taken as an indication of the political ontology that informs democratic practice in the United States, it 
is obvious that a rigidly-maintained consensus — a consensus which is itself anti-democratic, in Rancière’s terms — 
demands that any challenge to the order so conceived constitutes a threat that must be eliminated. That there can only 
be order is not merely ironic, it is an institutional given. 
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of Texas Southern University in November, 1967, and concluding with a brief return to Nashville 
in March, 1969 — include nearly 3,000 pages of evidence and testimony from investigators, 
administrators, police, community relations liaisons, and politicians. At the same time as these 
hearings were being held, Congress passed both the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (in April) and the 
revised Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 (in August), both of which sought to 
increase the opportunity of all to “fair and equal” housing. In February of the same year, the 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (also known as the Kerner Commission, so 
named for its chair, Illinois Governor Otto Kerner Jr.) issued its Report, which famously 
proclaimed: “Our Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white — separate and 
unequal” (1). Commissioned by President Lyndon Baines Johnson in the wake of the riots in 
Newark and Detroit, the report opened with the same set of questions as the hearings: “What 
happened? Why did it happen? What can be done to prevent it from happening again?” (1). The 
language of the Kerner Report, however, implicates a structural racism that the participants in the 
hearings consistently disavow. Where the hearings target the lawlessness and violence of “urban 
disorder” as both cause and symptom — a repressive form of civil disobedience itself in need of 
repression — the Kerner Report acknowledges, from the start, the “racial division” and 
“polarization of the American community” as tending to “the destruction of basic democratic 
values” (1). 
Segregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto a destructive environment 
totally unknown to most white Americans. What white Americans have never fully 
understood — but what the Negro can never forget — is that white society is deeply 
implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, 
and white society condones it. (1) 
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Such language of institutional culpability contrasts with the stark and unforgiving rhetoric of the 
hearings, exemplified by Senator John L. McClellan, who claims, from the beginning, that “[t]he 
riots cannot be justified” (6). The contrast in tone and blame persists in the very different ways 
each document understands its problem and how it approaches its solution. For the members of 
the Kerner Commission, the problem is segregation, institutional racism, and ignorance; for 
McClellan and the members of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, the problem is not 
merely the “philosophy” of the black radical but the black radical himself. Says McClellan, 
offering his “conclusion” before the hearings have even begun: 
It is my own judgment that we have come to the conclusion that idleness is the 
worst curse, and an economic base is the greatest necessity, and that the American 
system demands not only Government action, but enormous action in the private 
sector and especially by American business enterprise. (7-8). 
For McClellan, the violence and disorder (as well as the violence of disorder) result from a lack of 
appropriate economic opportunity, with the emphasis on opportunity signaling an unwillingness 
on the part of the black American to take advantage of what has been made available; the solution, 
therefore, is “enormous action” by capitalist enterprise. If “idleness is the worst curse,” those who 
are not already working (or those who refuse to work) must be made productive: un-production 
and waste, according to McClellan, are the root causes of violence and disorder.50 
 
50 The fear of anti-production (which is a fear that a source of potential surplus is going untapped) motivated the 
revisions to federal housing legislation, opening up not only the residential home but the “ghetto” itself to greater 
exploitation by forces of financialization and speculation. McClellan’s fear of “idleness” is somewhat obviated, not 
by making the unproductive bodies productive but by rendering their very space (the home, the project, the 
neighborhood) a source of surplus-production. 
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The ostensible goal of the hearings — to obtain the knowledge necessary to assure the 
“health, welfare, and safety” of the nation (2) — could only be achieved through a more absolute 
suppression of non-sanctioned violence: i.e., any violence that is not an extension of the “law-
making” and “law-preserving” functions of state militarism (Benjamin, “Critique” 240-41). Law 
must be preserved and security must be maintained for the sake of “the structure of our peaceful 
society” (United States, Riots 2). The violence inherent in the preservation of law and order is 
disavowed, as is the exceptionalism of police violence, as “law” comes to signify “peace” within 
a legislative discourse that equates “force” and “violence,” where violence only appears in a 
violation of law. The disavowal of state violence — or what we might more generally describe, 
following Étienne Balibar, as the violence-of-power — recasts that violence according to “the 
schema of preventive counter-violence” (Balibar 139). “Any violence … that has to become legally 
or morally legitimate must present itself if not as retaliation, at least as correction and suppression 
of violent forces … which have destroyed or disturbed an originary ideal, originally peaceful, non-
violent order, or threaten it with destruction” (139). Such a preventive counter-violence, in other 
words, imagines a nefarious violence which is temporally anterior to it, always before, which 
justifies the force of law as the necessary intervention into a field of unstable power relations in 
order that they may be corrected, which is to say put back in order.51 However, since the threat to 
which the violence of the state responds pre-exists it, the force of law must establish a permanent 
 
51 “[I]f, at a fundamental institutional level, violence can be justified only as preventive counter-violence, then 
something called violence, or violent behaviour — be it public or private, individual or collective — will exist only 
inasmuch as its violent suppression is already anticipated. In other words what we call ‘violence’ and the lines of 
demarcation between what is supposed to be violent behaviour and what is not, will exist only retrospectively, in the 
anticipated recurrence of counter-violence” (Balibar 139). 
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vigilance in the name of defense: it always acts in response to the “violent forces” that always 
threaten its ideality.  
A patriarchal (even paternal) tone of regret is clear from the start of the hearings, as 
McClellan states in the opening moments: 
We must face certain unpleasant facts. It is apparent that a new philosophy has 
flourished in recent years, having as its central theme the theory that we are no 
longer a nation of laws. In several fields, and particularly in the civil rights 
movement, there has been for some time a rapid increase in the number of civil 
disorders, sit-ins, unruly protest marches, disorderly demonstrations, and violations 
of law. It appears that many persons who, in the past, have condoned or sponsored 
willful civil disobedience have now taken the next step in advocating criminal force 
and violence. (2) 
McClellan’s language is largely transparent: the creation of two distinct sides of the issue, those 
who obey/uphold the law and those who do not, and the repeated characterization of the other as 
out of control. Part of the problem, for McClellan, resides in the theoretical production that 
sanctions such actions (seeming an almost disciplinary dispute in his use of the term “fields”), yet 
the ambiguity of the claim that the “central theme” of this “philosophy,” “that we are no longer a 
nation of laws,” leaves it in doubt whether McClellan is more bothered by the “willful” violation 
of law or the presumption that the legal foundations of the state can be called into question. In 
foregrounding the problem of this philosophy — “which contends that each man should be free to 
violate the laws which he considers unjust” — at the same time as he appeals to an inviolability of 
law that sustains any law in particular, McClellan also de-emphasizes the “genuine grievances” 
made by the supposed lawbreakers (2). McClellan juxtaposes “complaints from police and urban 
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officials” that television broadcasts “rarely show attacks upon policemen” with “complaints and 
alleged grievances relating to conditions which are said to underlie the outbreaks of violence, 
including unemployment, violations of civil rights, charges of police brutality, and the adequacy 
of housing, educational and recreational facilities, and relief and welfare programs” (4).52 Even if 
such grievances were “genuine” — and nowhere does McClellan suggest that they may be — the 
“riots cannot be justified,” and the primary concern is not to attend to such grievances but to “take 
the high road back to law and order,” in the words of Sen. Karl E. Mundt (6). In the repeated 
insistence that “[w]e want the facts to speak for themselves,” at the same time as it is admitted that 
the “causes” of the “disorders” under investigation “may be indeterminable,” McClellan and 
Mundt establish within the first dozen pages of the hearings the epistemic impasse that necessarily 
constrains them: despite the “testimony of nationally known sociologists, psychiatrists, public 
officials, and urban experts,” the motivations of the (almost exclusively black) militants and rioters 
is likely beyond what can be known (2, 3). (The irony that no “testimony” is provided from the 
“militants” themselves escapes the members of the subcommittee, for whom facts only originate 
from sources deemed official or expert.) The construction of this impasse serves two functions: 
first, in obscuring potential causes for the violence (which, it must be repeated, is always a violence 
in violation of the law), it irrationalizes the conduct and action of the rioters: i.e., no matter what 
grievances are claimed, they may never be verified and may as well not exist, thus removing in 
 
52 The obvious racial divisions alluded to and exploited in McClellan’s rhetoric was hardly exceptional in post-civil 
rights government discourse. As Christopher Bonastia shows, “From 1964 to 1968, federal bureaucrats began to 
discover what approaches to desegregation were more or less effective, civil rights opponents in Congress began to 
devise ways to restrain the more activist impulses of government agencies, and numerous riots and expressions of 
black militancy reduced white support for civil rights initiatives” (2). 
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advance any justification for their action (the riots cannot be justified);53 second, what can be 
known (the “facts” which “speak for themselves”) is all that can be known, thus the dual burden 
of authority and legitimation rests solely on the investigations and subsequent actions of the 
legislators. In other words, the construction of an impasse creates the space for a response at the 
same time as it decides in advance what counts as response. 
 From early on in the hearings, the legislative response to (its own) impasse takes the form 
of an obsessive psychic and discursive segregation: the senators as well as their summoned 
officials and experts repeatedly invoke a space of dissent outside the nation or community proper, 
a space of containment or quarantine where the irrationalism of militant violence originates and 
where it threatens to spill over and destroy the true space of the nation.54 Unsurprisingly, this space 
of exception becomes the site upon which the violence of the law (a violence never conceived as 
such within this discourse) may act with impunity and, in fact, out of necessity.55 Victor Burgin 
suggests the concept of “paranoiac space” to think about the racialized space that takes shape 
within the opposition “exile/nation,” an opposition that becomes internalized in nationalist 
 
53 The epistemological obscurity of the black militant position is figured in Mundt’s contrast to the “high road back to 
law and order” when he speaks of “the smoke-ridden trail leading to further chaos and eventually oblivion of our free 
society as we have known it” (6). 
54 See, for example, Mundt’s claim: “These are acts of violence which cannot be permitted, for if continued there is 
no limit to the conflagration which could sweep this country” (6). 
55 See Denise Ferreira da Silva’s analysis of “[n]ecessity as a figuring of violence” within the long history of western 
juridical philosophy in “No-bodies” (122-23), as well as its more comprehensive treatment in Toward a Global Idea 
of Race. 
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discourses.56 “History has familiarized us with the insidious movement in which ‘nation’ is 
confused with ‘race.’ Institutionalized racism may ensure that racial minorities live in a condition 
of internal exile within the nation of which they are citizens — an exile that, if it is not legal, cannot 
be named” (130).57 The evidence of the conflation of “nation” and “race” is everywhere in 
McClellan’s and Mundt’s comments in the opening pages of the hearings, most especially in their 
efforts to conceive the black neighborhood (or the frequently named “ghetto”) as a space of 
exception, a site of violent infection within an otherwise healthy landscape, “the structure of our 
 
56 In an article on the “interlocking matrix” of race, class, and gender in the construction of public space, Susan 
Ruddick asks why one of two “equally brutal” public murders in Toronto in the 1990s “provoked a massive outrage” 
while the other “was met with barely a comment within the larger community” (7). Contrary to “the assumption that 
public spaces are universally accessible to a civic public,” Ruddick notes that “gendered and racialized identities 
function to constrain participation in the public sphere” (7). In the case she examines, the narrative that most garnered 
public response quickly adopted the “gendered and racialized trope of the dangerous black male who threatens the 
integrity of the white community through sexual or physical violence to its women” (8, 9). The attack “was seen to 
compromise the freedom of middle-class families to move without fear through the city. This commercialized public 
space was, in this depiction, elevated to the status of every space in the city” (10). 
57 Balibar writes of the internalization of borders in these terms: “there can be no doubt that, in national normality, the 
normality of the national citizen-subject, such an appropriation is also internalized by individuals, as it becomes a 
condition, an essential reference of their collective, communal sense, and hence, once again, of their identity (or of 
the order, the ranking, by which they arrange their multiple identities). As a consequence, borders cease to be purely 
external realities. They become also — and perhaps predominantly — what Fichte … magnificently termed ‘inner 
borders’ [innere Grenzen]; that is to say — as indeed he says himself — invisible borders, situated everywhere and 
nowhere” (78).  
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peaceful society” (2).58 Further, the non-legal exile of the inhabitants of such spaces justifies their 
subjugation by the “law of the land” — what cannot be named, which is also what cannot be known 
and so (as Mundt repeats several times) cannot be justified, of necessity lies outside the law and 
must, then, be made lawful. In contrast with what Burgin calls “psychotic space,” where 
“boundaries fail” and “frontiers are breached,” where the “external object” is experienced as 
having “invaded the subject,” a paranoiac conception of space maintains the threat of such an 
invasion without yet experiencing it as having happened; instead, boundaries and frontiers are 
fiercely maintained (129). In sympathy with Melanie Klein’s theorizing of the paranoid-schizoid 
position, Burgin’s concept of paranoia suggests the defensive posturing of a psyche that imagines 
itself assailed by malevolent forces and responds by concretizing its own processes of splitting, 
idealization, and projection. By maintaining such manufactured divisions, paranoia holds off the 
dynamic forging of an ambivalence that would allow the reparative engagement with objects, both 
internal and external, characteristic of what Klein calls the depressive position. Klein goes further, 
however, when she suggests the possibility of denying the bad object altogether in “hallucinatory 
gratification,” where an unyielding sense of omnipotence annihilates the very possibility of the 
“painful situation.” She writes: “It is, however, not only a situation and an object that are denied 
 
58 Mundt’s imperative that “we take the high road back to law and order” furthers the claim that this spatial disruption 
has also interrupted the telos of the nation, constituting a temporal break or exception within an otherwise 
homogeneous history (6, my emphasis). In Hegelian terms, any deviation from “law and order” would be tantamount 
to a negation of real freedom, i.e. that freedom secured by the “ethical totality” of the state. In contrast with the 
classical liberal conception of freedom as measured by limits to individual will (“as if the individual were to limit his 
freedom among other individuals”), Hegel advocates a notion of freedom grounded in institutional forms: “As against 
this negative concept of freedom [based on limits], it is rather law, ethical life, the state (and they alone) that comprise 
the positive reality and satisfaction of freedom” (Introduction 41). 
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and annihilated — it is an object-relation which suffers this fate; and therefore a part of the ego, 
from which the feelings towards the object emanate, is denied and annihilated as well” (Envy 7). 
Such a fantasy of omnipotence supports the vision of the state espoused by legislators in these 
hearings where the very structure of relation between government-as-agent and the communities 
it abjects gets denied: those communities are outside what can be known, outside the law, outside 
the telos of nation; and the only way such communities can be made to fit the fantasy of the good 
relation is by being subjected to the annihilatory drive that denies their very difference. 
Houston Mayor Louie Welch’s testimony exemplifies, in many ways, the rhetoric of 
defense and disavowal. He was called before the subcommittee  to testify specifically on the “gun 
battle” between police and the students of Texas Southern University (TSU), which he 
immediately sets out to prove was not a “riot” like the others. Welch claims: “It is impossible for 
me to discuss a big-city riot in Houston, because Houston has not had one. As you know, we had 
a gun battle between students in dormitories at TSU and city police. The campus is not the 
community at large” (30). Welch’s insistence that one make a distinction between the university 
campus and the community at large — understood, in a sense, as the former’s exemption from the 
latter — is intended to highlight the difference between “campus disorders” and “big city riots” 
(30). For Welch, the issue is one of blame: while the mayor’s office may be held accountable for 
the “traditional underlying causes of unrest” such as “jobs or housing,” it cannot be held 
accountable for the localized and institutional-specific problems of a university, even if that 
university and its students are Houston residents (30). However, Welch’s frequent efforts to focus 
his testimony on his office’s diligent efforts to contend with the “racial problems” of the city are 
largely ignored by the subcommittee, which continually brings the focus back to the “disorder” on 
the campus of TSU. Seeming to reject Welch’s paranoiac separation of the university from the 
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Houston community, McClellan insists that “what happened at TSU is the crux of why we are 
here, because violence did occur in the city” (55, my emphasis). Welch again attempts to dissociate 
the “problems” of the university from the potential to address such problems available to his office 
when he insists in turn that the “militant efforts being made on the campus of the university … 
were not directed to municipal government in any way at the beginning.” 
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I believe your statement seems to indicate, 
that this was not a community disturbance or disorder. 
Mayor WELCH. This is correct. 
The CHAIRMAN. It occurred on the campus of the university.  
Mayor WELCH. The things that led up were intramural for some time. They 
were within the walls of the campus, so to speak, although we did have a public 
street that traverses the campus, which became involved several times. (55) 
Welch’s paranoid-schizoid conception of the space of the city relies on the same exceptionalizing 
of violence performed by McClellan and Mundt — the violations exist only “within the walls of 
the campus” and only affect the community at large to the extent that that community literally 
bisects the campus via a public street. Eventually, however, Welch admits that the violence of the 
campus disorder “overflowed to that street” (60). Rocks and bricks were thrown at cars passing 
along the street, and eventually student protestors “laid down in the street and blockaded it” (60). 
While the paranoiac maintains borders, insists on the absoluteness of separation between self and 
other, the abject and the body proper, this space and that one (the campus is not the community), 
Burgin notes: “In psychotic space an external object — a whole, a part, or an attribute of a person 
or thing — may be experienced as if it had invaded the subject” (129). It is an experience of this 
psychotic space, in other words, that paranoia defends against. In the example of the “public” street 
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that bisects the space-apart of the campus, the “public” themselves are endangered by the abject 
matter of that other space — the individuals/bodies that do not get to count as part of that public. 
The street is neither border nor frontier; rather, it is an interior — of the community, of the lawful 
and non-violent space of the state — thrust into proximate relation within an exteriority that 
threatens its self-constitution. At the same time, however, the public street, as signifier of the 
subject of the community, contains the abject space of the campus within it: bi-secting it, it also 
marks the limit by which the contour of its identity can be traced through exclusion of that which 
it does not contain. “Abjection,” notes Burgin, “establishing the first line of demarcation, is the 
zero degree of identity…. The paranoid racist subject, seeking to take its place on the ‘clean and 
proper’ side of abjection, has refused to symbolize the abject within itself” (131). In “an effort to 
force the closing of the street,” the bodies on the ground threaten to cut off the circulation of traffic 
by which the community measures its life and ensures its identity — yet it is the very presence of 
those bodies that testifies to the processes of abjection (processes of segregation and ghettoization) 
necessary to that identity formation (Riots). The “bricks, bottles, large chunks of concrete, and 
other missiles” thrown onto the street, but even more the black bodies that literally occupied its 
space, signify an invasion of the abject, triggering the responses of defense, containment, and self-
preservation (157). Police responded to the “blockade” by themselves blocking the street, closing 
it to the circulation of public traffic. When the street was closed and traffic “rerouted,” according 
to one Houston police lieutenant, “the situation would become calm,” yet when “the barricades” 
were removed, “it would start over” (158). Impasse is met with impasse, the space of the abject 
quarantined, denied the circulation of traffic necessary to stage its invasion of that public space. 
At the same time, the mutual efforts of blocking — the traffic on the street by the protestors and 
the traffic from entering the street by the police — become their own form of circulation: while 
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those who live within the university’s space of exception, those excluded from the mayor’s 
community at large, enter onto the public space of the street in an act of forced inclusion, the police 
respond by denying such efforts, re-affirming the space-apart of the campus by temporarily 
conceding the public street to the quarantined zone. 
Welch rejects the term “ghetto” to describe the black population of Houston, opting instead 
to speak of the city’s “laminations” of white and black, as if the city were constituted by a striation 
of colored bodies that have come about naturally, a geologic process of history: “as the city has 
grown, its laminations have occurred.” The area around TSU is “predominantly Negro,” he claims, 
but “[t]here are many very fine homes just a few blocks away, fine white homes” (58, my 
emphasis). Welch’s descriptions of the city’s racial (and socioeconomic) geography does not 
appear sufficient for the members of the subcommittee who request a “map” that “would give us 
a profile of this picture that you are giving us a word picture of” (58). Indeed, McClellan, as well 
as Sen. Edmund S. Muskie, seem incapable of making sense of the “campus disorder,” whether it 
should qualify as a community-wide disorder or an exception, as Welch argues. The map, which 
would supply an actual picture, to which Welch’s description is merely a supplemental “word 
picture,” would somehow help them make that decision. If the causes of the race riots under 
investigation are linked to “high unemployment, unrest, inadequate housing, low incomes, and so 
on,” in Muskie’s words, what would it mean that a riot takes place at this university campus which 
is flanked by a “low-income” neighborhood on one side and a “high-income area” on the other 
(58)? If one understands the space of exception as being constituted by what Giorgio Agamben 
calls the “state of exception,” a primarily juridical and even binary phenomenon, the space of 
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exception comes to be in relation to a sovereign power.59 Yet the topographical logic that motivates 
the questions (and confusions) of the congressional investigators relies on a displacement or 
suspension of the sovereign in favor of an almost geographical faith in the formation of public 
spaces. The map would provide the view from above, presumably depicting Welch’s “laminations” 
 
59 Are we here dealing with what Agamben names a relation of exception: “the extreme form of relation by which 
something is included solely through its exclusion” (18)? E. Lâle Demitürk argues that Agamben’s definition of “the 
concentration camp, the space where ‘the state of exception begins to become the rule’ can also be applied to the black 
ghetto, located within the boundaries of the modern nation-state” (61). It seems evident that the “sovereignty of 
whiteness, then, constitutes itself through an exclusion of (black) bare life, defined solely in terms of blackness” and 
that “[b]lack ghetto formation as a ‘space of exception’ is necessary in the form of the emergence of white sovereign 
power” (61). Demitürk’s argument, however, does not seem to recognize that what is here being named “white 
sovereign power” emerged not in the post-Reconstruction ghetto but in the Middle Passage. In a critique of the claim 
that the “refugee is the contemporary political subject par excellence,” Jared Sexton calls into question the functional 
use of Agamben’s terminology for a discussion of black life in the U.S. He writes: 
If in Agamben’s analysis the inscription of nativity in Euro-America is disquieted in the twentieth 
century by postcolonial immigration, the native-born black population in the United States — 
known in the historic instance as ‘the descendants of slaves’ — suffers the status of being neither 
the native nor the foreigner, neither the colonizer nor the colonized. The nativity of the slave is not 
inscribed elsewhere in some other (even subordinated) jurisdiction, but rather nowhere at all. The 
nativity of the slave is foreclosed, undermining from within the potential for citizenship, but also 
opening the possibility of a truly nonoriginal origin, a political existence that signifies ‘the presence 
of an absence that discloses the absence inherent in all presence and every present.’” (41). 
See also, further on: “The metaphoric transfer that dismisses the legitimacy of black struggles against racial slavery 
… while it appropriates black suffering as the template for nonblack grievances remains one of the defining features 
of contemporary political culture” (42). 
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in clear (i.e., black and white) visual form. Welch’s insistence that there are “pockets” rather than 
“a single big concentration” of poor black residents is intended to reinforce his claim that Houston 
has “very healthy integration,” witnessed by the “laminations” of “white, Negro, white” (58).  
When the mayor of Plainfield, New Jersey, George Hetfield, is called by the senate 
subcommittee to testify on the riots in that city in July, 1967, he immediately asserts that “no one 
is justified in placing the cause on unemployment, inferior schools, oppressive housing or 
inadequate recreational facilities” (959). He goes on to insist: “There is no real ghetto. Civil rights 
played no part in the Plainfield disturbances, in my opinion” (960, my emphasis). Hetfield’s 
assertion that there is no real ghetto in Plainfield echoes an earlier claim made by John Walsh, 
“staff investigator” of the subcommittee, who testified: “The city [of Plainfield] gives the 
appearance of being neat, orderly, and generally prosperous. There does not appear to be any 
specific section of the city which could be termed a ghetto, although there are individual houses 
which are in a rundown condition” (947). Walsh’s language is studiously non-committal, saying 
everything and nothing at once as it invokes the city as epiphenomenon. In addition to the 
“appearance” the city “gives,” as well as what “does not appear,” there also “does not appear” to 
be “any serious unemployment problem” (947).60 Walsh’s summary of his investigations consists 
of a chronological overview of interviews of those same officials and “experts” who will 
themselves testify before the subcommittee. As Walsh explains: “This chronology sets out only 
the major events which took place and the various witnesses will amplify the details which 
surround these events” (947). The amplification of evidence signifies the fundamental structure of 
proof that drives the objectivity or facticity of the hearings: questions, claims, statistics, and 
 
60 I will return, in chapter three, to the question of a city’s “appearance” when I examine the shift in post-civil rights 
urban policing to an emphasis on “order maintenance” and the policing of aesthetics. 
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phrases are repeated, sometimes ad nauseum, enacting through sheer quantity a form of consensus; 
and the testimony of the officials and experts, upon whose authority the image of the riots is 
constructed, itself gets doubled in the introductions and summaries by such figures as Walsh and 
in the facsimile reproduction of statements which, in addition to being read in full, function as 
written reports that are appealed to as yet further objects of proof. 
The discussion that follows involves Hetfield’s efforts to prove each of these claims: that 
unemployment cannot be an issue because there are enough jobs; that housing cannot be an issue 
because the slums have been demolished; that recreational facilities cannot be an issue because of 
the “efficiency” of the city’s “human relations commission” (960-62). The majority of the black 
community in Plainfield is “hard-working and responsible,” according to Hetfield, and it is “only 
a few hundred” who are the cause of the city’s unrest: “It consists of the can’t or won’t work, 
unemployed and unemployable, uneducated, hoodlums, addicts, misguided youth, and militants” 
(962). Hetfield cites an unemployment rate of 2.8 percent and statistics from the city’s chamber of 
commerce that lists “only 598 cases of unemployment” (960).  
The CHAIRMAN. You say many of the unemployed are not employable 
for either skilled or unskilled labor. Why wouldn’t they be employable for unskilled 
labor? 
Mayor HETFIELD. They are not even competent for unskilled labor, many 
of them, or they don’t want to work. 
The CHAIRMAN. That is what I was trying to find out. They are not 
employable because they don’t want to work; is that a fact? 
Mayor HETFIELD. Or they are not skilled enough for unskilled labor. 
The CHAIRMAN. They are not even skilled enough for unskilled labor? 
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Mayor HETFIELD. Right. Something is lacking somewhere. 
The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean a lack of mental ability to perform 
unskilled labor, or a physical handicap? What does it mean? It is a very significant 
statement. 
Mayor HETFIELD. There may be many causes, sir, whether mental, 
physical, no will to work, or what. We always have that. (960) 
As further proof that the unemployed in Plainfield are simply those who are too choosy about the 
kind of work they are willing to undertake, Hetfield cites the example of a local hospital that is 
“going begging” to fill its 104 vacancies for “menial jobs” (960). The coexistence of statistics and 
speculation fuels a discourse that wants to have it both ways: Hetfield wants his baseless prejudices 
affirmed at the same level of objective fact as the statistics that are supposed to elucidate them. 
The problem, as he describes it, is not societal, not the result of failed efforts to integrate the 
community, precisely because that “unemployable” subset of the black population has “resisted 
all attempts to be included as members of our integrated community” (962). None of his claims, 
however, stand up to even the most rudimentary scrutiny, as seen in the discussion with McClellan; 
this unemployable surplus, the abject subset whose exclusion is of its own making, cannot even be 
described: in Hetfield’s own words: “Something is lacking somewhere.” The implication of mental 
or physical retardation falls back on itself and exposes its own ad hoc construction, a baseless 
claim that is supposed to be shared by others, delivered with a wink and an implicit conspiratorial 
consent (which McClellan denies). At the same time, it is the truest thing Hetfield says, since 
something is definitely lacking somewhere. McClellan’s pragmatic and genuinely disconcerted 
response only exposes how ridiculous the conversation has become, with Hetfield speaking in an 
absurd racist code while McClellan mimes the objectivity and impartiality supposed to sanction 
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this discourse as fact. What is lacking is that which has been excluded from the start: the segregated 
subject from the epistemic field. Further, the something-that-lacks is also the thing “we always 
have” precisely because it subsists in its exclusion; just as the abject confirms the proper boundary 
of a self in its expulsion and just as the border traces the space of inclusion through an act of 
exclusion, the unemployable surplus or the something-that-lacks is always had because it is “our” 
most intimate property. In Balibar’s dialectic of violence and ideality, the unemployed as a 
historical category does not “predate the establishment of a social (welfare) state …; they come 
after its partial failure and dismembering” (142). In the particular American instance, what I am 
calling the unemployable surplus describes — in contrast but also in sympathy with Balibar’s 
claims of a “post-historical situation” — the subject of post-segregation, the real effect of the 
contradictory and destructive processes of racial integration in the wake of civil rights legislation. 
While Hetfield insists on the unemployable as the one who resists integration, it is precisely the 
opposite: the unemployable is the one whom integration resists, the figure whose exclusion is 
maintained in order to affirm the boundaries of a political reality, in Arendt’s terms, whose very 
existence is threatened by inclusion.  
A different logic motivates the desire for locating the source of the violence attributed to 
the black militant, one that, as seen in Burgin’s description of paranoiac space, understands space 
topographically, constituted by distinctly boundaried fields of representation. As with any 
topographical map, one can see a landscape in different ways depending on how the surface is 
coded (i.e., colored) in order to represent otherwise imperceptible gradations of depth. 
Paradoxically, such a map depicts difference by categorization and selection, essentially reducing 
a heterogeneity to those aspects of it that can be represented. Any such practice of visualization 
already operates according to the spatial demands of the boundary-seeking paranoiac whose most 
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primal fear is not, as would be the case for the occupant of the space of exception, to become bare 
life but the potential dissolution of identity that results from contagion. Muskie makes this clear 
when he explains to Welch the reason why he wants the “map” of the city: “The point that I am 
really driving at here is whether the university is located physically in proximity to any Negro area 
which is an area of high unemployment, unrest, inadequate housing, low incomes, and so on” (58, 
my emphasis). For the paranoiac, in his disavowal of the constitutive abject, nothing is more 
frightening than the influence of physical proximity; rather, what is frightening is that proximity 
itself is influence. The pictorial “profile” of the city map would show this based on its code (or 
key), yet in the very process of depicting, say, “unrest,” the profile is inevitably distorted, since 
the function of any profile is the depiction of only a selection of the subject, a turned face. That is, 
of course, precisely the point. Muskie needs to see the city’s profile in order to confirm what he 
already knows61: violence is contagious; which is why from the start of the hearings, violence 
 
61 I will return to this particular function of “knowing” later when I consider in more detail the way that knowledge 
serves not the purpose of accumulation but of restriction. In a consideration of the clinical phenomenon of the 
“concrete” patient in analysis — the one who holds fast to a disavowal and resists all interpretation — Alan Bass 
shows how “knowledge” on the part of such a patient “expresses her compelling defensive need to make sure that 
whatever fantasy she imposes upon the analyst can be taken as a reality in a way that brooks no alternative, no 
difference in apparent meaning” (37). Here, the knowledge that would be provided by the pictorial “profile” of the 
situation goes beyond McClellan and Mundt’s earlier efforts to relegate any reason for the violence to an 
epistemological obscurity; instead, the visual plays a special role in an overall quest for knowledge that will not secure 
new information but merely reinforce the concrete position of the investigators who already know that violence infects 
when in proximity to an area (which is to say, a people) whose tendency to violence has already been ontologically 
secured. 
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“cannot be permitted,” because if it is,62 its contagious nature would allow it to spread 
indiscriminately and there would be “no limit to the conflagration which could sweep this country” 
(6). Rather than a space of exception, then, the “pockets” of poor black residents in Houston are 
seen by this legislative discourse as sites of infection whose proximity to the functioning 
(circulating, public, white) areas of the city proper indicates its threat of contagion. The desire for 
a spatial (and often even pictorial) representation of the boundaries, byways, and impasses of a 
city arises from this desire to separate or abject the foreign body that nevertheless constitutes the 
healthy functioning of the body. Here we see another reason for the police response in Houston: 
to blockade the street that bisects the university campus keeps the public from entering this space 
of contamination and contagion. 
In attending to the ways that this discourse wrestles with such anxieties in the various 
figures deployed to explain (or explain away) the violence of segregated space, I hope to 
interrogate the political stakes that arise when this desire for law and order dictates the functions 
of particular aesthetic forms. Welch’s terminology of “pockets,” “laminations,” and 
“concentration” to describe the distribution of colored bodies within an urban space both informs 
and is informed by the ensuing discourse on the utility of the pictorial form as a proof of claim. 
Elsewhere in the hearings, similar terms can be found in discussions of perimeters, boundaries, 
and the function of a dividing line performed by public streets where they act as borders between 
two districts or neighborhoods or where they trace the limit of a municipality or a university 
 
62 This idea itself is difficult to grasp within the logic of exception that informs this legislative discourse and points to 
the paradox that subtends the disavowal of state violence. If violence can only be conceived as a violation of law, it 
already refuses to acknowledge any form of permissive authority, already exists outside of a structure of permission 
and consent. How, then, can its being permitted (or not) become a possibility? 
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campus.63 Maps are often provided with areas blocked off, shaded, or outlined to indicate not only 
the precise location of the rioting or the clashes between protestors and police but often simply to 
designate the blackest spaces of the urban topography. Although the diagram of the space around 
Fisk University in Nashville is reproduced devoid of any markings or overlays (see Fig. 1.1), the 
testimony of the hearings describes the ways its surface was drawn upon to indicate those 
structures and boundaries that constituted both actual sites of conflict during the riot and 
retrospective sites of cathexis, such as the “retaining wall” that divides the campus from the street 
which was marked with a “wavy line” (431). On a map of the city of Plainfield, shaded areas 
indicate both the main areas of interest in the city, such as the police and fire stations and city hall, 
and the two black housing projects; in addition, a thick shaded border creates a zone of quarantine, 
the space of violence, that occupies only part of the city as a whole (see Fig. 1.2). A map of the 
city of Detroit is provided which includes several “overlays” representing various situations and 
emphasizing again key sites of conflict. Unlike the other maps reproduced in the transcripts of the 
hearings, however, there is one image of Detroit whose surface is overtaken by an amorphous 
black blob (see Figs. 1.3 and 1.4). Robert Emmet Dunne, who served as assistant counsel for the 
subcommittee, explains that “the darkened areas [depict] those portions of the city of Detroit and 
the wholly enclosed community of Hamtramck that were affected by the major disorder of 1967” 
(1307). Such a saturation of the space of violence, which coincides with the blackest districts of a 
still largely segregated city, compels response; the city appears here under siege, overwhelmed by 
a visualized force of nullification. In this example, the image no longer provides information; 
 
63 Testimony on the Nashville riot takes up the figure of a “retaining wall” that separates the campus of Fisk University 
from the city proper (431); testimony on the Plainfield riot focuses on a specific parking lot and again on a “housing 
project” that is deemed “not a part of the street or a public place” (948).  
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instead, in its formlessness, the black blob consumes knowable space, blocks it out, halts the very 
practice of assembling facts for the purpose of producing verifiable claims. As Balibar notes: “A 
power which organizes itself as preventive counter-violence undoubtedly needs certain 
information about violence” (Balibar 139). The topographical map, but also the statistics, the 
charts and graphs, the photographic evidence, and the very form of the expert testimony itself, 
fulfills this function. However,  
the suspicion will never be eliminated … that there must be a basic element of 
misrecognition, a blind spot, in the midst of this ever-expanding knowledge, which 
stems from the fact that this knowledge is not only associated with power — as is 
all knowledge — but, more precisely, produced under the schema of preventive 
counter-violence, or the re-establishment of order” (139-40). 
The epistemic impasse established at the start of the hearings — according to which any knowledge 
of the motivations and desires of the black militant has been foreclosed — signifies the blind spot, 
the misrecognized surplus that circulates throughout this knowledge production as precisely that 
which generates the paranoiac proliferation of evidence that is never enough. Furthermore, it is 
this unknowable element, the black blob that spreads like a stain over the city map, that prompts 
the call for the re-establishment of order. 
 
The View From Above 
Alongside a faith in the power of the visual to confirm knowledge (in the form of the 
topographical profile), there is a simultaneous fear of the visual as a medium of contagion (in the 
form of the moving-image). The form of the map aids the overall goal of the congressional hearings 
to seek out the sources of violence and extinguish them precisely because it confirms what is 
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already known: there are boundaries that must be maintained. The form of the television broadcast, 
however, exceeds the constraints by which what is seen is known precisely because its images 
have not been subject to the processes of abstraction by which bodies and lives may be safely 
catalogued and contained, which is to say: discursively quarantined. However mediated, the 
images are still taken to be raw, and as such, they are capable of inciting mimetic behavior. The 
same fear is operative in McClellan’s anxiety over the “new philosophy” (of black militancy) to 
which he ascribes the central tenet “that we are no longer a nation of laws” — what the television 
broadcasts threaten, then, is an amplification of the same contagious threat inherent in civic dissent. 
McClellan notes that the primary complaint of law enforcement working in the cities flagged as 
sites of social unrest pertains to the televised broadcast of images which “has frequently had an 
inflammatory impact upon susceptible elements of our people” (3).64 Fear of the moving-image as 
itself a medium of contagion is hardly unique to this moment, or this discursive scene. In many 
ways, the fear of these legislators and of the law’s enforcers is rather transparent and banal: they 
worry that too much television coverage focuses on the violence enacted by the state (which their 
discourse disavows), that it makes them look bad, so to speak; but they are equally fearful of the 
 
64 Hetfield provides an example of the inevitable contradiction of such a discourse when it claims, on the one hand, 
that the riots “were planned, not spontaneous,” that they were “organized, precipitated, and exploited by a small, 
hardcore group,” and, on the other, that they were a hysterical outbreak caused by the contagious influence of a 
television broadcast (963). Hetfield: “I believe that the TV coverage played a large part in the Plainfield riots. The 
sensational coverage of the Newark riot showed persons looting stores while the police took no action to halt them. 
This view of looting appealed directly to the criminal and susceptible element. A mob hysteria was created which 
affected weak persons who would normally be law abiding” (962-63). Hetfield’s way out of the contradiction is to 
separate the rioters into two distinct classes: the “small, hardcore group” who planned the events and the “weak” (i.e., 
affectable) mob who were recruited in their hysteria.  
69 
 
mimetic potential of the moving-image even as they proclaim their own immunity from it. “Thus, 
it is argued,” says McClellan, “that as a result of the excitement engendered by these films of 
violence and by the showing of frenzied exhortations by apparent leaders of the mobs, other riots 
were sparked and ignited in cities within television range of the large city where the pictures 
originated” (3).65 Once again, proximity is invoked as itself influence (“within television range”), 
and once again what is at issue in this paranoiac vision of space is the failure of the boundary to 
contain the contagion, here given animated form and incendiary capabilities. On more than one 
occasion, the legislators seeks to recruit others to this view, urging, for example, Detroit journalist 
George Pruette, to corroborate their suspicion that the broadcast of riot imagery in one city 
catalyzes violence in another “within television range” by sheer force of mimetic contagion. 
Pruette, all too eager to affirm McClellan’s views (as long as they are speaking of his competitors), 
is repeatedly commended for his own reportage, in evidence at the hearings in the form of an hour-
long news documentary on the riots in Detroit, which, was “edited down to eliminate inflammatory 
and emotional incidents” (1211).66 Instead, Pruette’s film, represented in the hearings only in the 
transcript of the journalist’s “narration in addition to the sound on film,” focuses on the destruction 
of property and violence against police and firefighters (1211). In other words, it enacts, in visual 
 
65 McClellan’s use of the phrase “frenzied exhortations” to describe “apparent leaders of the mob” ascribes to them 
an affective quality of the subject-in-ecstasy, one who has lost recourse to the stoicism of good sense. Unlike the stern 
operatics of a fascist demagogue inciting the populace, McClellan sees the mob leader as devoid of reason, an example 
of what Denise Ferreira da Silva calls the “affectable ‘I’,” at the same time as he is endowed with the power to infect 
others with his “affectability.” 
66 At this point, the word “inflammatory” is repeated eight times in the span of not even two pages of the printed 
hearings. 
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form, the same disavowal of state violence (not to mention “emotions” writ large) with which 
McClellan opened the hearings. The police officers in Houston barricading the public street that 
bisects the campus of TSU in order to assert their control over the city’s means of circulation are 
engaged in the same practice of managing desire as the police officers in Detroit who have set up 
a checkpoint at the municipal border, stopping cars and retrieving loot. As a grand-standing Sen. 
Carl Curtis says to George Pruette shortly before they view the film on the Detroit riots: “The 
public media has a responsibility to promote the desire for law and order on the part of all people” 
(1210, my emphasis).67 
The film which was edited by Pruette also featured him as one of several “experts” who 
appear as a panel, accompanied by the program’s hosts, Ven Marshall and Dick Westerkamp. 
Titled Six Days in July, the broadcast, which aired on July 30, 1967 and was produced by WWJ 
Radio and Television News, is structured as an in-depth look back on the events of the Detroit 
Riot, which are presented chronologically, beginning on Sunday, when the first fires broke out, 
and concluding on Friday. “My colleagues and I hope to show you another dimension to the story,” 
says Westerkamp, “by taking you behind the camera lens.” Each segment is composed of aerial 
and ground footage of the riots (often accompanied by voice-over from one of the panelists), 
intercut with clips from official press conferences, and bookended by scenes from the studio 
soundstage where Pruette is joined by fellow “newsmen” Dwayne Riley and Robert Lyle, and 
cinematographers Al Deneau, Art Mazur, and Lare Wardrop. The program’s hosts interact with 
the panel of journalists and camera operators, getting their take on a specific piece of footage or 
provoking their reflections on what they had witnessed in their role as documentarians. At the 
conclusion of each day of the riot, which structures each segment, the broadcast cuts to an 
 
67 Not merely obeisance of the law but desire for it will return in my analysis of policework in chapter three. 
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advertisement for humanitarian relief: whether phone numbers for shelter and housing, for 
childcare relief, or for the Salvation Army or the Red Cross.  
From the opening promise to take the audience “behind the camera lens” to its sanguine 
conclusion that Detroit, just as its city motto dictates, will rise from the ashes,68 the broadcast 
flaunts its liberal moderation, avoiding, as Pruette says to McClellan in the hearings, inflammatory 
and emotional incidents.69 “It was our intention,” Pruette says to the subcommittee before they 
view the film, “to show exactly what happened as objectively as possible” (1208). The 
documentary is an exemplary exercise in non-sensational journalism, offered up in primetime, in 
hindsight, and via the suit-and-tied adjudication of an all-American cast of well-tempered, white 
newsmen. Almost every moment of the program feels curated to conform to the most milquetoast 
brand of capitalist ideology. The rioters are characterized as “lawless hoodlums” helping 
themselves to the “unprotected merchandise in store windows,” and posing a threat to the 
“consuming public,” whose “property” was being looted and destroyed, while the rioters 
themselves “couldn’t care less.” “The mood of the people on the street was a carnival,” reporter 
Robert Lyle explains. During a segment on looting, images of broken storefronts and stockpiled 
shopping carts quickly yield to more insistent scenes of arrest and the checkpoints set up at 
municipal perimeters, followed by a clip of Detroit Governor George Romney calling for federal 
 
68 Detroit’s motto: “Speramus meliora; resurgent cineribus” (“We hope for better things; it shall arise from the ashes”) 
was written by Father Gabriel Richard following a fire that all but destroyed the entire city in 1805. 
69 In fact, the program’s most “emotional” scenes are the interludes of humanitarian relief. The advertisement for the 
Red Cross, for example, is scored with the persistent staccato blip of a heartbeat set to rapidly cut shots of medical 
workers reaching for bags of blood — or perhaps it is more accurate to say a bag of blood with the implication that 
supplies are running out. 
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troops, followed by President Lyndon B. Johnson calling for federal troops — there is no room for 
misinterpreting the causal sequence of (unlawful) actions and (penal) consequences. In such 
sequences, the film manifests the paranoid-schizoid desire to police the capillaries of circulation, 
all of the routes by which bodies and things traverse the topographies of capital; and the 
maintenance of boundaries is integral to this as it establishes the infrangible borders that protect 
those routes — hence the need on the part of the police in Houston to blockade the public street at 
its ends before the student activists blockade it from within, to assert control over circulation. Lyle 
continues his commentary over a scene, shot at night, of a group of National Guard troops, poised 
in the middle of the street with rifles aimed at an oncoming car. He explains that the troops were 
blocking traffic in an effort to both keep the trunk loads of loot from getting beyond the municipal 
borders and to protect the looters themselves from the more violent districts of the city. “It’s 
amazing that people didn’t want to stop,” he says. “They would have to order them three or four 
times with a rifle pointed at your head and then they would argue about turning around, even 
though there were all kinds of shots being fired across the street.” Lyle’s amazement comes from 
a position outside of the disavowed space of state violence and registers both his transparent faith 
in the regulatory power of law — surely federal arms cannot fail to halt unpermitted circulation — 
and his own desire to be in proximity to that violence — to want to stop at the point of its rifles 
(evident in part in the switch from the third-person “they” to the second-person “your”). The 
doubling of the violence — the “rifle pointed at your head” and the “all kinds of shots being fired” 
— is recast to fit that disavowed structure where the gun in your face is merely a punctuation to 
the “order” which is insisted upon merely to keep you safe from the real violence that saturates the 
space of the city under siege. 
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The documentary relies on images of aftermath,70 second-hand accounts from law 
enforcement, and anecdotal evidence from the journalists to illustrate and amplify the violence that 
otherwise only appears in the form of the structure fire or the tense, almost still-image, of the 
standoff. Images of garbage trucks hauling piles of broken glass and brickwork, for example, 
precede a segment on “sniper activity” in the broadcast’s coverage of the third and fourth days of 
the riots. In a discussion on the sound stage, Westerkamp talks about the severity of the gun 
violence on that third night when “sniper activity broke out all over the west side.” As a result, he 
suggests, “two or three people” were killed at the Algiers Motel. The deaths Westerkamp alludes 
to, with the implication that they were victims of riot violence, were three young black men who 
were murdered by city police.71 Images of gouges in brick and concrete facades and holes in 
windows are offered as “evidence of sniper activity, of the exchange of sniper and police fire.” 
The mimetic capacity of the violent image is tempered by the film’s curation and its portrayal of 
the city during the riots as a space saturated by violence, only approachable via the spatial or 
temporal distance of a camera mounted to a helicopter or a public official addressing a press corps. 
In the enclosure of the studio sound stage and the mediation of the imagery by a crew of white 
newsmen who present everything in retrospect — so no longer posing a threat of temporal 
proximity — the film immunizes its audience from the inflammatory contagion of the violent 
image. At no point does the film present anything like McClellan’s figure of the mob leader and 
his “frenzied exhortations;” in fact, when the black citizen of Detroit shows up in the film, he is 
more often than not under arrest, even if the film is also careful to include several black law 
 
70 This emphasis on crime as the aftermath will be integral to my analysis of policework in chapter three. 
71 John Hersey’s non-fiction account, which relies on  of these murders is covered extensively in his book, The Algiers 
Motel Incident. 
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enforcement officers and city leaders to condemn the riots. At no point in the film is a participant 
in the riots allowed to speak, a tactic that both adheres to the film’s pretense to objectivity through 
the suppression of sensational content — since it is precisely the words, the language, the 
“philosophy” of the black militant that is most feared — and maintains the collective subject of 
the mob.72 
In an appeal to Pruette’s expertise, McClellan asks: “In your judgment, as a television man 
and newsman, does [the film] portray a generally fair and correct picture of the situation and the 
happenings as they occurred?” (1209). After it has been established that, indeed, the film provides 
a “correct picture” of the events, McClellan shifts to establish Pruette as an autonomous third-party 
“not employed by this committee” and not “under the direction or instructions of this committee” 
(1209). As further evidence of the film’s “objectivity,” McClellan and Pruette discuss how it won 
an Emmy Award and how it has been submitted “to the national competition now in Hollywood,” 
all of which further proves, for McClellan that “this is not a picture that has been doctored or 
prepared for this particular hearing” (1209). Mundt joins the evaluation by asking Pruette if, 
following the broadcast of the documentary in Detroit, “any serious or responsible challenge 
developed in the Detroit area to its accuracy and objectivity” (1209). The series of questions feels 
both necessary and superfluous: as if it Pruette’s allegiances and objectivity should be the subject 
 
72 There is a scene in the KTLA production Hell in the City of the Angels on the Watts riot of 1965 that features a 
young black man who speaks passionately about the oppression of his community and the desire for revenge that is 
now becoming manifest. One of the more interesting aspects of this moment is the argument that ensues behind him 
as some stand up for him and urge him to speak while others disagree amid claims that he does not speak for them. 
Such a picture of a conflicted black community undermines the image of the collective mob upon which so much of 
the testimony of the hearings and the WWJ documentary rely. 
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of inquiry and as if any challenge (“serious and responsible”) to the evidentiary quality of the film 
should be exposed. However, the structure of every question implies the answer it already knows 
because it is this film they chose to view and this journalist in particular who was called to testify. 
As we have already seen, the function of repetition in these hearings serves the dual purpose of 
affirming the already-known and of taming contingency by making the unexpected (i.e., Welch’s 
claim that the university campus is not part of the city proper) fit the confines of the pre-established 
epistemic field of inquiry. While the set up for the viewing of Six Days in July is intended to 
provide a proof of its own — that the legislators are willing to confront the realism of the 
documentary form in its quest to allow “the facts to speak for themselves” — there was never any 
question that anything other than the “correct picture” would be shown. Pruette’s insistence on the 
film’s objectivity, the industry awards, the community response — all of these supplemental proofs 
constitute the performance of the committee’s own objectivity, the affirmation of its own correct 
picture mirrored back it at in the curated form of the news broadcast. 
 The degree to which Six Days in July strives to de-sensationalize its content and immunize 
the threat of the violent contagion may also be seen in comparison with another contemporary 
news documentary on the riots. In 1965, KTLA aired its own special broadcast on the Watts Riot 
in Los Angeles titled Hell in the City of the Angels. From the start, it is clear this documentary 
strikes a very different tone, even if it shares many formal similarities with the WWJ production: 
the broadcast opens with host and narrator Hugh Brundage speaking over aerial footage of the city, 
commenting on the relative racial harmony, supported by claims that the black population of Los 
Angeles was much better off than those other urban centers of the U.S. which were beginning to 
show signs of racial unrest. Of course, the story of peace and prosperity merely serves to set up 
the paroxysmal title sequence when Brundage abruptly shifts his tone and declares: “Then, with 
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the suddenness of a lightning bolt and all the fury of an infernal holocaust, there was Hell in the 
City of Angels.” The KTLA broadcast is set to a dramatic orchestral score which accompanies 
Brundage’s voice-over narration and the images of violent clashes between police and rioters. 
Although both films include aerial footage, the segments in Hell in the City of the Angels are much 
longer, the editing much more sparse — the average shot length in Six Days in July is perhaps a 
few seconds at most, in contrast with the favored form of the aerial shot which runs for sometimes 
several minutes at a time in the Los Angeles broadcast. On the subject of aerial footage, 
cinematographer Art Mazur, who worked alongside Pruette, speculates that had city and state 
officials seen what he saw, from above, they would have understood much sooner “the 
seriousness” of the situation in Detroit: “It was apparent from the air that the town was about to be 
sacked.” For the most part, however, Six Days in July avoids dwelling on the aerial view of the 
city, and any footage from this vantage is accompanied by an explanation of what can be seen as 
well as the causes and effects that are not immediately visible — it is, in brief, curated through its 
contextualization. In KTLA’s film, long stretches of aerial footage roll without such mediation, 
unedited and intact, and the manufactured pretense of knowledge conveyed by WWJ through its 
careful curation and retrospective commentary is absent. If the aerial camera signifies a privileged 
place from which the imminence of events becomes legible, according to Mazur, the images and 
accompanying reportage from KTLA dwells instead in the contingency of the experience. As the 
helicopter hovers over the city, the journalist aboard narrates only what he sees, largely without 
comment, and the seen constitutes the entirety of his narration; his voice and vantage is 
superfluous, a supplement to the lens which performs the same descriptive labor. In contrast with 
the retrospective tenor of Six Days in July, the KTLA broadcast operates more often in the 
speculative mode, bringing the audience along for the ride, as it were. In one of the film’s longer 
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aerial sequences — which like most of the others is composed of a single roving shot — the footage 
shows several buildings on fire and the nearby blocks where people gather to watch. At one point, 
the aerial reporter speculates about the motives of those on the ground based on their movements 
and gestures, fascinated by their seeming unconcern, and soon fixates on a trio of young black men 
who are seen running from one of the fires. He immediately concludes that the young men were 
involved in starting the fires and as the camera tracks their movement through a nearby parking 
lot and into a building out of frame, the reporter, in his broadcasting of the events, directs police 
to the location of the “suspects” he has conjured from his knowing vantage above. In both films, 
the aerial shot puts a physical distance between the seer and the seen, it moves outside and above 
the more phenomenological experience that would be captured by a camera at ground level and, 
in that distance, it abstracts the image. In producing such distances and abstractions, the aerial shot 
fulfills several (sometimes contradictory) functions: it reduces the threat of contagion and the 
landscape becomes more legible in terms of a total picture of events.73  
 Six Days in July almost impeccably pulls off an aesthetics of law and order, affirming the 
moral right of government and law enforcement through its de-sensationalizing of otherwise 
emotional and inflammatory content and its use of framing, retrospection, and editing in service 
of a logic of containment and static representation. It strives for a specific legibility that tells the 
story of a city under siege and effectively fulfills Sen. Curtis’s imperative for American media to 
promote the desire for law and order. The film’s aesthetics reproduce the logic of the police that 
Rancière describes as “not a social function but a symbolic constitution of the social” (Dissensus 
36). The “essence” of the police, he argues, “lies in a certain way of dividing up [partitioning] the 
sensible [partage du sensible],” where this “partition” indicates both “that which separates and 
 
73 Cf. the cinematographer’s claim above: “It was apparent from the air that the town was about to be sacked.” 
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excludes” as well as “that which allows participation” (36). Six Days in July internalizes this 
function and makes it the aesthetic principle by which exclusion is rationalized and participation 
is restricted to only those who are on this side of the manufactured “constitution of the social.” 
Hell in the City of the Angels, on the other hand, seems more concerned with doing the opposite, 
of playing up the illegibility of the riots, and of stoking fear and promoting the narrative of racial 
violence as a social contagion. Limits of the contemporary technology — seen, for example, in 
many extended sequences shot at night where the Los Angeles landscape gets rendered in almost 
abstract expressionist forms of black and grey — reinforce the associations of blackness, obscurity, 
and danger that become so central to the state discourse on violence. In the broadcast’s scenes 
during night, most of which are shown from above via helicopter footage, what shows up on screen 
is barely visible: we see the contrast of the fires only dimly rendered against a blacker backdrop 
of night sky and unlit streets, but we cannot see what is burning. We see the contours of structures 
but only enough that the ambiguous imagery is both hellish (as likely intended) and beautiful in 
its abstraction. In some ways, the aesthetic presentation of the broadcast fulfills the hyperbolic 
worry of Hetfield that the riots will become a conflagration that will consume the nation.74 
However, this contagion of the visible is communicated through the figuration of violence while 
the actual subject matter of the film — in these night-time scenes, at least — gets swept up in the 
processes of abstraction: the context for the uprisings, the violence wrought by segregation, gets 
bracketed out in such sequences. 
 In the next chapter, I will continue to think about what it means to represent the conflicts 
and anxieties of this post-civil rights era in an analysis of two feature films. As the analysis will 
shift to accommodate works of fiction, I will nevertheless maintain this focus not only on what 
 
74 Cf. note 64. 
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gets seen/represented within the strictures of particular genres and media but how such modes of 
representation communicate through those very limits.  
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Fig. 1.1 — Diagram of Jefferson Street in the city of Nashville, Tennessee. 
 
Fig. 1.2 — City of Plainfield, New Jersey. 
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Fig. 1.3 — City of Detroit, Michigan (left). 
 
Fig. 1.4 — City of Detroit, Michigan (right). 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
Frustrated Desires — Representations of Labor in Post-Civil Rights Film 
 
Chapter Introduction 
In the first chapter, I analyzed a federal discourse on violence and political right in a series 
of legislative hearings tasked with investigating the crisis of the urban uprisings/riots at the end of 
the 1960s; and I theorized an aesthetics of law and order that arose out of a paranoid-schizoid 
conception of urban space and how it was used to manage representations of the uprisings in order 
to neutralize the challenge to the hegemony of capital and state. The hearings and the two television 
broadcasts that I analyzed are early examples of discursive and aesthetic objects from the period I 
am calling the post-civil rights era, which begins in 1967 — with the revisions to the Civil Rights 
Act and the Housing and Urban Development Act — and endures up until about 1983 — when 
President Ronald Reagan secured a victory over the striking air traffic controllers, often seen as 
the dawn of American neoliberalism. This period is characterized by the psychic aftermath of what 
I see as the state’s failure to reckon with the political problems of desegregation and the 
subjugation of domestic (gendered) labor. As I argued in the first chapter, it is equally important 
to understand this failure in the context of the purported solution that took shape in the revisions 
to the major civil rights legislation in 1967. The revisions to the Housing and Urban Development 
Act, in particular, were seen to open up the home — both the single-family dwelling and the 
apartment in the ghetto — to greater financialization by capital. As I will show in this chapter, this 
political problem (of desegregation) and its economic solution (make housing more affordable by 
shifting the burden of debt onto the public) contributed to a crisis of the domestic  that was 
represented and worked through in films conceived and produced outside of the Hollywood mode 
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of production. Although both films that I analyze in this chapter are most easily categorized as 
works of cinematic realism or naturalism, they make use of tropes from melodrama that, in their 
breakdown, reinforce my reading of how domestic concerns become overdetermined by the 
problematic of labor in the post-civil rights era. In the introduction, I looked at the psychoanalytic 
concept of trauma as a way of describing and analyzing this period; and although trauma is often 
marshalled for just such projects of narrating collective suffering, it felt inadequate to the 
specificities of this moment in American history, not least of which because of the moral baggage 
the concept has accrued in its overuse in sociological theory. Instead, I argued for the relevance of 
the concepts of defense and care as they are theorized in object relations psychoanalysis. If we 
accept that de-segregation was the defining problem of the post-civil rights era, the legislative 
discourse that occupied my attention in the first chapter can be understood as manifestly defensive, 
in this specific sense, and it was precisely a space and experience of care that was sought in the 
bureaucratic aesthetics of law and order — a somewhere where the problem of knowing could be 
suspended in favor of facilitation and the promise of potentiality. 
After the collapse of the Hollywood Production Code in 1968, which all but abolished 
industry restrictions on graphic content, American film became enamored with the kinds of gritty, 
realistic representations of violence that had previously been confined to exploitation cinema.75 
 
75 As Eric Schaefer has shown, however, there was never any clean separation of mainstream and exploitation cinema, 
not in industrial terms nor in aesthetic matters of form and content. 
Exploitation films are usually thought of as ethically dubious, industrially marginal, and 
aesthetically bankrupt. That they emerged from the mainstream industry, indeed, that their origins 
can be traced to respectable films made with the alleged ‘good intentions’ of decreasing human 
suffering, is another paradox surrounding exploitation. But progressivism, the movement that gave 
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What might have appeared to be the birth of a cinematic naturalism in the United States, however, 
was often rooted in misogynist and classist fantasies of the nation’s pathologized others.76 Films 
such as Joe (1970), Five Easy Pieces (1970), and Looking for Mr Goodbar (1977) mask, behind 
their ostensible meditations on violence, capital, and inequality, a paranoiac vision of those classes 
and races who are confined to a milieu of anomie and deviance — an ideological vision wholly 
consistent with the federal discourse that conflates the urban with the criminally pathological.77 
Outside Hollywood, however, an emerging alternative cinema was combining elements of Italian 
Neorealism, cinéma vérité, direct cinema, and the French New Wave to document and dramatize 
 
birth to these films and was then instrumental in suppressing them, was itself filled with paradoxes. 
(17) 
As we will see, theories of melodrama often share the ethical desires of progressivism. 
76 See Molly Haskel’s From Reverence to Rape, which traces the history of the (mis)representation of women in film 
up through the 1970s. Of the transition from the 1960s to the 1970s, for example, she writes: “In the roles and 
prominence accorded women, the decade began unpromisingly, grew steadily worse, and at present shows no signs 
of improving. Directors who in 1962 were guilty only of covert misogyny (Stanley Kubrick’s Lolita) or kindly 
indifference (Sam Peckinpah’s Ride the High Country) became overt in 1972 with the violent abuse and brutalization 
of A Clockwork Orange and Straw Dogs” (323). 
77 Derek Nystrom’s study of 1970s Hollywood cinema has explored this dynamic in detail, although his analysis tends 
to conflate the categories of social strata and class. See, for example, his claim that “the new visibility of working-
class characters in the 1970s was generated by a series of middle-class concerns and dilemmas. Much as 
representations of homosexuality are often more concerned with stabilizing heterosexual identity (or, for that matter, 
as images of blackness are frequently produced by white anxiety), the decade’s cinematic renderings of white working-
class masculinity tell us a great deal about the crisis within what I will call the professional-managerial class (PMC) 
during this period” (4). 
85 
 
social conflicts with an almost naturalistic attention to individual, family, and community 
dynamics.78 In such films, depictions of violence take a different form from their Hollywood 
counterparts: while the latter rely on externalized and often paroxysmal representations of 
brutality,79 filmmakers such as Charles Burnett, Billy Woodberry, Julie Dash, and John 
Cassavettes explore the diffuse and ubiquitous violence that results from the everyday effects of 
structural inequalities. In Burnett’s Killer of Sheep (1978), for example, the many sequences of 
children at play invoke, in their games of war and feints at death, a rehearsal of future conflict at 
the same time as they explore the cause-effect relation of injury and empathy. Where Hollywood’s 
auteurs often rely on stark juxtapositions of moral conflict to indict specific traits or types in a 
mimicry of political critique, a film like Woodberry’s Bless Their Little Hearts (1983) subverts 
melodramatic tropes to expose the socioeconomic foundations of moral judgment and the 
collective determination of individual thought. This chapter makes use of the generic framework 
of the melodrama, where it shows up in works of post-civil rights cinematic realism, to show how 
these films frustrate traditional aesthetic channels of sociopolitical desire and how conceptions of 
class, labor, and race informed the experience and imaginary of domestic life in this era. 
I argue against the theoretical tendency to erect (methodological or hermeneutic) borders 
between the categories of race, gender, and class in the study of aesthetics and politics, 
 
78 “The concern with family, in particular, determines Killer of Sheep’s narrative and helps define Burnett’s vision of 
black urban space, one that is, unlike Sweetback, enabled by communities working together in various forms rather 
than by individuals working alone” (Massood 24-25). See also Guerrero; and Kleinhans, “Realist Melodrama.” 
79 More often than not, the violent episodes in films like Joe and Looking for Mr Goodbar have the problematic 
function of communicating the film’s message through acts of homicidal vengeance which merely reinforce the 
misogynist or classist ideology that undermines its pretentions to tolerance and justice. Cf. Haskell, pp. 323-330. 
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exemplified, perhaps, in Fredric Jameson’s claim that the discourses of civil rights — which he 
contrasts with the “politics of social class” — were not “intrinsically subversive,” and that they 
were, rather, “cooptable because they are already — as ideals — inscribed in the very ideology of 
capitalism itself” (“Class and Allegory” 844). In the first chapter, I showed how “the ideals of 
racial justice and sexual equality” (844) challenged the implicit rule over and ownership of the 
prevailing political ontology of the nation by exposing its exclusionary structure and the logics of 
abjection and immunization by which it maintained control over that reality.80 While perhaps not 
“intrinsically subversive” according to the dictates of historical materialism, such “ideals” were 
the animating force behind the physical demonstrations against the state and in the streets. Of 
course, the very designation of racial justice and sexual equality as ideals ignores the inherent 
material critiques of state, capital, and patriarchy that the movements of the era promulgated and 
enacted — in brief, Jameson’s move to name the ideals of justice and equality obfuscates the 
critical focus on injustice and inequality. Further, the challenge embodied in these critiques must 
be understood as inseparable from class antagonisms and the broader socioeconomic injustices 
precisely because the categories — and experiences — of reproduction, subsistence, and 
employment are emphatically gendered and racialized.  
 
80 In the state discourse on the urban uprisings at the end of the 1960s, the response to this challenge took the form of 
a paranoid-schizoid imperative to defend the nation from its internal saboteurs, its abject others, who threaten to undo 
the boundaries of America’s cities and in the process to undo the nation herself. The ostensible interest in the security 
of urban life was, however, inseparable from the (armed) maintenance of the municipal borders which doubled as 
barriers between races and classes and guaranteed the commercial and speculative interest of the capital state. 
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 In the first part of this chapter, I survey the literature on melodrama which reached a critical 
mass in American and British scholarship in the 1970s.81 Although some sense of a historically 
consistent conception of melodrama is relevant to my argument — and although questions of 
pathos, excess,82 and moral polarization are all central to what follows — I am more interested in 
 
81 The genre of melodrama is notoriously capacious, and any effort to synthesize its many tropes into a coherent and 
historically consistent form would amount to little more than an exercise in encyclopedic reduction. As Ben Singer 
notes in his study of cinematic melodrama and modernity, there are typically two approaches that are taken to define 
the term for the purposes of critical analysis. One might, for example, identify a “defining element that manifests itself 
in various ways throughout all the genre’s many permutations” (38). For those critical endeavors that pursue such an 
approach, the “essential element” most frequently associated with melodrama is excess (39). Or one might, with 
Singer, “analyze melodrama as a ‘cluster concept,’” which would involve identifying a larger set of tropes that 
combine in various degrees and establish a constant over time and in otherwise disparate cultural contexts (44). 
Drawing on the earlier definitional study of William S. Dye, Singer identifies five “basic features” of melodrama: 
pathos, overwrought emotion, moral polarization, nonclassical narrative structure, and sensationalism (44-49). 
82 The figure of excess is a constant in the critical literature on melodrama, where it is posited as one of the “essential 
elements” of the genre, according to Ben Singer (38). As Peter Brooks notes: “Nothing is understood, all is overstated” 
(41). In seminal works of film theory by Geoffrey Nowell-Smith and Laura Mulvey, excess figures the expressive or 
gratifying release of “psychic energies and emotions which the narrative ‘represses’” because they are “fundamentally 
incompatible with the demands of dominant patriarchal ideology” (Singer 39). Melodrama is also characterized by 
emotional excess in its characters, an excess of “visceral responses” in the spectator (i.e., its overwrought pathos and 
the inevitable tears of sympathy), and an excess of “moral outrage” that most often takes form in the hatred for a 
villain (39-40). As a way of talking about melodrama, Christine Gledhill notes how excess is frequently tied to the 
naïve identification of the genre’s popular audiences whose repressed desires and visceral attachments are coded as 
gender specific. “The designation of the family as a bourgeois institution, the perceived materialisation of bourgeois 
ideology in these films as a sphere conventionally assigned to women — the home, family relations, domestic trivia, 
consumption, fantasy and romance, sentiment — all imply equivalence between the ‘feminine’ and bourgeois 
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how melodrama operates as an analytical category for thinking through the sociopolitical use of 
cultural forms. I am also interested in the ways that the genre of genre theory itself was often a site 
for the working through of the very same sociopolitical anxieties that were being explored in the 
films from which those theorists derived their critical narratives of collective desire. While the 
classical formula of the melodrama brought about narrative closure in order to facilitate a cathartic 
identification with the moral good or a proxy experience of frustrated sociopolitical desires,83 the 
 
ideology” (Gledhill 12). Critical observation of excess is split off from the identification and experience of it, and the 
one who, in ironic detachment, judges excess as symptom occupies a position of superiority in relation to the one who 
is affected by it. Excess as figure is a tool of ideological critique. Excess as experience and desire indexes an aesthetic 
over-investment, a too-close relationship with the cultural object that fails to account for its inherent status as a product 
of fiction. 
83 Peter Brooks, for example, argues that the “melodramatic” is a specific mode of engaging with a world that has 
undergone a progressive desacralization. What he terms the “melodramatic imagination” seeks to unveil the moral 
occult, which he defines as “the domain of operative spiritual values which is both indicated within and masked by 
the surface of reality” — “the repository of the fragmentary and desacralized remnants of ancient myth” (5). The 
melodramatic imagination penetrates reality’s surface and seeks in such desacralized remnants an experience of 
morality and meaning that is no longer operative — not since the historical transition from feudalism to bourgeois 
capitalism via the Enlightenment. For Brooks, melodrama “evolves out of the loss of pre-Enlightenment values and 
symbolic forms, in response to the psychic consequences of the bourgeois social order, in which the social must be 
expressed as the personal” (Gledhill 29). In other words, melodrama provides the cultural space for an experience that 
had been repressed in the triumph of the secular over spiritual life. The “moral occult” comes to index “a generalised 
need for ‘significance,’ the terms of which are historically relative, rather than as a set of specific ideological ideas” 
(Gledhill 29). For “secular bourgeois society,” then, this significance took the form of “all that cannot be contained 
within the dominant order — anti-social desire, the ‘numinous,’ the struggle of good and evil” (29-30). As a result, 
there was an intimate association of the emotional and the moral in nineteenth-century bourgeois melodrama: “Ethical 
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cinematic melodramas of the post-civil rights era reach no such formal completion. Thus, where 
melodramatic tropes appear in the films I analyze in this chapter, instead of providing avenues for 
identification and pathos they reveal, in the breakdown of such formal channels, the absence of a 
moral ground from which one might stand above (or at least aside from) the excesses of capital 
and its subjugation of the domestic. For such a critique, whether a specific novel or film is a 
melodrama is less relevant than how the genre mobilizes a set of critical questions to theorize and 
analyze the problems that most concern me here: namely, how representations of reproductive 
labor, subsistence, and unemployment problematize — and dramatize — the function of the 
domestic economy as the site where capital first lays claim to psychic and social life. While the 
first chapter explored how the ideological contest over public space in the 1960s was related to a 
paranoid-schizoid abjection of the nation’s black others and a fear of racial integration, this chapter 
moves into the interior of the home to show the subjugation of the domestic by the capitalist state. 
In A Woman Under the Influence (1974), set in a residential neighborhood in West Hollywood, 
the nervous anxiety of a working class housewife figures the violence of reproductive labor. In 
Bless Their Little Hearts (1983), the struggles of a black man to find regular work in the segregated 
community of Watts exposes the failed efforts to create opportunities for historically oppressed 
peoples in the wake of the civil rights struggles and explores the effects (and affects) of 
underemployment at the end of the post-civil rights era.  
 
Tracking Desire and Frustration: Melodrama as Category of Experience 
 
imperatives in the post-sacred universe have been sentimentalized, have come to be identified with emotional states 
and psychic relationships, so that the expression of emotional and moral integers is indistinguishable” (Brooks 42). 
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In the critical literature on melodrama, an emphasis on the “personal” and the “emotional” 
often fails to conceive social and economic dynamics in a way that accounts for differences in 
gender, class, or race. Thomas Elsaesser84 and Peter Brooks, for example, both interrogate how 
melodramatic forms respond to a world where the structure and meaning of experience has been 
“violently thrown into question” — i.e., in the transition from feudalism to bourgeois capitalism 
(Brooks 15). However, the very category of “experience” in this discourse is indeterminant, an 
abstraction intended to register broad historical changes whose effects are then made integral to 
the desires and anxieties of an imagined public. A concept of domestic interiority remains implicit 
in these theories that nevertheless rely on categories of individuality, desire, and morality to make 
the case for a melodramatic drive that emerges in tandem with the rise of the interior as a unique 
 
84 “Melodrama,” for Elsaesser, describes a source of aesthetic material taken up by canonical works of literature and 
cinema in order to transcend the solely mimetic function of popular culture. Although he attends to the conventional 
series of binaries that make up the thematic poles of the melodrama — i.e., high/low, good/evil, public/private, 
innocence/guilt, irony/pathos — he also replicates that binary logic in his insistence on a distinct separation between 
the “popular” and the literary. Thus, the value distinction between popular/mass culture and serious/literary culture 
remains operative: the popular in itself possesses a critical and analytical value only where it has been dislodged from 
popular culture and appropriated by high art. While melodrama is valued for its mimetic truth-content, as “popular” 
culture it retains critical relevance only to the extent that it has served as material for the production of what Elsaesser 
terms “sophisticated” art. “Even if the situations and sentiments defied all categories of verisimilitude and were totally 
unlike anything in real life, the structure had a truth and a life of its own, which an artist could make part of his 
material” (49, my emphasis). Linda Williams and Christine Gledhill (among others) have drawn attention to the 
critical practices that draw on the structures of value inherent in such cultural binaries which are then problematically 
mapped onto relations of gender, race, and class. See Williams, Playing the Race Card, 10-16; and Gledhill, “The 
Melodramatic Field,” 11-12. 
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space of experience and feeling.85 As Martha Vicinus notes, “Domestic melodrama was the 
working out in popular culture of the conflict between the family and its values and the economic 
and social assault of individualization” (128). However, in the opposition between the family and 
its values and the social coercion of the individual, Vicinus, too, evacuates the categories of the 
private and the interior of their economic determinations, ignoring that the individual is as much a 
product of society as it is of the family. “Value” here becomes exclusive to the domestic/familial 
in contrast with the social/individual which, in its “assault” on the family, acquires the character 
of an anti-value. One cannot conceive these “familial values” without resorting to negative 
formulations; in other words, “value” comes to signify the negation or inversion of those aspects 
of bourgeois capitalism that must be disavowed in order to preserve an ideal image of the subject 
who lives and has been nurtured in a space apart. Thus, when Vicinus argues that melodrama “is 
not concerned with what is possible or actual but with what is desirable,” she rightly diagnoses the 
psychosocial use of the genre but does not provide the concrete signifiers that would clarify who 
is doing the desiring. Hannah Arendt’s genealogical distinction between the social and the political 
gets reified in theories of melodrama which fail to recognize that the social “is neither private nor 
public, strictly speaking” (28).  
In Elsaesser’s historical survey of melodrama, despite the genre’s tendency to take the form 
of “escapist” mass entertainment, the peculiarities of its popular idiom were mobile, able to be 
captured and put to work in proper realist works of fiction. Further, they were often capable of 
 
85 It may be worth looking into the discursive links with a competing effort in political theory to indict and separate 
out this space of domestic interiority for the same reasons that it is celebrated in the critical literature on melodrama. 
We saw this in the first chapter exemplified in Hannah Arendt’s determination of the domestic as a space ruled by 
necessity. This concept of necessity will be integral to my analysis of A Woman Under the Influence, below. 
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amplifying the realism of the realist work in their more precise mimetic relation to historical and 
social variables. It is similar for Brooks who argues that melodrama evinces a psychological 
realism, capable, in its exaggerated forms and feelings, of expressing a reality that is otherwise 
repressed in a sublimated society. Chuck Kleinhans takes a different approach in his stress on 
melodrama’s concern with the family and its conflicts which in their very interiority accrue, for 
him, an almost quasi-universality. “Perhaps more than any other genre, melodrama deals directly 
with one side of the capitalist dichotomy, with the personal sphere, home, family, and women’s 
problems” (“Notes” 42). Where realism invests gesture and detail with a social significance which 
typically assumes a pessimistic, even fatalistic, relation to the world it depicts, melodrama shifts 
the emphasis to an almost redemptive focus on the moral tenor of effects (“Realist” 160-62). In 
such terms, melodrama acquires an almost pragmatic significance. “More directly than other 
genres, melodrama helps us understand, relate to, or deal with the same kind of situations that we 
emotionally experience in personal life” (“Notes” 43). In its emphasis on the personal and the 
familial, melodrama has a “fairly coherent historical and social existence,” yet, at the same time, 
it has a “protean form” that emerges in its “profound psychological resonance in the audience of 
its own time” (“Realist” 158, 163). Contrary to the theories of excess and repression, then, 
Kleinhans argues for melodrama’s groundedness. In its historical coherence and through its 
pragmatic aesthetics, melodrama might serve, instead, to temper the cynical “momentum of 
realism,” to bring it back within a framework of didactic and ethical relation (“Realist” 162). For 
Kleinhans, the function of melodrama is didactic and pragmatic: “it represents to us the 
contradictions of capitalism as evidenced in the personal sphere” and it “helps us understand, relate 
to, or deal with” the situations that arise as a result of those contradictions (“Notes” 43). Here, the 
use of melodrama is tied to its analogical structure: we can relate to it, Kleinhans suggests, because 
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we have been there. “I’m sure some of my readers have direct experience from their own family 
with the central question in All That Heaven Allows: should a widow remarry, and if so, outside 
her class and to a younger man?” (“Notes” 43). For Kleinhans, then, the aesthetic experience, even 
where it is affective, remains intellectual: its analogical structure allows for a direct experience of 
the film’s moral conflict and requires the viewer to consider the fictional resolution in the context 
of her own life. This is a decidedly different aesthetic experience from what we find in Elsaesser, 
Brooks, and Vicinus, where the film communicates at a primarily affective and unconscious level. 
The critical literature on melodrama frequently sees in the genre a cultural space within 
which domestic desires negotiate an antagonistic relationship with the forces of state and capital, 
providing, for example, a narrative triumph of the weak over the powerful.86 For Brooks, however, 
melodrama and “the state” are historically bound up with one another; in his analysis, the purported 
goal of the French Revolution was to render “the Republic as the institution of morality” — an 
“attempt to sacralize law itself” (14, 15). Where this inevitably fails, the drive for a secular morality 
“necessarily produces melodrama instead, incessant struggle against enemies, without and within, 
branded as villains, suborners of morality, who must be confronted and expunged, over and over, 
to assure the triumph of virtue” (15, my emphasis).87 The assumption that melodrama can be the 
 
86 Christine Gledhill notes that “melodrama’s invariable deployment of familial values across sub-genres attests to a 
psychic overdetermination of the social and personal, charging the idea of home and family with a symbolic potency” 
(21). Martha Vicinus puts it even more succinctly: “Melodrama always sides with the powerless” (130). 
87 As I will argue in the next chapter, there is an affinity between this melodramatic structuring of experience and the 
“spectacle of policing,” as Jean and John L. Comaroff have noted. The “theatrics” of policing, especially in 
postcolonial contexts, “are anything but hidden or half-hearted. More often than not they assume the overdrawn shape 
of melodrama…. So it is with the spectacle of policing, the staging of which strives to make actual, both to its subjects 
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product of a (failed) revolutionary drive for state formation suggests an intimacy, if not a 
homology, of the political and the aesthetic that Brooks leaves largely unanalyzed. Implicit in such 
an analysis is the belief in an ahistorical social drive, a sort of Freudian collective unconscious,88 
that seeks a mimetic experience of its “most basic desires and interdictions” in representational 
form (5). Although the motivations are historical — the bourgeois attempt to recover the sacred 
that the Enlightenment had purged from social life — the drive itself is timeless. If the Revolution 
fails to enact the state as the institution of morality, the drive does not cease, does not fail altogether 
in its effort to give form to its desire for the triumph of virtue: it necessarily produces melodrama 
instead. This is why, for Brooks, “melodramatic rhetoric, and the whole expressive enterprise of 
the genre, represents a victory over repression” (41).89  
The post-civil rights era in the United States provides an interesting context for these 
theories of melodrama that bridge the aesthetic and the political by way of psycho-social 
investment in something like a historical narrative. What would constitute the drive of a Freudian 
collective unconscious in the United States in the 1970s? It would have to be not only ambivalent 
 
and to itself, the authorized face, and force, of the state — of a state, that is, whose legitimacy is far from unequivocal” 
(“Criminal Obsessions” 276). 
88 Freudian and not Jungian because it is not a repository of sociocultural archetypes but the locus of drives and the 
bearer of repressions. 
89 It is a victory over the repression of the drive for morality as the calculus of social life, and it does not matter that it 
happens in cultural rather than political form. “The melodramatic utterance breaks through everything that constitutes 
the ‘reality principle,’ all its censorships, accommodations, tonings-down. Desire cries aloud its language in 
identification with full states of being…. Desire triumphs over the world of substitute-formations and detours, it 
achieves plenitude of meaning” (Brooks 41). 
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but outright contradictory in its pursuits as the analysis of the urban uprisings in the first chapter 
has shown. On the one hand, there is a desire to defend the dominant conception of the state as the 
sole determinant of what can count as political life in a nation whose history has followed — and 
must continue to follow — a profoundly moral telos. On the other hand, there is a desire to 
dismantle this very order of the state, and to make of this dismantling the new paradigm by which 
the inequalities and immoralities of this order are exposed and made to account for the abjecting 
violence by which the state maintains its forms. In the classical conception of melodrama, the 
genre names a space of mediation between an individual who requires that space in order to enact 
a fantasy of revenge against a social order that demands a renunciation of any private form of 
value. Where tropes of the genre show up in the post-civil rights films that I discuss below, 
however, even the fantasy of such a space is more than the cultural object can promise. At this 
point in American history, the moral power of poverty — a Judeo-Christian power that lingered in 
the early bourgeois era as a remainder of feudal power structures — had since been subsumed into 
the teleological bildungsroman of the rags-to-riches figure of the good capitalist. In proper 
Hegelian fashion, the innocent child, the poor mother, or the abused wife only retained its moral 
value (emblematized in powerlessness) as a moment, no longer a good in itself. As moment, it 
needed to be sublimated, sucked up into the inevitable and inexorable march of progress. This all 
but undoes melodrama’s classical temporality, thus crippling its melancholic form of hope in 
which it had once been possible — or so the genre theorists argue — to resurrect the lost love, to 
show, in fact, that it had been there the whole time, it was only misrecognized, falsely indicted by 
a specious system of value that had now been overthrown. In the post-civil rights films I examine 
below, there is no longer a question of how it should have been, as if imperial capitalism was only 
one possible way things could have turned out, and as if recognizing this might somehow conjur 
96 
 
up the other possible ways that might be championed instead. Where manifest destiny orders the 
temporality of social history, things are only ever how it should be, where the status quo and the 
moral order are seen as inseparable. 
Thus, in the paranoiac imperative of post-civil rights American statecraft, the lure of the 
melodramatic fantasy no longer entices one to experience the victory of the moral over the secular. 
Melodrama’s repetition compulsion no longer takes the form of a unified drive for the experience 
that arises from a world that has been made morally legible. Moral legibility, in brief, is not an 
issue. If anything, the United States, beginning in the 1960s, suffered a political and cultural surfeit 
of moral values,90 even if they were fiercely contested. When Richard Nixon described his 
“majority” in contrast with the “Roosevelt coalition,” for example, he sought to construct a 
political base united by “the same basic values” — “people who care about a strong United States, 
about patriotism, about moral and spiritual values” (qtd. in Cowie 126).91 In 1969, Nixon’s 
“Middle America Committee” — which had been tasked with harnessing the political power of 
the “‘white middle class’” — understood that constituency as “‘deeply troubled, primarily over 
the erosion of what they consider to be their values’” and planned its appeal accordingly (qtd. in 
 
90 Even inflation would become a moral issue in a climate where the economy itself was a site of cathexis for such 
drives. Paul Volcker: “[Inflation] corrodes trust, particularly trust in government. It is a governmental responsibility 
to maintain the value of the currency that they issue. And when they fail to do that it is something that undermines an 
essential trust in government” (qtd. in Cooper 29-30). 
91 The very notion that there could be moral and spiritual values is antithetical to the melodramatic drive that Brooks 
locates in the nineteenth-century bourgeois struggle against the repression of the moral which is coextensive with the 
spiritual. We should also pay attention to the way that Nixon establishes “moral value” as the exclusive property of 
those who also value militarism and nationalism — as if, to be against a “strong United States” or not caring enough 
about patriotism renders one immoral by default. 
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Cowie 128). In this context, where the state acquired the metonymic expression of the moral 
structure of experience and became the object most in need of defense, state morality became 
congruent with traditional forms of family values: the male breadwinner, feminized reproductive 
labor, individual responsibility, and white superiority. When the state as the center of political 
power was then called into question by the radical critiques of the civil rights movement — which 
exposed its exclusive, abjecting structure (the ways in which the purported health of the institution 
was secured through violent processes of social immunization) — the state became the institution 
for the defense of morality. If capitalism and its purported value structure could, at the peak of the 
industrial era, come to be figured in the character of the villain and the circumstances of his defeat, 
by the mid-twentieth century in the United States, capitalism itself became, through an 
indissociable link with the American state, the object of defense. New Deal Keynsianism and the 
affluence of the postwar era in the United States saw an alliance between a bourgeoning (white) 
middle class and the bastions of capitalist power who united in their opposition to the seditious 
and subversive calls for the socialist redistribution of wealth and for civil rights for racial minorities 
and women. In a political landscape where the nation became the defender of “family values,” the 
anticapitalist sentiment of the Victorian melodrama — with its strict figurative association of 
power with villainy and evil and powerlessness with innocence and good — would no longer be 
legible to what could be considered the conservative part of the populace. So when the (now 
outmoded) tropes of classical melodrama show up in these post-civil rights films, they no longer 
express desire or gratification but rather they index the breakdown of the moral calculus in the 
cultural sphere. In the excess of gestural drama in the acting of Gena Rowlands in A Woman Under 
the Influence, for example, pathos does not lead the viewer to a position of moral transcendence; 
instead, it suggests a perversion of forms where the corporeal and psychic effects of capitalist 
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subjugation show up with the full weight of their irrationality and abjection. Where the exploitation 
of the powerless at the hands of the powerful was once a cathartic means to validate one’s 
oppressed values, in this post-civil rights era, we only see the suffering for what it is and bear with 
its bearers the shame for those who no longer even have a claim to moral superiority in the 
assumption of powerlessness as a virtue.92 
 
The Labor of Love: Reproduction and Subsistence 
On the surface, John Cassavettes’s film A Woman Under the Influence (1974) looks very 
much like a melodrama: wife and mother Mabel Longhetti (Gena Rowlands) suffers from an 
unnamed nervous illness93 that ultimately leads to her being committed to a psychiatric hospital 
by her husband Nick (Peter Falk) who has been pressured by his mother and enabled by the family 
doctor. The film is rife with the exaggerated and overwrought forms typical of the melodrama — 
in its operatic score, in Mabel’s repeated reenactments of Swan Lake, in the manichaeistic 
opposition of forces (of love and hate, order and chaos, desire and rage).94 However, in those 
 
92 This is most explicit in the scene in A Woman Under the Influence when Mabel asks her father to “stand up for her,” 
to which he responds by literally standing up out of his chair. I analyze this scene in detail below. 
93 The film never names her “illness” — opting instead for the euphemistic or stigmatizing, such as “sick,” “nervous,” 
“wacko,” or “crazy;” this absence of diagnosis undermines the pretense of psychological classification at the same 
time as it opens up, and even encourages, allegorical readings of the film. 
94 Elsaesser wrote of the “myth-making function” of early forms of the melodrama — from the medieval morality play 
through the romantic “cult of the picturesque” (44). One of the primary functions of such “popular” forms was “the 
non-psychological conception of the dramatis personae, who figure less as autonomous individuals than to transmit 
the action and link the various locales within a total constellation” (44). This was the source of the stereotypes that 
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moments when the façade of the sublimated self breaks down — yielding to a primal violence of 
discourse and gesture — the film also makes clear its pretense to a cinematic naturalism. The 
pathos of the family drama with its wrenching scenes of conflict, embarrassment, and abuse seem 
to confine the film’s thematic concerns to the struggles of private life. An analysis attentive to the 
social realism of melodrama (per Kleinhans) might see in such a drama a mimetic appeal to the 
working classes in its presentation of a wife and mother who suffers a nervous illness, an 
overworked husband and father who cannot cope and whose abuse is at least partially responsible 
for his wife’s breakdown, and the children and extended family caught in the middle and forced to 
take sides. In the film’s ambivalent style, however, the psychological turmoil of its characters does 
not speak to a crisis of individual desires but indexes, instead, the violence of a social structure 
that exerts an absolute control over the purportedly private space of the domestic. Mabel’s 
“madness” is inseparable from the conditions of her labor, from the demands made on the 
reproductive sphere of the home, and from her subservience to capital. While melodrama’s tropic 
investment in domestic conflict conventionally affirms the moral right of the family in opposition 
to social coercion, A Woman Under the Influence denies any moral ground and exposes the logic 
of opposition for what it has become: complicity.95 There is no position from which we might 
judge any of the actions in the film as right or wrong, not only because it has stripped the characters 
 
populated the most distilled forms of the late-nineteenth century melodrama, such as the mustachioed villain or the 
swooning damsel in distress.  
95 Although this will be covered in more detail below, it is worth noting at this point that complicity is ubiquitous in 
the film, not only on the part of the men, in the name of domestic subservience, but in the violence of women against 
each other and turned on themselves. Neither action nor language can escape its determination by this complicity with 
the hegemonic forces of capital. 
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of reason and choice — leaving them in a perpetual cycle of compulsion and reaction — but 
because, unlike the classical melodrama, morality can no longer be posited as a value in opposition 
to the forces of capital, which always had the last word anyway. Domestic life cannot be affirmed 
— neither ideologically nor even structurally — as distinct from a social order whose dictates it 
ultimately obeys as it performs the reproductive routines of sustaining and nurturing variable 
capital. While the home remains a site of familial conflict in the film, there is no interiority where 
one might escape the violence and coercion of the social which operates in the very gestures and 
desires of spouses, siblings, and children. 
In his essay for the film’s Criterion Collection release, critic and filmmaker Kent Jones 
praises those moments in the film when aggression breaks through the constraints of sublimation. 
As an example, he points to the final scene when Nick, having smacked Mabel down off the couch 
and onto the floor, stands over her and growls: “I’ll kill you! I’ll kill you! I’ll kill those sons-of-
bitchin’ kids!” Jones describes the moment as a “terrifying” one “and a liberating one as well, 
because it gives voice to frustrations that most people bottle up just when they’re about to reach 
the surface” (my emphasis). If the film gives voice to such moments of aggressivity, however, it 
also exposes the power relations inherent in vocality, for it is only Nick’s “frustrations” that are 
vocalized (in his frequent fits of shouting) and given voice by the film. Where Mabel’s 
“frustrations” reach the surface, they erupt in pathological displays of incoherence, in stuttering, 
in whispered pleas, and in the mute mouthing of words that cannot be spoken. In fact, the film 
amplifies her moments of inarticulate speech and gestural ticks in its adherence to the cinéma 
vérité aesthetic of exposure: the shakiness of the handheld camera, the ambient sounds that often 
compete with the main dialogue, the long takes and scenes that persist beyond their narrative and 
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dramatic exigency, and the frequent close-ups within which are sometimes crammed several faces 
and limbs.  
For Mabel, the home is neither container nor refuge: incapable of being herself — she 
pleads with Nick to tell her what to be, how to be96 — she is exposed in her own home, the promise 
of an inner sanctuary unfulfilled. Whether she is playing with her children, entertaining her 
husband’s work crew, or simply lounging in wait for her family to return, she finds only that she 
is doing it wrong: talking too loudly or too closely, being overly intimate or not being motherly 
enough, alienating her guests or offering them too much. It is in such a “powerlessness” that 
Gledhill locates the moral stakes of the melodramatic form: “Powerlessness regains moral power 
in its association with a family or social position that should command protection” (21). The film, 
however, does not offer the closure typical of the melodramatic form, partly because it does not 
resolve the moral stakes. Mabel is “powerless” in her compulsion, her acting out and being ruled 
by daemonic forces, but also in her marital subservience and her inability to decide for herself who 
she is — she will be whatever Nick tells her to be. In one of the film’s more touching yet cynical 
moments, Mabel is presented as one whose position “should command protection,” and there is a 
gesture to melodrama’s moral power of powerlessness but there is no moment of transcendence or 
realization. Mabel sits at the dinner table with her children, her husband, their parents, and the 
 
96 Early in the film, Nick brings his work crew home the morning after an all-night shift for Mabel to cook them a 
spaghetti dinner. When Mabel gets too close to one of the men, putting her face beside his as he sings an aria, Nick 
shouts at her to “sit down” before telling everyone to leave. In the conversation between husband and wife that follows, 
Mabel defends herself by telling Nick, “I’m not one of those stiffs that you like with their noses up in the air,” asserting 
that she is a “warm” person and that she “loves” his friends, “loves” anyone he “brings in the house.” Her self-defense 
quickly gives way, however, and she says to him: “Nicky, don’t be afraid to hurt my feelings. Tell me what you want 
me to be, how you want me to be.” 
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doctor, and she describes her experience at the hospital where her behavior was strictly regulated 
and she was subject to shock treatments. Nick interrupts her, punching the table, his face inches 
from her own, and tells her: “Be yourself. Go ahead. Simple talk.” Mabel looks up and quietly 
asks her father: “Dad, will you stand up for me?” The camera stays in a close-up shot on Mabel’s 
face and we hear her father get up from his chair at the other end of the table; he has stood up for 
her. Misunderstood, she asks him again, and he responds that he does not know what she wants 
him to do, pleads with her that he does not understand “this game.” Mabel “talking at cross-
purposes” with her father, wanting, when she asks him to stand up for her, his defense and 
protection (from her husband), seems to evoke the melodrama’s classic relation of pathos.97 Her 
figurative plea for support is taken literally, however, and her failure to communicate — which 
throughout the film usually results from a mutism or psychic retreat — feels here especially 
poignant in its clarity. In her powerlessness, although Mabel may invite pathos, she does not secure 
a victory, even allegorical, over the forces of capital and its domestic avatars. There is no change 
in the form of relations. No one is punished. No one even seems to have understood what happened. 
The Manichean structure of classical melodrama here gives way to a structure of what we might 
call amoral morality: unlike the poor widow, the weak child, the mistreated daughter, Mabel does 
not acquire power through suffering. This is not to say that she may not be pitied or evoke pathos 
 
97 Elsaesser defines the “archetypal melodramatic situation” in terms of “the response to the recognition of different 
levels of awareness” (66). This response manifests either as irony, where the spectator “registers the difference from 
a superior position,” or as pathos, which “results from non-communication or silence made eloquent” (66). 
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but that such “emotional” matters do not bridge the moral and the sentimental in the way the 
classical form had.98 
In the penultimate scene of the film, Mabel is due to return home from her six-month stay 
in a psychiatric hospital. In preparation, Nick plans a surprise party to welcome her home, and the 
film dwells in the anxiety of her imminent return as Nick stalks through the house and then outside 
in the rain asking himself and others if he went too far, if the house packed with people eager for 
drink and merriment might be “too much” for a woman still recovering from a recent nervous 
breakdown. When Nick’s mother confronts him outside and tells him “these people can’t stay 
here,” that “they got to go,” he relents without argument but tells her: “You do it! I know it’s 
wrong! I can’t do it! Can’t tell them not to go!” The moment is representative of Nick’s portrayal 
throughout the film as someone who both knows what must be done — a knowing determined by 
the strict codes of a working-class social normativity — yet finds himself incapable or unwilling 
to do it.99 His moments of decision are projected onto others and ascribed to a fatalism that 
determines his actions from without: he has to miss a date with his wife because of a burst water 
main, he has to throw his judgmental neighbor out of the house because his wife has been insulted, 
he has to have Mabel committed for the sake of the children and for her own good. When Nick is 
forced to act by those circumstances outside of his control, he erupts: he shouts, curses, threatens, 
 
98 “Ethical imperatives in the post-sacred universe have been sentimentalized, have come to be identified with 
emotional states and psychic relationships, so that the expression of emotional and moral integers is indistinguishable. 
Both are perhaps best characterized as moral sentiments” (Brooks 42). 
99 We might recall here the function of knowing, examined by Alan Bass, as an enacting of the concrete in the clinical 
setting. Knowledge does not, here, provide the motive and justification for action (or interpretation); it serves to 
prevent difference from intruding on a scene where intolerability has been sufficiently quarantined. 
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hits. In his confrontation with an implacable reality, he knows only imperatives: “don’t,” “stop,” 
“be normal,” “speak normal,” “get down,” “get out,” “get off,” “sit down.” 100 Nick occupies a 
position of authority in relation to the demands and conventions of a reality that calls upon him for 
its defense, but he is, the film suggests, unable to fulfill those demands. His words have no effect: 
Mabel does not “stop” and she certainly never is normal, however impossible that may be. Such 
vocalizations are not, however, gratuitous, not altogether without effect; rather, they are, like the 
physical blows that eventually intervene to enforce the imperative where it has not been obeyed, a 
part of the domestic economy — both in the order and circulation of role-based behaviors and the 
forces of internal governance, as well as in the expectations and consequences of capital where its 
immediate apparatuses of regulation are absent. In the quasi-private sphere of the domestic, the 
reproductive labor of housework is overdetermined by the machinations of the quasi-public sphere 
of production and its imperatives (of value creation) which are embodied and enforced by the 
patriarch-as-breadwinner.101 
 
100 There is, of course, the inherent problem of such an imperative of the formula “be normal” or “speak normal,” 
which, in its command to cease acting abnormally, exposes the unnatural constructedness of the normal. Mabel’s 
compulsions are both abnormal and natural (i.e., they happen without the interference of social convention). 
101 Robert O. Self has shown how the ideal of “breadwinning” — the belief that the public and remunerative quality 
of “men’s work” was sufficient to sustain either a working-class or middle class family, thus relegating women to the 
unpaid caregiving of domestic work — persisted throughout the first half of the twentieth century, and was “not even 
acknowledged as an ideology” in the 1960s debates on civil rights reform. “It functioned as an organizing mythology 
of social life and was believed to be the bedrock of a sound family and by extension a sound society” (18). Even 
among the most progressive discourses of civil rights reform, this ideology shaped the desires and limits of policy. As 
Self notes, “For many civil rights leaders, racial progress was inseparably linked to the capacity of African American 
families to create the male-breadwinner, female-homemaker household presumed to be enjoyed by whites. The 
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Mabel does not (cannot) benefit from the separation of home and work which Nick takes 
for granted, restricting her labor potential to the reproductive needs of herself and her family. The 
interiority of her psychic space is, thus, coextensive with the interiority of domestic space where, 
as Arendt had always insisted, need determines possibility and value is inseparable from bodily 
capacity. As Leopoldina Fortunati notes, the female houseworker’s “exchange of work for work” 
leads to a “subordination of female labor power’s productive capacity to its reproductive 
capacity;” it is, further, “determined by capital in order to oblige the woman to exchange her labor 
power (as capacity to reproduce) with variable capital” (15).102 Fortunati evokes an image of the 
female body that is simultaneously machine and raw material, a vampiric figure of constant capital 
that, in the process of working for another, works on and consumes itself: “A woman no longer 
uses her body, her body is a means of work and uses her. Her body not only becomes estranged 
from her, but, insofar as it is subject to the orders of others, it also becomes her enemy: it consumes 
her living processes” (72). The subordination of the productive to the reproductive is, thus, not 
 
common goal of the upwardly mobile black family involved trading a woman’s domestic labor in a white home for 
prideful domestic labor in her own home” (24).  
102 Fortunati here exposes the sexual division of labor that informs Marx’s definition of variable capital, which he 
describes as “that part of capital which is turned into labour-power” and thus “both reproduces the equivalent of its 
own value and produces an excess, a surplus-value” (Capital 1 317). The specific action of the reproduction of value 
described here takes place both in the process of the production of surplus-value — within the sphere of production 
proper — and at home where the labor of subsistence is performed for the productive laborer by another. In other 
words, the process of reproduction in the production of surplus-value depends on the cooperation (Fortunati writes of 
an “obligation”) of the sphere of reproduction as what sustains the variable capital of labor power. “This is to say that 
capital does not simply posit itself as a waged work relation but as a dual work relation: waged within production and 
non-waged within reproduction” (Fortunati 16). 
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without consequence: when the body itself becomes the means and the material for the creation of 
value, its own generative processes are brought into the circuit of production and consumption.103 
Mabel Longhetti is under the influence of her nervous anxiety whose ostensible aesthetic purpose 
is to figure the strain of conforming to a regime of social normativity; yet she is also under the 
influence of what Fortunati describes as the totalizing subordination of capital. In the 
improvisational and acutely physical performance of Gena Rowlands, her body acts out its own 
imminent breakdown. Mabel’s body is not only used but is being used up, its “living processes” 
are consumed by a family that counts on her physical and affective labor for its subsistence. Her 
relation to her children is a source of pride but also marks the limit of her (re)productive labor; as 
she tells them early on the same day she is committed: “I never did anything in my whole life that 
was anything except I made you guys.” It is Mabel’s body, the way it emotes, its gestures, its 
balletic swoons and its defeated crumpling, that bears and acts out the violence of an ontological 
war of the spouses104 while also exposing its one-sidedness. It is the sole terrain of the battle, and 
its stakes, but there can be no victor. 
 
103 When Fortunati writes about how the woman’s “body” becomes “estranged from her,” she renders Marx’s theory 
of alienation even more existentially repugnant (72). Marx describes alienation in these terms, in the Economic 
Manuscripts: “The product of labor is labor which has been embodied in an object, which has become material: it is 
the objectification [Vergegenständlichung] of labor. Labor’s realization is its objectification. In the sphere of political 
economy this realization [Verwirklichung] of labor appears as loss of realization [Entwirchlichung] for the workers; 
objectification as loss of the object and bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation [Entäusserung]” 
(108). Fortunati’s critique forces us to consider that, in the non-waged labor of reproduction, the object lost by the 
domestic wife/mother is quite literally her own body — she is alienated from herself.  
104 Kent Jones claims the film is a “war movie,” noting that “Mabel and Nick have dueling conceptions of reality, each 
as valid as the other.” This claim, however, ignores Mabel’s lack of agency: the only time she could be said to act 
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 One of the effects of the bodily estrangement that Fortunati describes is the forced 
renunciation of autonomy. Mabel’s body is not her own. The gestural and vocal quirks of her 
nervousness thus become a form of resistance to Nick’s authority, paradoxically assuming a kind 
of autonomy in compulsion, a way of evading his verbal imperatives. Although Nick’s commands 
are the vocal precursor to the physical force that inevitably proceeds them — he slaps her in the 
face in the film’s final scene — the words themselves also enact a violence. “If there is such a 
thing as violence in language, the term must be taken literally — not the violence of symbol, but 
the violence of intervention, of an event the immateriality of which does not prevent it from having 
material effects, effects not of metaphor but of metamorphosis” (Lecercle 227). Vocal language, 
in particular, exhibits the violence of “body penetrating body,” in, for example, the piercing of an 
ear-drum (229). As we see in Nick’s verbal imperatives, there is a mixing of these two violences: 
“the material violence of the scream, and the immaterial violence of persuasion” (230). If the 
domestic interior is the space of necessity, the space of bodies acting on bodies — without the 
transcendent, community-making function of what Arendt calls “speech” which can only take 
place in the public sphere — it is also the space where the violence of capital, most visible in the 
processes of accumulation and exploitation, extends into the capillaries of everyday life. Mabel’s 
compulsions and Nick’s commands enact, in the filmic narrative of a family drama, the impossible 
negotiation of domestic freedom and capitalist unfreedom.  
 
against her husband, to make the conscious choice to betray Nick’s “reality,” is her attempt at infidelity which 
culminates in what could only be described as rape. If husband and wife have dueling conceptions of reality, there is 
never any question which is the victor — in fact, the very idea that there could be more than one such conception 
would have to ignore Mabel’s struggle to simply articulate who or what she is. If anything, the “war” arises out of 
Nick’s frustrated effort to secure victory without cost, which is to say that even his reality is an illusion. 
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A Woman Under the Influence may also be said to dramatize the lapse in the self-governing 
or auto-policing function of the domestic interior as the site where social norms, having been 
inscribed on the body, organize the practices of family living that rehearse the obligations to 
capital. Near the start of the film, as Nick agonizes over calling Mabel to tell her that he will miss 
their date, he confesses to one of the men of his crew that, sure, Mabel is “unusual,” but “she’s not 
crazy”: “This woman cooks, sews, makes the bed, washes the bathroom. What the hell is crazy 
about that?” Although Nick means to say that Mabel cannot be crazy precisely because she does 
these things, the way he says it suggests there might be something crazy about the labor of 
housework. His speech exposes the psychic violence of the domestic sphere. He means to use 
Mabel’s devotion to her role as housewife and mother as proof against the claim, which he makes 
himself, that she is crazy. His supposedly rhetorical question about the craziness of housework 
has, however, a subversively sincere response summed up in a single word: everything. Is it not 
crazy that a relation ostensibly grounded in love and mutuality should demand a fidelity that is 
both material and immaterial?105 Is it not crazy that where that fidelity wavers, where the body and 
person of the houseworker do not adhere to the dictates of a normality beyond question, they 
should be subject to violent reorganization? Fortunati writes: 
The fact that housework is not solely bed-making, cleaning, washing, ironing etc. 
has already been argued ad nauseam. This is work that, within certain obvious 
limits, not only makes the satisfaction of material needs possible, but is also work 
directly related to the satisfaction of non-material needs. Housework has to [be] 
 
105 “Within the processes of reproduction of labor-power, two clear figures can be discerned. (1) The process of 
commodity production does not take place in a direct way. Rather, it has two distinct phases separated from each other 
by the moment of consumption. (2) Both material and non-material use-values are produced within it” (Fortunati 72). 
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organized around material and non-material functions because the male worker, 
as labor-power, needs both. (74) 
Mabel’s purported craziness is cast in contradictory terms, as both the expression of her “delicate, 
sensitive” nature and her capacity to “climb the walls, break dishes, scream.” Sylvia Federici 
exposes the inherent misconceptions of such categories as “affective” and “immaterial” labor to 
describe the so-called ubiquity of service work, which modes of labor, she notes, are “a component 
of every form of work rather than a specific form of (re)production” (122). Examples of service 
work that isolate the affective-relational quality of that labor “are deceptive, for much reproductive 
work … demands a complete engagement with the persons to be reproduced, a relation that can 
hardly be conceived as ‘immaterial’” (122). Even the more encompassing category of “care work” 
is reductive and misleading since the “distinction” between physical and emotional aspects of such 
labor “is untenable” as “what differentiates the reproduction of human beings from the production 
of commodities is the holistic character of many of the tasks involved” (123).106 Nick’s conclusion, 
that she is “not crazy” yet “not like a normal person,” assumes a kind of responsibility that takes 
the form of a self-accusation: “She’s mad at me.” Mabel’s position outside the sphere of 
production, as the one who labors on behalf of or in order to maintain the value-creating labor-
power embodied in her husband Nick, strips her of agency, and even her abnormality must be 
understood as a reaction to forces she cannot control. Mabel is the one who is affected, witnessed 
by the trembling, the gestural ticks, the muttering, and the nonsensical vocalizations, all of which 
 
106 As I argued in the Introduction, object relations psychoanalysis provides us the theoretical language and logics for 
understanding care as a totalizing thing — both in its envisioned practice and in the fantasy of its promise. 
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are coded as signs of her incipient madness, her nervous illness.107 Yet as the one who is affected, 
she is also affecting, held responsible for the ways that her own emotions (which are also not her 
own) affect her family. 
 
Looking Hard: Underemployment and Exhaustion 
Billy Woodberry’s Bless Their Little Hearts (1983) revisits the same Watts neighborhood 
explored in Charles Burnett’s Killer of Sheep (1978) and features some of the same cast, brought 
along by Burnett who penned the script and worked behind the camera for Woodberry’s feature. 
In some ways a collaborative effort by the two figures of the L.A. Rebellion, Burnett nonetheless 
removed himself from the film’s direction and editing, encouraging Woodberry to develop his own 
vision for the project.108 Kaycee Moore reprises her role as the central matriarch, having played 
opposite Henry G. Sanders as “Stan’s wife”109 in Killer of Sheep, here cast in the role of Andais 
Banks, the frustrated and overworked wife of Charlie Banks (Nate Hardman). The film centers on 
Charlie’s struggle to secure regular work and the material and psychological effects of his 
underemployment on himself, his wife, and his children. Most of the film takes place within the 
domestic interior of the family home, primarily the kitchen, and depicts the tensions and 
confrontations that result from Charlie’s lack of regular work. A brief affair with another woman 
from the neighborhood leads to the film’s most dramatic sequence: a ten-minute clash between 
 
107 When she asks her children what they think of her, not just as their mother but how they think of her as a person, 
one of her sons responds: “You’re smart, you’re pretty. You’re nervous, too.” 
108 “He would deliberately restrain himself from giving me the solution to things,” said Woodberry — from the film’s 
description by Ross Lipman on the UCLA Film & Television Archive website. 
109 Curiously, she is never named in the film nor in its credits. 
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husband and wife in the kitchen, followed by Charlie’s self-imposed exile for a night. Once the 
semi-regular employment of his “casual” gig concludes, Charlie has the idea to catch and sell fresh 
fish with some of his friends only to walk away from the enterprise in the film’s final shot. 
Stylistically and thematically consistent with its predecessor, Woodberry’s film is nevertheless 
quite distinct. While both films adopt the signature neorealist style of the L.A. Rebellion 
filmmakers, and while both depict the same neighborhood, cast some of the same actors, and focus 
on similar dynamics of labor and domesticity, Bless Their Little Hearts engages more explicitly 
with infidelity, ideology, and the worsening relations between a still segregated black community 
and a white nation that manifests only obliquely in its institutional forms (the unemployment 
office) and in the presence of its vacancy and unconcern (the skeletal structures that litter the post-
Watts Riot landscape).  
The film opens with a scene of Charlie at the unemployment office, waiting in line, filling 
out forms, scoping job listings, and eventually taking note of an advertisement for “a casual labor 
job.” From here, Charlie returns home only to head right back out to his friend Duck’s place, where 
the men are gathered around a table, drinking and talking about “how to make some money.” The 
scene is filmed entirely in relative close-up shots of the men at the table, never showing all of them 
together and never allowing an entire body within the confines of the frame — it is a scene without 
a subject but where the subject is also every piece of them. The men discuss the possibility of 
robbing gas stations and banks (“there’s one on every damned corner”), a prospect advanced by 
the logic that there are “little kids out there doing it and we are smarter than they are.” Charlie 
demurs, saying that he wouldn’t want to do anything that would separate him from his family, and 
ends up derailing the conversation as he assumes a more philosophical take on their predicament: 
“I don’t feel I’m no loser. I feel that basically all I got to do is look hard at my situation and just 
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try and figure out what’s going on. But I must believe in God because I feel all this must be a test. 
See I feel that there comes a point in a man’s life where he has to make a choice between the 
spiritual and the material.” Although “we always choose the material,” he says, “I believe, through 
a little faith, we can move a mountain.”110 Charlie’s choice of the spiritual over the material gets 
read by Edward Guerrero as representative of the opposition between idealism and materialism 
with Charlie taking “up philosophic company with Hegel and the idealist position that 
‘consciousness makes conditions,’ against Marx and the materialist inversion ‘conditions make 
consciousness’” (315). Although seemingly supported by Andais’s frequent accusations that 
Charlie is too caught up in “dreaming [his] dreams,” Guerrero’s claim fails to account for the 
significance that Charlie’s idealism — which is more colloquial than philosophical — takes root 
in faith not consciousness. “Charlie imagines that, as an inspired individual, he can, through hard 
 
110 Charlie seems to have in mind this moment from the New Testament Book of Matthew: “Then the disciples came 
to Jesus privately and said, ‘Why could we not cast it [the demon] out?’ He said to them, ‘Because of your little faith. 
For truly I tell you, if you have faith the size of a mustard seed, you will say to this mountain, “Move from here to 
there,” and it will move; and nothing will be impossible for you’” (17:19-20). The moment is a curious one, positioned 
between a brief discourse on succession and suffering and one on the Israelites’ exemption from Roman taxation. 
After Jesus and the apostles Peter, James, and John, return from the top of a mountain where they witnessed a vision 
of Moses and Elijah and the prophecy of Jesus’s resurrection, they are confronted by a man who asks for his son to be 
cured of epilepsy. Before Jesus exorcizes the demon that has caused the boy’s condition, he says: “You faithless and 
perverse generation, how much longer must I be with you? How much longer must I put up with you?” (Matthew 
17:17). This intertext plays with the moral attributions the film sets up on its surface in the way it appropriates a moral 
superiority for the community-outside-community (Israelites/black Americans) and dissolves the notion of fiscal 
responsibility in the figures of spiritual succession and a responsibility to the “nation” that lives in internal exile. In 
claiming the status of “others” as the privileged position outside of the confines of state law, Jesus and Peter subvert 
the hierarchy of social relation. 
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work alone, transcend the historical/social relations in which he is caught and which consist of, 
among other variables, the structural unemployment and underdevelopment that plague the black 
community of South Central Los Angeles” (315-16). Without denying the assessment of what it is 
that has Charlie caught, I would argue that Guerrero’s claim ascribes a purpose to Charlie’s faith 
and supposed work ethic that the film never provides. So much of the film finds Charlie either out 
of work or underemployed, caught in the semi-regularity of casual labor, that it simply does not 
make sense to insist on his ideological belief that hard work alone creates the conditions for social 
mobility, which is also not what he says at his dining table sermon. It is not the work itself that 
promises transcendence for Charlie. His idealism, if we can call it that, occupies a position outside 
of the experience of waged labor, considering its prospect and relating to it as a mere possibility, 
even where it is spoken of in terms of an inevitability: “I will get a job,” “I’m going to get a job.” 
It is neither the activity of consciousness nor the strenuousness of manual labor that constitutes the 
vehicle for Charlie’s faith in the miraculous power of collective transformation. In the drink-fueled 
discussion of prospects for employment, which is not a discussion about finding a job (because 
there are no jobs) but rather cooking up plans to “make some money,” Charlie’s option is a non-
option: contrasted with the only other ideas — robbing banks and gas stations or hunting rabbits 
— his declaration of faith is not even part of the conversation. His speculations, too, exist outside 
of the contractual circuit of employment, outside the dialectic, whether Hegelian-idealist or 
Marxist-materialist.  
Charlie’s faith originates in a space apart where employment is no longer a guarantee, 
subject instead to the cruel irony of “casual labor.” What does labor look like, his words seem to 
say, when it is stalled prior to its contract with capital? What does it mean that all he has is the 
capacity to look and the imperative to interpret? “I feel that basically all I got to do is look hard at 
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my situation and just try and figure out what’s going on.” For Guerrero, the dilemma is resolved 
in Charlie’s submission, his move from one rung of the ideological ladder down to another: “By 
the film’s close, he has replaced his version of dominant ideology, that of middle-class optimism 
and mobility through individual effort, with its underclass counterpoint, an outlook by which he 
perceives himself as socially worthless, economically discarded, and psychically defeated” (316). 
From the conflict of hope and despair, we end with just despair. The problem with Guerrero’s 
reading is that the film offers no evidence of this transition, nothing to show that Charlie has moved 
from one ideological position to another, nothing, really, to show that he has occupied any of these 
positions — an interpretation in favor of Charlie’s ideology would already be burdened to find 
those utterances and actions in the film that can unambiguously count as ideological. Although 
Guerrero notes the “understated, ambiguous, and melancholy” qualities of the film’s concluding 
moments, he still sees Charlie’s walk away from his friends, away from the camera, and off into 
the background as a sign that he is “completely defeated, disgusted …. his consciousness finally 
ground under by conditions” (321). Guerrero is most interested in a naturalist reading of the film 
that emphasizes its Marxist critique of capitalism, in general, and the racist violence of American 
capitalism, in particular — and this does not misrepresent the film. In what he describes as if it is 
obvious social realism, however, there are clear affinities with the melodrama that offer a more 
politically dynamic interpretation of the film. Elsaesser notes the way that the family melodrama  
records the failure of the protagonist to act in a way that could shape the events and 
influence the emotional environment, let alone change the stifling social milieu. 
The world is closed, and the characters are acted upon. Melodrama confers on them 
a negative identity through suffering, and the progressive self-immolation and 
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disillusionment generally ends in resignation: they emerge as lesser human beings 
for having become wise and acquiescent to the ways of the world. (55) 
Where the traditional drama externalizes conflict which is “projected into direct action,” argues 
Elsaesser, the domestic melodrama limits “the range of ‘strong’ actions” and foregrounds the 
inward turn of the character who is impotent in the face of a world that resists his action (55-56). 
Formally, there is little to distinguish Elsaesser’s account of melodrama and Guerrero’s realist 
interpretation of Bless Their Little Hearts: in both, the narrative proceeds from suffering to 
disillusionment to resignation. The difference lies in how we are to interpret the aftermath of this 
absurd trajectory. In the classical form of the melodrama, as Elsaesser points out, the brutalized 
creature that emerges on the other side of self-immolation acquiesces to that very brutality in a 
demonstration of wisdom — for whatever that is worth. In Guerrero’s account, however, the 
acquiescence is internalized and the (mysterious) thing that Elsaesser calls “wisdom” is altogether 
absent — in other words, there is only defeat: there is only a movement down the ideological 
ladder. 
With the exception of the scene in the kitchen where Charlie and Andais have reached the 
moment when words must be said — so much of the film beautifully captures this repression of 
the hard truths that must but also must not be spoken — most of the film communicates the 
conflicts of psychic life through often mutely visual means. Alessandra Raengo picks up the notion 
of the Brechtian gestus which she finds “reinterpreted in different directions” by the filmmakers 
of the L.A. Rebellion where “the individual does not disappear to the advantage of a symbolic act 
that captures the complex intersection of sociopolitical forces but is rather protected, preserved, 
and elevated in her individuality, even simply because of the camera’s ability to record her” (301-
302). Raengo identifies several of these “resilient and sublime” gestures in Bless Their Little 
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Hearts, mostly where they involve Charlie’s hands: in the close-up shots of him filling out forms 
in the unemployment office, but even more in those moments when the labor of the hands is 
obscured somehow and the emphasis shifted to “his entire bodily posture that commands attention 
within the frame” (302). Such moments provide “access to something that the L.A. Rebellion has 
described so radically and so well: the landscape of the characters’ minds” (303). 
Andais tells Charlie several times in the film that he needs to stop dreaming and be a man 
(i.e., get a job and bring in a regular paycheck to support the family). Her tear-filled rebuke, late 
in the film, that she’s “tired of helping [him] dream [his] dreams,” feels warranted, considering 
everything we have seen to that point, and Charlie doesn’t disagree, affirming instead that she “has 
a right to be tired.” The very accusation that Charlie busies himself with “dreaming pipe dreams” 
says that he is too unconcerned with the material immediacy of his world, opting instead to imagine 
his way into a future no longer bound by the impasse and frustration of the present. The pipe dream 
is a genre of fantasy akin to the wistful daydream but in lieu of the daydream’s flight from the 
confines of temporality, the pipe dream sets its sights on a particular future that has broken free of 
its determination by the past. “It wasn’t always this way and it ain’t going to always be this way,” 
Charlie pleads, to which Andais responds: “When ain’t it been this way.” Dreaming pipe dreams 
means giving in to the affective assurance enabled by such temporal trickery and no longer being 
bound by the sociohistorical conditions that have the purported final word on just how much better 
the better life can be. Is Andais right about Charlie? Is a belief that things will change, even with 
the implicit claim that they will change for the better, enough to make Charlie a dreamer of pipe 
dreams or, in Guerrero’s terms, an ideological dupe? Although the film sets up an opposition 
between Charlie’s indulgent optimism (things will change for the better) and Andais’s defeatist 
realism (things will be as they have always been), it does not suggest either position as a choice 
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which necessarily excludes the other.111 Without making either Charlie or Andais into reductive 
caricatures of the poor, black subject stripped of agency by the machinations of a ruthless 
capitalism, the film nevertheless presents this as a moment of impasse: the very opposition of hope 
and despair ensures the conflict at the heart of the domestic, an interiorization that doubles112 the 
impasse of a structural segregation voiced by federal (white) legislators that the black experience 
in America is unknowable. It is in this sense that both sides of the opposition may be seen as 
operating according to a mode of response dictated by the epistemic impasse that symbolizes 
black-white relations and the problem of segregation in the United States. Charlie and Andais can 
be read as acting without knowledge of their own motivations, or at least at a degree of remove 
from what they articulate as their desire, caught as they are in a perpetual state of reaction. Charlie 
says as much when he insists that “basically all I got to do is look hard at my situation and just try 
and figure out what’s going on.” When Andais confesses to a friend that she knows Charlie is 
sleeping with another woman, she says that she is not going to let him know that she knows, opting 
instead to “play it on his conscience [and] make him feel real bad.” Much of their relationship, in 
fact, consists in a sort of veiling of what they know of themselves and of each other at the same 
 
111 This is where my problem with Guerrero’s reading ultimately lies. 
112 This doubling of the public or social impasse in the interiority of the private or domestic is doubled again in the 
psyches of the parents and again as it is passed on to the children. See, for example, Alan Bass on “racial persecution 
in the US” as an instigator of the “intergenerational transmission of trauma” (275). See also Balibar on the “‘post-
historical’ situation” of unemployment spanning several generations: “Now, provisional or not, the situation is that 
millions of disposable human beings are at the same time excluded from labour — that is, economic activity — and 
kept within the boundaries of the market, since the market is an absolute; it has no external limits. The Market is the 
World” (142). 
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time as they justify their actions as reactions dictated by the other or the environment. Charlie 
speaks of his infidelity as inevitable: an escape from the responsibilities of his home life and the 
inability to be to his children what they need him to be but also as the necessary outcome of 
Andais’s lack of sympathy and understanding. As Guerrero notes, much of the emotional power 
of the scene of the fight in the kitchen, which makes it “one of the most convincing domestic fights 
in recent narrative cinema,” derives from the improvisation of the actors who were allowed “to 
draw upon their own cultural repository of gestures, experiences, and memories to animate the 
scene” (320). Samantha N. Sheppard describes the scene as a “bruising moment,” which she 
defines as “those emotionally powerful scenes that reflect and underscore broader sociopsychic 
narratives and experiences specific to Black communities” (229). The scene is also the only 
moment in the film when the two unveil their knowledge of each other to each other, the only time 
when the performance of ignorance gives way to a vocalization of the violence wrought by the 
reactionary logic by which they are otherwise bound. In almost every other moment of the film, 
the visual communicates that the disagreement between Charlie and Andais is not about the 
question of whether or not things will always be this way but about the very content of the this way 
as the material conditions to which they respond. Charlie and Andais both labor outside the 
legitimized sphere of capitalist production yet the structure that informs how they are supposed to 
respond to this social exile is decidedly different in each case.113 
 
113 “What image does the process of production and reproduction of labor-power conjure up? As has already been 
said, it presents itself as a photograph printed back to front, as mirror image of the process of commodity production. 
While within reproduction labor-power as capacity for production is produced, in production labor-power is 
consumed. While in the latter the male worker is a means of work, in the former he is the object of work, and his 
means of subsistence are the means of work for the woman. The two processes are opposites: in production, the 
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For Charlie, the labor of dreaming, looking, and interpreting are no less necessary than the 
wage labor he cannot secure with any degree of regularity, and his words and actions in the film 
suggest his rejection of the latter as the sole paradigm of work — one source of his ongoing 
disagreement with Andais is that he cannot convince her that looking for work is itself a form of 
labor, one that occupies most of his time. When Charlie and a friend visit the neighborhood barber 
to inquire about jobs, the older man talks at length about the kinds of discipline and qualifications 
required to find and hold a steady job. He asks Charlie: “What can you qualify to do? You have to 
know something before you can get a job. What can you do?” “I can work,” Charlie responds, as 
if there should be any other prerequisite. The assertion that knowledge precedes employment 
affirms and contradicts the sociohistorical relations the film explores: it affirms an ideological 
commitment to education as the institutional prerequisite of gainful employment; and it contradicts 
the existence of unskilled labor that maintains and reproduces the material structure and means of 
circulation that prop up the fantasy of the transcendent work ethic. However, the very ideology of 
education as the passage from unskilled to skilled, from value-consuming to value-producing, rests 
upon a process of dis-identification and normalization. 
[A]ny basic process of education, which aims not only at normalizing subjects, but 
also at making them bearers of the values and ideals of society, or at integrating 
them into the fabric of ‘hegemony’ … mainly by means of intellectual processes, 
is not mere learning, an acquisition of capacities, knowledge, ideas, and so on, 
written on a tabula rasa, as classical empiricist liberalism innocently imagined. On 
 
exchange-value of labor-power as capacity for production is produced and its use-value consumed; in reproduction, 
the use-value of labor-power is produced and its exchange-value is consumed” (Fortunati 69). 
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the contrary, it has to be a deconstruction of an already existing identity and a 
reconstruction of a new one. (Balibar 140) 
When Charlie is asked what he can do, what qualifies him, he is being asked what he has been 
made into, in what way he has been primed for his integration “into the fabric of hegemony.” His 
pleading response, “I can work,” identifies his willingness to enter into such a space at the same 
time as it marks him as one who has been excluded from it, left outside looking in. If education, 
in Balibar’s dialectic of violence and ideality, breaks down and reconstructs identities, it does so 
in order to acclimate the educated subject to the capillary exercise of power-as-violence. What is 
education, in these terms, if not an apprenticeship in the labor of ideal attachments? What is the 
educated subject if not the bearer of the ideals of society?  
Against Guerrero’s Marxist fatalism, Kleinhans argues that Bless Their Little Hearts 
“maintains the dialectical form of realist narration, as opposed to the negative determinism of 
naturalism, by use of socially significant gesture and detail” (160). Where Guerrero emphasizes 
the film’s “consistent downward movement” — exemplified in his image of Charlie’s ideological 
devolution — Kleinhans insists on the ways its seeming fatalism is tempered by moments of 
comedy and catharsis, offering a reading of the final scenes of the film, after the fight in the kitchen, 
that “redeem[s] the pessimism” (162). In the film’s final shot, when Charlie walks away from the 
roadside fish stall he and his friends have set up out of the trunk of a car, the image of him in the 
center of the frame, back turned, ignoring the pleas of his friends, and walking off through a field 
of tall grass may very well affirm his earlier desire to choose the spiritual over the material. For 
Guerrero, as we have seen, the image signifies Charlie’s defeat, but for Kleinhans, who admits that 
“[t]his is the most speculative part of my interpretation,” it signifies “the moment of moral choice 
and coming to a new level of awareness and a return to his home, his family” (166). Kleinhans 
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goes so far as to declare this conclusion “gratifying” in the way it shows Charlie breaking with 
“his friends’ materialism,” his willingness to “set right” his “sexual wandering,” and his ability to 
“cry in front of his family” (163). More interesting than these interpretations of the film’s politics, 
perhaps, is the very imperative to interpret and the specific way in which they imagine the political 
horizon that structures the positions one can take. Genre is cathected for its capacity to provide the 
aesthetic contours within which that horizon can be mapped and articulated. Guerrero’s 
“naturalism” provides a political reality determined in the last instance by the base over the 
superstructure; Charlie’s desire for the “spiritual” is really a desire for the “ideal,” Guerrero argues, 
and we all know how that works out. For Kleinhans, coding the film as a “realist melodrama” 
allows for an attachment that masks its cruelty and opens up a space within the political where 
experience and choice regain their moral character: where aesthetic convention and social norm 
overlap we can be gratified by Charlie’s assimilation into the familial fold. The aesthetics of the 
realist melodrama “avoids irony and self-reflection,” which allows a film like Bless Their Little 
Hearts to speak “powerfully and directly to that which is unrepresented, misrepresented, and 
underrepresented in the dominant culture’s depiction of the exploited” (163-64). In this sincerity 
of form, Kleinhans locates “the film’s moral standard” that holds Charlie up “as an equal” but 
which also presents him as having to “make a moral decision … to bring money home for the 
family” (164). As we have seen, however, the coding of the family breadwinner as a moral position 
relies on a discourse that insists on sexual and racial divisions of labor that maintain the very 
structures of oppression. 
 Charlie’s predicament in Bless Their Little Hearts is overdetermined by these seemingly 
contradictory discourses on work and worklessness. When he does not work at all, he fails to fulfill 
his socially-determined role as breadwinner, the sole financial supporter of his family. He is 
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disgraced in the eyes of his wife and devalued by a society that interprets his joblessness as both 
irresponsibility and a personal failure to work hard enough to be employed. In this formulation we 
can recognize the power of waged labor as what validates work in a social context where, for 
example, the reproductive labor of housework or the intermediary labor of looking for a job are 
cast as either necessary (so not deserving of reimbursement) or extra-curricular (so preliminary to 
the contractual obligation of the wage).114 As a member of the “underclass” Charlie bears the 
stigma of the asocial deviant, cause of his own disgrace, yet as a victim of social exclusion his 
plight is the effect of forces outside his control, even if those forces are endemic to his 
demographic. It is precisely this failure to make sense of Charlie’s situation — without recourse 
to an ideological framework that provides the narrative coordinates — that the film reveals. 
 
Postscript: What’s the Best Way to Say ‘Underclass’? 
William Walters notes how the discourse on unemployment in the postwar era became 
bound up with the ideological framings of social division that would eventually be codified in 
neoliberal practices of state welfare.115 The concepts of “the underclass” and “social exclusion” 
 
114 As Michael Denning notes, even in the devaluation of unwaged labor, there is yet another distinction — between 
a feminized reproductive labor and a masculine unemployment — that exposes a further degree of stigmatization. 
“One arm of the state apparatus insured and secured the normative male breadwinner against the risk of involuntary 
unemployment; another arm tested the ways and means of women raising children and doled out a stigmatized relief. 
If the social-democratic conception of unemployment broke with the nineteenth-century rhetoric of the Poor Laws by 
understanding it as systemic rather than individual, as a waste of social labour rather than a malingering of the idle 
and dissolute, it also drew a stark and ideological line across the working multitude” (Denning 86). 
115 Melinda Cooper’s Family Values and Marisa Chappell’s The War on Welfare provide extensive critiques of the 
gendering and racializing of this discourse. See, for example, Cooper, 32ff., and Chappell, 21ff. 
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present two seemingly opposed ways of describing that part of the population that had been 
marginalized or left behind by liberal democracy’s relentless march of progress. The “underclass” 
most often shows up in “conservative debates … about urban poverty” and signifies an effort to 
“reconstitute social issues as problems of ‘urban disorder’ and ‘security’” (125).  
Usually ‘the underclass’ invokes a specific sector of society, an almost pathological 
community, cut off from the wider world by virtue of its asocial values and habits. 
The underclass represents a milieu in which a dangerous culture of drugs, violence, 
unemployment, single motherhood and welfare dependency, all intersect and 
reproduce; a world in which mainstream values concerning work, marriage and 
personal responsibility are seriously lacking. (125-26) 
It should not be hard to hear the echoes here with the American legislative discourse that I 
examined in the first chapter. The discourse of the “underclass” pathologizes and racializes 
poverty, obscuring structural and economic effects behind an image of the national others as 
responsible for their own abjection. In the legislative discourse on urban disorder that I examined 
in the introduction, the “underclass” is the operative logic by which the violences of state and 
capital are disavowed and projected onto those who bear its force. The discourse of the 
“underclass” ensures the moral superiority of its orators by ascribing to those others the traits and 
tendencies that oppose the values that constitute its superior social status.116 Such a moral calculus, 
however, depends upon these negative figures to articulate their positive forms: asociality, divorce, 
irresponsibility/dependence, unemployment — all must be seen as negations of or deviations from 
 
116 The similarity is not merely discursive but epistemically consistent with the logic that informs the genre theorists’s 
understanding of value as itself defined in opposition to the anti-value of capitalist sociality. 
124 
 
the supposedly natural forms that underwrite the social contract.117 As such, they threaten the 
integrity of the social, which, as we have seen, was always already dependent upon a forced (and 
enforced)118 segregation. The postwar image of the welfare state as the ideal means for producing 
“integral societies, fully national communities” (Walters 124) became, in the decades after civil 
rights, a source of anxiety for the governing class which accrued its power and privilege from 
division and disenfranchisement. Nixon’s appeal to the “silent majority” and the concerted (often 
secret) effort to mobilize such anxieties for political ballast relied on a logic of moral values that 
could only see itself as threatened by these negative attributions: anxieties about structural 
deviance were marshalled to posit the positive form of morality: sociality, marriage, personal 
responsibility, independence, and employment. My analysis in the first chapter has already shown 
 
117 Zygmunt Bauman writes: “The prefix ‘un’ suggests anomaly; ‘unemployment’ is a name for a manifestly temporary 
and abnormal condition and so the nature of the complaint is merely transient and curable. The notion of 
‘unemployment’ inherits its semantic load from the self-awareness of a society which used to cast its members as 
producers first and last, and which also believed in full employment as not just a desirable and attainable social 
condition but also its own ultimate destination; a society which therefore cast employment as a key — the key — to 
the resolution of the issues of, simultaneously, socially acceptable personal identity, secure social position, individual 
and collective survival, social order and systemic reproduction” (11). 
118 I briefly looked at this (false) distinction between force and enforcement in the first chapter. It will show up again 
in the next chapter in my analysis of policework. See also, Derrida, “Force of Law,” especially 233ff. “When one 
translates ‘to enforce the law’ into French, — as by appliquer la loi, for example — one loses this direct or literal 
allusion to the force that comes from within to remind us that law is always an authorized force, a force that justifies 
itself or is justified in applying itself, even if this justification may be judged from elsewhere to be unjust or 
unjustifiable…. Applicability, ‘enforceability,’ is not an exterior or secondary possibility that may or may not be added 
as a supplement to law. It is the force essentially implied in the very concept of justice as law, of justice as it becomes 
law, of the law as law” (233). 
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how the very prospect of a racially integrated, whole nation — no longer segregated, no longer 
bound by the naturalized dictates of the sexual division of labor, no longer classed119 — was a 
source of anxiety because it threatened the sanctity of a political reality that was ontologically 
dependent on exclusion. A seeming contradiction arises here between this desire to maintain the 
segregated form of social order and the articulation of a moral structure that defines itself in terms 
of coherence and wholeness. This contradiction is doubled in the figure of unemployment which 
is cast both as an abnormal, which is to say pathological, trait of the “underclass,” and as a normal, 
even expected, consequence of industrial capitalism.120 What appear here as contradictions, 
however, merely illustrate the discursive distinctions between ideological oppositions and the 
different manifestations of unconscious sociopolitical desires. As Walters notes, the concept of 
“social exclusion” emerged as an alternative to the “underclass” precisely because of the latter’s 
“pejorative connotations and highly racist associations” (126). “Whereas the underclass concept is 
accused of ‘blaming the victim,’ the notion of social exclusion allows for a fuller ‘structural 
explanation of the phenomenon of the divided society” (126). In the work of Lydia Morris, the 
notion of the “underclass” performs a “conceptual containment,” “localizing the causes of mass 
unemployment” and restricting the negative manifestations of asociality to “a pathological sub-
population” in order to protect “the wider social system from the criticism that it is dysfunctional” 
 
119 In the words of British sociologist T.H. Marshall, the ideal form of the welfare state “envisaged ‘a population which 
is now treated … as though it were one class’” (qtd. in Walters 124). 
120 Michael Denning points to the efforts of early trade unions to secure “out-of-work benefits,” as well as the self-
identifying of the “wageless” as “unemployed” in their marches and riots, and to the theoretical work of J.A. Hobson 
and William Beveridge who argued against the moralizing discourse of unemployment as the effect of “individual 
depravity or idleness” (83). 
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(Walters 127). For Walters, the concept of exclusion, however, produces its own form of 
“containment,” and it points to the way that both of these discourses (the “underclass” and “social 
exclusion”) legitimate a state practice that is able to conceptually relocate structural problems to 
the margins (127-28). Both perform an apologetics intended to absolve those who benefit from the 
existing structure of social order. 
Chapter Conclusion 
 While the traditional forms of melodrama served the use of providing a cultural outlet for 
the experience of otherwise frustrated sociopolitical desires, where its tropes show in works of 
(cinematic) “realism” in the post-civil rights era in the United States, the criteria for a successful 
victory over repression (Brooks) or the formally excessive undermining of the dominant social 
structure (Mulvey and Nowell-Smith) or a proxy moral victory over capitalism’s asymmetrical 
oppressions (Vicinus) no longer appear operative. In brief, the object no longer allows for a 
transcendence of form, no longer allows an experience whereby frustration can be aesthetically 
transformed into satisfaction. The otherwise frustrated sociopolitical desires that emerge in the two 
films looked at in this chapter cannot find a proxy form of satisfaction in the space of the cultural 
— for a domestic life not fully determined by the absolute control of capital in A Woman Under 
the Influence and for an inclusive and non-oppressive form of the social contract in Bless Their 
Little Hearts. As I argued in the first chapter, the genre of the legislative hearing served to provide 
a space where anxieties (about de-segregation) could be worked through in a paranoiac logic of 
abjection; this logic, which had always been a part of the reigning political ontology of the nation, 
informed the construction of the domestic as the object most in need of defense, most under threat 
by the nation’s abject others. In that same chapter, I also looked at two television broadcasts that 
were tasked with a similar role of managing anxieties; although, as we saw, they approached this 
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role in very different ways. The more aesthetically conservative and bureaucratic production in 
Detroit used forms of containment, exclusion, and immunization to neutralize the threat of the 
violent contagion represented by the urban uprisings. In Los Angeles, however, the KTLA 
broadcast used sensationalism, sparse editing, and abstraction both to de-contextualize the 
uprisings from their place within a discourse for civil rights and to encourage the same anxieties 
about contagion that the other broadcast worked so hard to suppress. In every instance, we see the 
idea that the aesthetic work desires something and that this desiring is bound up with the form and 
genre of the work. This is shown most explicitly in my methodological introduction, but it is worth 
saying here again that there is a relationship between an aesthetic (or a discourse) and the promise 
or desire an object is entrusted with in order to work through or hold a set of anxieties. Aesthetic 
objects are objects of defense but, as such, they can fail or breakdown; hence my reading in this 
chapter of the post-civil rights melodrama as a site of such breakdown. 
 What most interests me in thinking about A Woman Under the Influence and Bless Their 
Little Hearts as objects of defense is how their forms show up negatively, critically, and in the 
process of breaking down. If the (cultural) object of defense is supposed to allow for a working 
through or a holding of anxieties, what can we say when they fail in this way? As I have argued 
throughout this second chapter, that “failure” so often shows up in the films where issues of gender, 
normativity, race, and domesticity are overdetermined by anxieties related to the problem of labor 
in the post-civil rights era. Work, as theme and material, gets in the way of the fantasy such that 
the means by which classical melodramatic forms provided a cultural space for the satisfaction of 
sociopolitical desire are here disturbed or broken. One of the questions that remain at the 
conclusion of this chapter is precisely why the introduction of “work” (as problem/topos) into the 
domestic interiority of the melodrama restrains and frustrates the desires that previously found 
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paths to expression — by way of, for example an excess or moral purity or power. Instead of 
exceeding the object, these forces fall back into it: evidenced in the body of Gena Rowlands or in 
the mute gestures of aggression and conflict in Bless Their Little Hearts. In the traditional 
melodrama there are paths of egress for those desires that show up in aesthetically formal or 
narrative ways — those “tropes” that get named as the essential elements of the genre — in the 
hyperbolic language of sentiment and moral purity in early bourgeois French theater (Brooks), in 
the excesses of color, lighting, and objects in the mise-en-scène of Sirk (Nowell-Smith and 
Elsaesser), in the figuring of capitalist injustice and oppression in the villainy of a character in 
Victorian fiction (Vicinus). In post-civil rights cinematic realism, however, even where it makes 
use of the same tropes of classical melodrama, they are activated  — the hyperbole of Rowlands’s 
acting, the oppressive mother-in-law, the moral issue of infidelity — only to be dragged back into 
the aesthetic confines of the object; as, for example, when Mabel wordlessly hums a song from 
Swan Lake while she dances without ever invoking its operatics to forge that path of egress beyond 
the object. The thing cannot be said where its saying, per Brooks, is precisely what constitutes its 
expression, which is to say its victory over repression. In Bless Their Little Hearts, similar classical 
tropes show up only to be denied at the moment where they would conventionally be fulfilled; as, 
for example, in the evils of capitalism which never get figured in an individual or (corporate) entity 
but instead saturate the space of the film,121 from the interior of the unemployment office at the 
start to the roadside fish stand at the end — there is no point of leverage where its defeat can be 
 
121 The devastation wrought by Capital/History is total, and the landscape’s dissolution bears witness to this. It is 
surely no coincidence that Charlie’s stroll through the wreckage of Watts is structurally and aesthetically reminiscent 
of Edmond Kohler’s trek through the postwar devastation of Berlin in Germany Year Zero (1948). See Figs. 2.1 and 
2.2. 
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staged, no person or thing to figure the evils so that they may be routed, if not in real life, at least 
in the proxy form of the film narrative. 
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Fig. 2.1 Charlie Banks walks through the wreckage of Watts. Bless Their Little Hearts. 
 
 
Fig. 2.2 Edmund Kohler walks through the wreckage of Berlin. Germany Year Zero.   
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CHAPTER THREE: 
Policework: The Banality of Labor Outside Production 
 
Chapter Introduction 
 In the first chapter, I analyzed the federal discourse on the urban uprisings of 1967-68 in 
order to show that this conflict over the space of the American city was as much a contestation of 
the nation’s prevailing political ontology as it was about the specific issues of inequality that made 
up the pragmatic critique of civil rights. A subsequent analysis of a series of congressional hearings 
and two television broadcasts of the uprisings demonstrated the particular way I am bringing 
together an analysis of politics and aesthetics to show how anxieties about the nation after de-
segregation informed the uses of cultural objects at the time. One of the ways that post-civil rights 
anxiety manifests for the ruling class, for example, is in the worry over the security and 
maintenance of goods. The categories of labor and value were called into question when the literal 
bodies of the oppressed reconfigured the space and function of the city as those same bodies set 
up barricades, initiated combat, and appropriated goods. Political anxiety at this time was thus 
inseparable from worries related to work and profit — which is why, in the words of Sen. John L. 
McClellan, “idleness is the worst curse.” In the second chapter, I looked at two works of post-civil 
rights cinematic realism for the ways they incorporated tropes from classical melodrama in order 
to express another set of anxieties of this period: namely, those of the working classes, which were 
seen to be conflicted in the desire both to maintain gendered and racialized norms and to abolish 
them. Worry over the state of the domestic and the place of the family in the broader national 
imagination was further overdetermined by what I have been calling the problem of labor.  
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In the second chapter, I analyzed two films from the post-civil rights era to see how these 
anxieties about labor, family, and the domestic informed an aesthetic landscape in the wake of de-
segregation. In A Woman Under the Influence (1974) and Bless Their Little Hearts (1983), I looked 
at representations of housework and underemployment for the ways they broke with the traditional 
formula of the melodrama and how this opened up new ways of problematizing the gendered and 
racial determinations of domestic labor in post-civil rights American film. I made use of the critical 
literature on the genre of the melodrama in my analysis of these two films in order to show how 
the genre’s aesthetic promise goes unfulfilled when the tropes of suffering, family values, and 
moral triumph no longer transcend their forms. Instead, they indexed the breakdown of a moral 
calculus that could no longer assuage the psychic and corporeal effects of capital’s brutalization 
of the domestic. 
In this final chapter, theories of police and policing will be read alongside work on the 
genre of crime fiction to think about how representations of policework in the post-civil rights era 
break with the traditional ways that policing and detection have been represented and theorized. I 
am especially interested in how these new modes of representation — in both fiction and non-
fiction/documentary — show how the aesthetics of policing leads to a policing of aesthetics: order 
maintenance and the immunization of social space. These practices of governance, often labeled 
biopolitical, should be seen to embody the aesthetics longed for in the political anxieties over 
desegregation that were examined in depth in the first chapter. In the first part of the chapter, I will 
return to the legislative discourse of the late 1960s to show how the conception of the function and 
role of the police changed in its response and adaptation to the political and social challenges 
mounted by civil rights.  
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Policework as Carework: An Historical Case Study 
In 1966, one year prior to the start of the hearings on urban rioting,122 the Senate Committee 
on Government Operations tasked its Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization with an 
extensive investigation of the relationship between the federal government and individual 
municipalities concerning, especially, issues of housing, civic unrest, and unemployment. The 
series of hearings, titled “Federal Role in Urban Affairs,” concluded in June, 1967, one month 
before the most destructive riots of the era in Newark and Detroit. New York Mayor John Lindsay 
was called before the committee in August, 1967, to speak on the city’s efforts to reign in poverty 
and improve housing. Lindsay praised his police commissioner, Howard Leary, for his part in 
implementing “new police techniques” and for pursuing “a broad range of efforts that were brought 
to bear” on the “riot situations” in the city (579). New York City did not experience a riot on the 
same scale as other major cities in those years. However, in the decade or so that followed, New 
York City (and the Bronx, in particular) became the epitome of urban crime and poverty.123 Leary’s 
own testimony was provided to the committee in December, 1967. In his opening remarks, he 
emphasized the “high correlation between crime and poverty; between racial outbreaks and 
 
122 The discourse of these hearings was the focus of my analysis in the first chapter of this dissertation. 
123 Unsurprisingly, Leary attributes the city’s success in preventing an uprising on the scale seen in Detroit and Newark 
to the “police behavior in this area [which] was nothing short of remarkable” (2954). In response to two “racial 
incidents” in the summer of 1966, the police, according to Leary, showed “clearly and unmistakably” that they 
“intended to take all appropriate measures to restore the community’s tranquility but would not be provoked into 
unnecessary or exaggerated action” (2954). There is more to be said about this action without over-reaction that Leary 
wants to claim for his department. Almost all of these qualifiers beg the question about just what Leary means by such 
claims: What is an appropriate measure? What is unnecessary action (and by extension how do we determine when 
action is necessary)? At what point does action become exaggerated? 
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unemployment; between the use of narcotics; the incidence of violence; and the degree of 
educational, social, and cultural deprivation;”  to which he gave the disclaimer: the “police alone 
cannot correct any of these conditions, yet we bear on a daily basis much of the burden of the 
effects of these evils” (2952). It is not clear what counts as an “evil” in Leary’s discourse — if, for 
example, “racial outbreaks and unemployment” are both evils or if the former is merely the “effect” 
of the latter — nor is it evident what logic animates the “correlation” he identifies beyond merely 
noting that, say, crime and poverty coexist. It is most likely that crime, racial outbreaks, the use 
of narcotics, and violence are the effects of poverty, unemployment, and deprivation — but this 
hardly resolves the ambiguities (i.e., how is violence both a specific category of effect while it is 
also that which describes the entire series, is, in other words, the manifestation of evil, according 
to this discourse). Part of the difficulty in parsing Leary’s claims lies in the common-sensical, self-
evident approach that sees in the divide between the police and the community a divide between 
civility and lawlessness;124 but part of the difficulty also lies in the displacement of affect or rather 
the way that the affective import of his claims is lost in the equivocation over the chain of psychic 
causality. In the correlation of “racial outbreaks and unemployment,” for example, if 
unemployment is the evil and racial outbreaks are the effect, it is, nevertheless, the effect that 
constitutes the “burden” for police, as Leary sees it — in other words, the police are not burdened 
by unemployment but by the “racial outbreaks” which result from unemployment. According to 
 
124 As we saw in the previous chapter, William Walters showed how the separation of the discourse of the “underclass” 
from that of “social exclusion” and how the latter attempts to provide a more “structural explanation” of social 
division, yet both serve the same function of absolution and apologetics. (See Ch. 2, pages). We also saw in the 
introduction how the legislative discourse of the congressional hearings appropriated moral right as exclusive to the 
state and characterized any deviation from state-imposed ideals of Law as inherently lawless and corrupting. 
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this logic, we have two series, the causes/evils: poverty, unemployment, and deprivation 
(educational, social, and cultural); and the effects/burdens: crime, racial outbreaks, the use of 
narcotics, and the incidence of violence. Aside from the perhaps obvious questions regarding what 
constitutes the difference between “crime” and “the use of narcotics,” for example, I am eager to 
ask not only why this claim is made but why it must show up where it does, namely as a kind of 
preliminary, opening remark. Why is this where we start? 
Most of Leary’s testimony concerns his desire to build (or see built) a more technocratic 
and institutionally refined police force to more successfully combat urban crime and ensure the 
safety of the civilian populace. But if this is his desire, why does he preface all that he says with 
this phenomenological distinction between causes and effects, especially if “crime” is an effect 
and its cause is outside of the control of the police? When he asserts that these issues “are, of 
course, police problems, but they are also the problems of the American people,”125 we are again 
left to contend with the ambiguity of his claims (2952). In light of the discourse he has invoked — 
 
125 Leary specifies the problems that constitute the “key areas of law enforcement” as “crime, violence as distinguished 
from civil rights demonstrations, the administration and management of police service, the civilian review board, and 
the effect of Supreme Court decisions on confessions” (2952, my emphasis). The last “problem” is in reference to the 
Miranda v. Arizona decision of the Supreme Court from 1966 which established the rights of a criminal defendant 
against self-incrimination — the decision was a hotly contested one among law enforcers. Although Leary appears to 
support the dissenting justices who “insisted that much police questioning is not coercive and that society has a 
legitimate right to ask a suspected criminal to explain the circumstances that gave rise to his arrest,” his progressivist 
views of police enforcement ultimately put him on the side of change (2957). It may have been “the view long held 
by those of us who enforce the law and have the obligation of ferreting out the criminal and protecting society,” he 
noted, adding: “I think it is important that law enforcement officials accept such decisions, learn to live with them, 
and, above all, seek new methods and techniques that are consistent with them” (2957). 
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the discourse that wants to accept responsibility for social injustice by recognizing that the 
pathologies of the so-called underclass are indissociable from structural, institutional, social 
inequalities (but in this acceptance to also absolve oneself of the responsibility) — “the problems 
of the American people” would seem to reference the deprivation and impoverishment, the “evils,” 
which are precisely not “police problems” because they are more broadly social, which is to say 
systemic. This point could be seen illustrated in Leary’s claim that the city’s “major attack on 
narcotics violations … appear to have reaped rewards, if the soaring arrest rate of drug peddlers is 
an indication of our success” (2953). If crime is the effect, how can an arrest rate count as a measure 
of success in addressing the real problems that the police (and American society) face? There is 
an assumption here that the higher quantity (absolute and relative) of arrests means that police are 
successful in their fight against crime, although it may also be argued that more arrests are, rather, 
an indication that crime has grown (i.e., there are more criminals). What counts as justice in such 
a picture of law enforcement? In Leary’s claims, we can already see a specific vision of policing 
as a kind of work subject to its own internal consistencies that resembles, in large part, the schemas 
and frameworks that determine the growth of value in private enterprise. If more arrests means 
there are more criminals, then the police could be said to have shown an adequate response to the 
problem of supply and demand created when the law fails — and it seems the law, in this theory, 
is supposed to fail — to achieve its ideal organization of the social without the intervention of its 
enforcers. We must also not lose sight of the problematic nature of number of arrests as an 
indication of success. As I will show, the arrest is only the first stage in the process of judicial 
correction, and it is often an indication of nothing more than that this quasi-independent branch of 
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law enforcement has met its own criteria of success. In other words, an arrest is not a prosecution, 
and that matters.126 
Leary’s call for the redefinition of the police as a corporate technocracy — what he calls 
“the police force of tomorrow” — is remarkable not only in its prescience but also in its contrast 
with his characterization of the “problems” and “evils” that contribute and shape “crime” in the 
United States. 
The time has come, I believe, for the police to call upon those in the population at 
large who understand and employ the highly sophisticated and modern techniques 
of industrial and commercial management to help us modernize and streamline our 
methods. We must go out into the community in search of new ideas, new 
techniques, and new equipment that will make our operations and our manpower 
more efficient…. In many respects our operation is comparable to those of the 
largest industries. Like many large corporations which have grown with the 
continuing expansion of the American economy, we have set new records this year. 
Never before in our city’s long history have we employed such a large police force. 
 
126 Nor even is a prosecution a guarantee of justice, as if such a cliché need even be said. It matters, however, to the 
police officer, to the way he perceives his work, and to his own sense of efficacy. In the television documentary, The 
Police Tapes (1973) — which I analyze in detail below — the filmmaker, Susan Raymond, asks a Bronx police officer 
some follow-up questions regarding a recent arrest. She wants to know about the length of jail time for a man who 
was arrested for rape two times. The officer explains how the charge will be reduced in a plea deal, and instead of a 
prison sentence of 25 years, it is more likely to be between five and ten. Susan Raymond then asks: “How does a 
forcible rape get changed to an assault?” The officer responds with a wry smile and explains how the plea is arranged 
in the courtroom. He tells her: “It really isn’t up to us to determine what type of sentences people have. Sometimes 
we become very frustrated because they do plea bargain these cases down.” 
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Never before have our police officers been better equipped and better trained. Never 
before have the demands for their essential services increased so sharply. And never 
before has our police budget been higher…. But we are still far short of the level of 
performance that we seek.127 We are bogged down by a Niagara of paperwork. We 
retain many unsatisfactory management techniques and we still are striving to give 
the citizen of our city maximum service for each dollar he spends. To attain our 
goals we need the help of management specialists outside the police department 
and are seeking their advice on a consistent basis. We hope they will help us 
eliminate many of the unnecessary burdens placed upon our police and will help us 
to create the most modern and effective police force in the world. (2955) 
Attention to the grandiosity and rhetorical flourish of this speech is integral to making sense of the 
claims being made here, because the actual substance and function of policework once again gets 
obscured by this corporate vision of the police force as an institution whose success should be 
measured by its effectiveness, performance, and value — and it should be emphasized that Leary 
means value in the most transactional sense possible: in police service per taxpayer dollar. Again, 
if the evils that create the problems that most burden police are structural and socioeconomic — 
poverty, unemployment, and deprivation — we have to wonder why a more technocratic and 
modernized police force will make the changes necessary to combat them. There is an obvious 
answer, of course: it is not the job of police to address such problems. In a sense, the responsibility 
of the police strictly is what shows up here as epiphenomenal: the crime that inevitably follows 
 
127 In light of these comments, it is curious that when Sen. Ribicoff asks if the force in New York City has enough 
police “to take care of all the needs” of the city, Leary refuses to commit to an answer, merely stating, “That matter at 
the present time we are now studying. I wouldn’t be able to make a decision at this moment” (2959). 
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from rampant inequality. This is why paperwork, management technique, and training are what 
Leary most covets “to create the most modern and effective police force in the world.” At several 
other points in his testimony, Leary further clarifies and qualifies what this ideal force would look 
like. In addition to being more technocratic and making use of new and creative administrative 
approaches, he wants to increase the force to record size and to expand the available tactical and 
patrol forces in order to create a highly mobile police that can “provide maximum visibility” 
(2952). Only in this way can they be prepared to face the “crisis in crime” faced by the nation. 
 
Mystery and Care: The Aesthetics of Policework 
After working behind the camera on the seminal television series, An American Family 
(1973), Alan and Susan Raymond spent three months, in 1976, filming the police officers of the 
44th Precinct of the South Bronx. The resulting 90-minute documentary, The Police Tapes, first 
aired on public television in 1977. Largely made possible by developments in portable video tape 
recording, the Raymonds shot over 40 hours of footage at a cost of $20,000; the use of the handheld 
camera and footage from the backseat of a patrol car influenced the police procedural series Hill 
Street Blues (1981-1987) and the reality TV show COPS, which started broadcasting in 1989. In 
an interview with the filmmakers included on the DVD release of The Police Tapes (2006), Susan 
Raymond talks about their “strong belief” in the style of cinéma vérité, which informed their work 
on An American Family but changed “when we got to the streets of the Bronx.” They could no 
longer adopt the fly-on-the-wall approach because “the nature of police work” necessitated a more 
interrogative involvement. 
Someone is having a nightmare. Someone is screaming. Someone is calling for 
help. The police officer arrives and has to figure out what is going on, who is telling 
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the truth, who did what to whom, and what is the officer going to do to help them. 
Well, I didn’t understand what was happening. I was totally confused, so I started 
asking the officers, started throwing questions from behind the camera: What’s 
going on? And then I found out the officer didn’t know what was going on, and that 
was the nature of his job. (“Interview”) 
Raymond describes her realization that the audience was in much the same position as herself and 
the police officer, that they were all implicated in the same situation of not knowing, of seeking 
after a truth that would only reveal itself upon interrogation and evaluation. “You had to help your 
audience. You had to help them understand what was going on, even if the answer was ‘I don’t 
know what’s going on.’” In this way, the aesthetics of cinéma vérité gave way to a stylistic 
approach that mimed “the nature of police work” that they were documenting. Raymond articulates 
what we might call an aesthetics of policework, characterized by an interrogative, almost 
beckoning, approach to a reality at odds with itself where the profoundly expressive yet 
incommunicable experience of someone calls out to the other for interpretation and succor: 
“Someone is having a nightmare. Someone is screaming. Someone is calling for help.” From the 
oneiric interiority of the subject someone appears as if in relief, as the figure in relation to a 
background that obscures rather than situates it. Such an aesthetics of policework bears an 
ostensible similarity to ways that the genre of crime fiction has been interpreted and theorized. In 
a more recent study of police and detective fiction, Luc Boltanski describes the genre’s 
fundamental encounter as one of “mystery,” which he understands, in quasi-phenomenological 
terms, as the “irruption of the world in the heart of reality” (3). Likewise, Ernest Mandel writes: 
“The real subject of the early detective stories is thus not crime or murder but enigma. The problem 
is analytical, not social or juridical” (15). Where “crime was a framework for a problem to be 
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solved” and not the subject in itself of the action and narration, the mode of the classic detective 
story privileges the mystery as analytical puzzle because it is “the only irrational factor that 
bourgeois rationality cannot eliminate” (Mandel 15, 27). According to Raymond, while the 
irrationality and enigma of the scene of real-life crime suggests the need for something like 
“bourgeois rationality” to show up and make sense of the situation, judgment intervenes in the 
process: in order to “figure out what is going on,” the police officer — and this may be one of the 
key signifying differences between the “officer” (or “beat cop”) and the “detective” — must 
determine “who is telling the truth” and “who did what to whom” before help may be provided, 
before even the causal details of the event may be established, before it is even determined that 
help is deserved.128 
Violence and death are contained according to strict logics of societal abstraction. “[Death] 
is not lived, suffered, feared or fought against,” Mandel claims. “It becomes a corpse to be 
dissected, a thing to be analyzed. Reification of death is at the very heart of the crime story” (41). 
In the roman noir of the 1940s and 1950s, epitomized in the works of Raymond Chandler and 
Dashiell Hammett, violence and death had begun to break from the logics of attribution and intent 
that define the mystery for Boltanski. Fredric Jameson writes of the “de-mystification of violent 
death” in Chandler, in whose work the structural and determinant influence of the central murder 
is “contaminated” by “the other random violence of the secondary plot” (27-28). In an apparent 
break with the classic model of attribution — and its delineation of significance from event to 
intent — Jameson argues that Chandler’s detective fiction dispels the aura of the rational. “Murder 
comes to seem … in its very essence accidental and without meaning” (28). Here, where the 
 
128 As the film seems to argue, more often than not, help is withheld in favor of an approach that seeks, instead, to 
merely be done with the situation. 
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representation of violence and death no longer fits into the logical form of “intention and 
execution,” the expectation of “the solution to an intellectual puzzle” characteristic of classic 
detective fiction has been replaced with “an evocation of death in all its physicality” (28). This 
“aesthetic deception” nullifies the conventional crime fiction contract between reader and text, and 
in the substitution of the physical for the intellectual the reader, who “no longer [has] any time to 
prepare himself for it properly, … is obliged to take the strong sensation on its own terms” (28-
29).129 Jameson does not qualify this “strong sensation” — is it disappointment, disorientation, 
guilt, surprise? He seems to take seriously Chandler’s own claim that what readers of crime fiction 
most cared about was not the action but “the creation of emotion through dialogue and description” 
(qtd. in Jameson 1).130 Yet the “aesthetic deception” that the physicality of death facilitates does 
 
129 The full quote reads: “Now, however, the gap between intention and execution is glaringly evident: no matter what 
planning is involved, the leap to physical action, the committing of the murder itself, is always abrupt and without 
prior logical justification in the world of reality. Thus the reader’s mind has been used as an element in a very 
complicated aesthetic deception: he has been made to expect the solution to an intellectual puzzle, his purely 
intellectual functions are operating emptily, in anticipation of it, and suddenly, in its place, he is given an evocation 
of death in all its physicality, when there is no longer any time to prepare himself for it properly, when he is obliged 
to take the strong sensation on its own terms. Was it then simply … to substitute an experience of space for that of the 
temporality of problem solving, that these shill games were constructed?” (28-29). 
130 For Mandel, the cynicism and gruff of the hard-boiled detective is little more than decoration for what remains a 
prototypical bourgeois type: “at bottom they are still sentimentalists, suckers for damsels in distress, for the weak 
confronting the strong” (35). Although the emphasis shifts from “the painstaking analysis of clues and related 
analytical reasoning” to an “obstinate questioning” and dogged tracking down of the criminals, the hard-boiled 
detective still expresses a bourgeois ideology that avoids any denunciation of the grand structure of capitalist order 
(36). One of the obvious shortcomings of Mandel’s analysis is precisely this reliance on the ideological that subsumes 
(and ultimately negates) the differences within the literature of popular crime fiction. The only distinction that matters, 
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not evoke an emotion in particular, but rather instantiates, or so Jameson seems to suggest, the 
aesthetic experience of feeling where the “purely intellectual” was believed to be all that was at 
stake — a substitution of “an experience of space for that of the temporality of problem solving” 
(29). While authority as subject and intent of classic detective fiction is affirmed in the process of 
attribution for Boltanski and in the mastery of ratio for Mandel, Jameson argues that such a “purely 
intellectual” satisfaction of solving the puzzle of the crime succumbs to the obligation to feel 
something instead. 
 In an anthropological study of police culture in Taiwan, Jeffrey T. Martin develops a theory 
of “police as linking principle”:  
police provide a ‘linking principle’ for the context-switching trajectory through 
which trouble is absorbed into the status quo. This culturally substantiated, 
historically constituted linking principle defines the practical interface between 
‘policing,’ as a kind of social control diffused throughout modern social life, and 
‘the police,’ as a state-based institution. (157)  
This tension between policing as a diffuse mode of social control and the police as institution sets 
up a very different notion of “mystery” from that confronted by Susan Raymond and what was 
theorized in Boltanski and Mandel. Martin’s almost positivist theory of police culture looks at the 
phenomenon as fulfilling a necessary function in the social order: as practical interface and linking 
principle, police not only enforce normativity, they regulate difference — which is both semiotic 
and violent — and rationalize the coercive and totalizing means by which the state ensures that 
 
for Mandel, is that between a so-called “real literature” (the work of, say, Dostoevsky or Dickens) and this 
“Trivialliteratur” that is only ever capable of a mimetic relation to its historical context (26). Thomas Elsaesser makes 
a similar distinction between “sophisticated” and “popular” art in his genealogy of the melodrama. 
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normativity. Similar to Leary’s proclamations about “modern policing,” there is here, too, a 
pragmatism131 that takes precedence over the ethical and the ontological: the necessity of the police 
is a privileged given that need not be invoked nor explained.132 What is mysterious about the police 
encounter in this narrative, however, lies in the way that trouble is absorbed in order to maintain 
the status quo. We could say that it is a kind of mystery that the police are tasked with averting, 
but we could also say that in its context-switching trajectory the police sustain the mystery — if 
we accept that what is mysterious is not the trouble that disrupts the status quo but rather that 
which maintains it.133 The police officer arrives and has to figure out what is going on, but the 
officer didn’t know what was going on, and that was the nature of his job. What Susan Raymond 
describes is that scene of trouble — in a phenomenological guise — that Martin’s police must 
absorb; and what constitutes police-work in this model is making known what is unknown, even 
if not knowing is the nature of the job. In other words, trouble names that which disrupts knowing’s 
certainty in the otherwise heterogeneous space of the social — it is that space made sense of. As 
Martin writes, “police operate to hold things together” in a labor that is described as “trouble-
 
131 Martin explains at the outset of his study that he is focused on “how police fit into the sociocultural order of life” 
(157). Thus, his work is inherently observational and descriptive, and, it could be argued, justifiably defers questions 
of ethics and more foundational inquiries into political ontology. However, we might also wonder at the function of 
the descriptive in such anthropological accounts. For example, what are its epistemic boundaries and how do they also 
predetermine the field of values by which the phenomenon so described may be understood? 
132 Robert Reiner has argued that the contemporary era has seen the development of “police fetishism,” which he 
defines as “the ideological assumption that the police are a functional prerequisite of social order so that without a 
police force chaos would ensue” (3).  
133 We saw an analogous ambivalence in the opposition of natural/unnatural in A Woman Under the Influence. 
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management” (157, 158). “The work of police is, in other words, to manage a stabilizing 
intercontextual movement of trouble through a social landscape” (157). When Martin explains that 
police fulfill their function as linking principle in both their “presence” and their “absence,” the 
spatial image of the mobile enforcer who contains disruption is augmented by the interpellative 
notion of law’s internalization. The police strive for what Leary calls “maximum visibility” 
through maximizing mobility, but policework also produces this other kind of social presence-
through-absence: “an ambient invocable force maintaining a conflicted status quo” (158).  
 Martin argues for a reconceptualization of “police culture” by moving away from a focus 
on “organizational structure, ethos, and worldview” to emphasize instead how the police are 
incorporated into “the broader sense-making processes at work in the cultural order more 
generally” (158). There are more than mere superficial similarities to the theories of policing and 
crime that we saw in Boltanski, Mandel, and Jameson, where policework — in its fictional and its 
ideological forms — is analyzed for its sense-making role.134 At the same time, as we see in The 
Police Tapes, the rationalizing work of the police as linking principle succumbs to the many 
contradictions that arise in its practical application in a still segregated and poverty-stricken 
neighborhood. The police in the South Bronx never seem able to establish such connections — 
and their efforts often take the form of imperatives and elaborate performances of authority and 
 
134 When Martin refers to the police as a cultural thing, he understands this as “a genre of signifying practice that 
generates consequential interpretations of specific events around particular hegemonic ideals…. Embedded in such an 
order of relations, the police role is not to enforce the abstract principles of law (not even ‘discretionarily’ enforce 
their ‘spirit’), or is it to ‘fight crime’ (for they must in fact actively facilitate structural illegalities of state involution). 
So what are the police there for? They are there to hold things together [and] to manage the way trouble ramifies 
through the received political economy” (176).  
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judgment. The existing hierarchies of racial and socioeconomic power relations overwhelm nearly 
ever effort to force and enforce a community. 
Boltanski’s argument abstracts crime fiction from the social and historical relations that 
Mandel considers essential to their cultural significance and insists, instead, on an almost universal 
semiotic value of the mystery. In his account, the mysterious event “does not have a meaning as 
long as it has not been possible to attribute it to a given entity or, when that entity is already known, 
to determine that entity’s intentions” (4). The mysteriousness of the mystery, for Boltanski, lies in 
its semiotic obscurity and its narrative inexplicability. Where Mandel indicts the enigma in its 
guise as a convention of crime fiction in the way that it figures the bourgeois desire for analytical 
mastery or the drive for a rational totality, Boltanski delights in the manufactured experience of a 
crisis of intention, where meaning is predicated on the necessary relation of attribution and intent. 
Meaning means something only where someone emerges as the willful agent of an event, and it is 
the function of the detective to explain the trajectory of this causal sequence when the mystery 
obscures its otherwise rational motivations.135 Most striking here, perhaps, is the difference 
between the aesthetics of actual policework as the Raymonds understood it — i.e., an interrogative 
approach to a situation of not knowing — and the traditional ways that crime and policing were 
represented and theorized. Susan Raymond was well aware of the “drama” of policework, and she 
knew it would be good material for a documentary for that reason (“Interview”). But her 
experience in relation to the scene of crime would change drastically in the course of making The 
 
135 Such a theory of “meaning” might be contrasted with its investigations in post-structuralism. See, especially, Gilles 
Deleuze’s philosophy of sens in The Logic of Sense, where the event is understood in relation to the accumulation of 
quasi-causes and the significance of intent and attribution produce meaning (sens) in the form of their breakdown in 
nonsense. 
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Police Tapes, just as that “scene” was revealed, in the case of a homicide, to more accurately 
coincide with the events and experiences after the crime had been committed, after the body was 
found, and was often more appropriately a scene at odds with itself, one characterized by inquiry 
and interrogation, on the one hand, and grief and frustration, on the other. A temporality of 
policework emerges here that is vastly at odds with the notion of policing as prevention and 
maintenance. The scene of a violent crime is a scene of aftermath; as event it is also what comes 
after the event (after the crime, after the violence, in its wake); the unthinkable  — from the point 
of view of the defenders of the social contract — thing has already happened, someone has been 
injured or killed; or, something has happened that constitutes a threat of something worse (injury 
or death) and the police are called to intervene before the worse thing can come to pass. When 
Susan Raymond says that someone is having a nightmare, is screaming, is calling for help,  she 
suggests that the event is ongoing but more often than not (as the film itself shows), the screaming 
and calling for help are subsequent to the assault, the rape, the murder.136 In the way that the 
cultural representation of such scenes are theorized (in Boltanski’s mystery and Mandel’s enigma, 
for example) the policework assumes in this encounter a purely intellectual relation between the 
police and the crime.137 
 
136 I would like to think more about the difference between the ongoing crime event and the aftermath crime event. 
What counts as policework surely changes drastically. 
137 It is worth noting that by the end of the 1960s not only had the perception of policework undergone a significant 
change but the very makeup of the institution had changed as its relation to the “public” also took on new dimensions 
and a new aspect of burden. As Leroy Lad Panek notes in his history of the police novel in the United States, “in the 
1950s the character patterns of the great detective, the amateur, and the hard-boiled private eye were handed down 
from older generations of mystery writers and, in the way of popular fiction, needed to be updated or abandoned” (41). 
Writers of crime fiction began to turn from the intellectual loner to the “squad,” the precinct of police officers as a 
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Before the processes of detection and investigation begin, however, when the police arrive 
on the scene, they announce their presence with sirens and lights — to the enigmatic moment of 
succor described by Raymond, often characterized by a chaos of bodies and intents, the police 
bring the full spectacle of law enforcement. In one scene near the end of The Police Tapes, a patrol 
car blares through the streets of the Bronx, siren wailing, before coming to a halt outside an 
apartment building, lights fixed on a group of mostly young black and Puerto Rican men and 
women milling around a body that lies prone on the concrete. The officers climb out of the car and 
cut through the bodies, joining other officers already on scene. “All these people and nobody saw 
anything?” one of the officers queries the gathered crowd. People ask the officers multiple times 
when the ambulance will come, when help is coming, to which one officer responds with the terse 
command to “shut up.” The ambulance never arrives — “there is no ambulance” one of the officers 
explains, annoyed by the repeated questions — and the limp body is lifted, instead, into the back 
seat of a patrol car, criminalized even in death. As the officers on scene multiply and direct people 
away from the presumably dead young man in the street, his mother arrives and begins to scream 
— harsh, staccato shrieks — reaching her arms out to her son’s body as she collapses to the ground, 
 
collective subject, and from the rigorous case of detection as the motor of narrative to “routine, to the mechanical and 
human procedures that were increasingly important in professional police work in the twentieth century” (41). Early 
on in the subgenre of the police novel, works by authors such as MacKinlay Kantor, Jack Webb, and John Ball 
typically championed the police as “society’s bulwark against increasing chaos” (81). “Instead of confronting the real 
problems of police and policing (corruption on one hand and social ills on the other) the cop writers of the 1950s and 
1960s depict policemen and police departments as beleaguered, but peopled by honest, hardworking, moral men” (81-
82). 
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barely held up by those behind her. Susan Raymond recalls the scene in an interview several 
decades later as an exemplary moment of what it meant to inhabit that new aesthetic mode when 
the dictates of cinéma vérité no longer fit the reality in which they found themselves, when the 
experience beckoned in a way that called for response. What she realized, however, was that she 
had been changed in the process of encountering such scenes during the weeks and months of 
filming. “I was recording and I didn’t care at that point. And that was really bad, to find out that I 
had taken on that cynical hard shell that the cops take on to survive in these mean streets. And I 
didn’t know if I liked that or not.” If the aesthetic ground of the police encounter is characterized 
by not knowing, by adopting an interrogative and, ultimately, judgmental relation to the 
representational matter of the event, it is also determined by a pervasive sense of helplessness, 
running into the brick wall of socioeconomic conditions, as it were. But why is the “cynical hard 
shell” described as the necessary — inevitable, natural, understandable, reasonable — response of 
the police officer to the situation of policing the ghetto?  
South Bronx Police Chief Tony Bouza explains that the average police officer, who comes 
from the “lower-middle class or upper-lower class,” begins in the profession with a degree of 
optimism: “he wants to help people.”  
And he goes to the police academy, and he is told he is going to be helping people 
and he is taught how to help people and he’s going to be preserving the fabric of 
our society, preserving life and property and maintaining the peace and doing all 
noble purposes, and then he gets out there and he discovers he is regulating human 
behavior and he is bitterly resented and he is shocked. (The Police Tapes) 
Bouza theorizes that out of this resentment and in order to preserve a store of emotion for his 
personal life, the police officer becomes “hardened” and “cynical;” drawing an analogy with 
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prostitution, the officer, like the prostitute who cannot afford to get “emotionally or romantically 
involved with every client,” the officer “cannot afford to become emotionally or romantically 
involved with every client,” which results in him “developing callousness over his emotions.” 
Bouza’s psychologism racializes emotion: while “conditionable” is made a universal predicate of 
humanity, the poor black resident of the ghetto is conditioned to violence and inarticulateness, 
while someone like Bouza himself (white and middle class, perhaps) is conditioned to seek a good 
education for his children and to “resolve disputes” through “communication.”138 Although it 
passes for a pragmatic assessment of the problems of policework, Bouza’s discourse is 
emphatically racialized and classed; and, despite his recognition of the systemic nature of the 
issues of the American ghetto, the racialization of his discourse has distinct effects on any 
distinctions that are made between the subjects under consideration. We might wonder, for 
example, about the function of the collective noun in comments such as these: 
The fact of the matter is that we are manufacturing criminals, we are manufacturing 
brutality out there. We are very efficiently creating a very volatile and dangerous 
sub-element of our society, and we are doing it simply because we don’t want to 
face the burdens and the problems and the responsibilities that their existence 
imposes upon any society with conscience. So rather than awaken your conscience 
to the problem you’re far better off ignoring it, and that’s what we are doing. And 
I am very well payed almost to be a commander of an army of occupation in the 
ghetto. (my emphasis) 
 
138 Denise Ferreira da Silva’s work on the global category of race has done much to analyze the philosophical and 
historical context of such conditionability — although she uses the term affectability, putting the emphasis on the 
classical epistemological distinction between affection and autonomy. See, especially, Towards a Global Idea of Race. 
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Bouza’s insight into the “manufacturing” of the ghetto acknowledges the historical and material 
causes that have contributed to the problem of the post-civil rights social landscape — oppression, 
too, is work. However, it remains their existence that is the primary problem in this description. I 
have shown in the previous chapters how this defensive logic informs the reactionary response to 
de-segregation which has been forced to acknowledge the structural causes of oppression that it 
nevertheless disavows in maintaining the culpability of the abject other. In the first chapter, this 
was evident in the language of the hearings and the reticence to yield the reigning conception of 
the nation’s political ontology — to allow it, in brief, to make room for that other. In the second 
chapter, in addition to the discourse of the underclass, this was figured in Charlie’s futile 
negotiations with the workless landscape of post-civil rights Los Angeles.  
 
The Ghetto as ‘Eyesore’: Policing Aesthetics 
 The mysteries and enigmas routinely confronted by the beat cop or the patrol officer are 
distinct from the experience and method of the homicide detective or the private investigator, the 
preferred figures of classic (bourgeois) crime fiction. What Susan Raymond describes as a kind of 
Cartesian confrontation of individual subjects, mutually inexplicable to one another in the depths 
of their selves, does not fit the conventional picture of the mystery or detective genre. The enigma 
does not communicate itself through the part-object relation of the clue and its context (as 
meaningful inconsistency between thing and environment) nor in the temporality of the past event 
that lingers in the present precisely because it has not yet been inserted into a causal sequence. 
Although the encounters captured on film by the Raymonds could be described as “dramatic” in 
the sense that Susan Raymond had expected before they started filming, the experience of 
policework that they represented did not quite fit that expectation. Despite having “all the 
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ingredients of a good story,” as Raymond saw it, the individual scenes of policework captured in 
the film did not cohere to narrative conventions of climax and resolution (“Interview”). Despite 
arriving at the scene of a crime in a state of not knowing what was going on and needing to ask 
questions to establish even the most basic details in order to decipher an event, the processes of 
inquiry and judgment repeatedly proved to be insufficient.139 One might not ever know what really 
happened because the accounts of the event were contradictory — hence the need for judgment to 
intervene prior to the conclusion of the rational labor of deduction and the inevitability that 
someone will be arrested (or at the very least accused). Or one knew what happened — the young 
man died from being stabbed fourteen times — but the knowledge did not assuage the conflict and 
could not provide succor to those who called for help. In the immediacy of policework, which is 
the subject of The Police Tapes, instead of clues the officer (not yet investigator)140 is confronted 
 
139 What is it about the police encounter that requires verbal description in order for there to be a satisfactory 
representation of the depicted events? Is this doubling of discursive affirmation similar to what we saw in the first 
chapter in the desire for the “picture” — pictorial representation, physical document — to supplement the “word 
picture” of testimony in the hearings? The film frequently problematizes what can and what cannot be seen in the 
police encounter. Often, what we see is the event after the event, the scene after the arrest when the accused is already 
handcuffed and the officers must explain to the camera — to the audience but also, as Raymond has made clear, to 
the filmmakers themselves — what happened to get to this point. The arrest necessitates a verbal narrative of the 
arrest, its justification. When the visual cannot in itself fulfill the function of evidence, it requires a verbal supplement: 
description in the mode of justification.  
140 “Not yet” in the temporal sequence of policework, in which the “beat” or “patrol” officer has an immediate 
experience of a crime (or its aftermath) followed by the mediations (which, classically, also take the form of a kind of 
meditation) of the investigator. It might be interesting to consider, in the particular instance of murder, how the role 
of the coroner is the true mediator of policework, coming in to declare the body dead and, thus, open to investigation. 
153 
 
with testimony, or rather testimonies: often competing accounts of an event that either persists or 
threatens to recommence. Here, real-time police work takes the form of a kind of community 
relations, and issues of circulation and social exchange take precedence over the more 
metaphysical debates about identity, causality, and relation that occupy the attention of the classic 
investigator confronted with mysteries and enigmas. When Susan Raymond speaks of the you that 
must help the audience “understand what was going on” — just as the police officer is called upon 
to help the person in distress whose capacity for verbal communication has been outstripped and 
who can only express the trouble that overwhelms them — she is not merely caught up in an 
imitative fallacy. The former adherent of cinéma vérité’s imperative of non-involvement becomes, 
in such situations, if not implicated by the event being filmed, at least interpellated by it: she 
becomes its subject. However, as the facilitator of the message, she must transcend her aesthetic 
mimicry of police work, and in this simultaneous movement further into the mystery of the event 
and further away from it, the representation of crime assumes a function it did not possess in the 
classic modes of detective fiction and true crime. We may be reminded here of Martin’s theory of 
police as linking principle, where the epistemic serves a different function: knowledge is not 
predicated on detection but through securing a space of legibility. The supremely rational and 
analytical detective described by Mandel and Boltanski could never be seen to admit, as does 
Susan Raymond, that “I don’t know what’s going on.”141 Not knowing what’s going on prompts 
the quest to interpret the clues, to analyze, to investigate, to master the mystery of the event because 
 
141 The possibility of not knowing what’s going on abolishes the certainty that there is meaning, which, in Boltanski’s 
theory, grounds authority. Meaning is no longer the natural yield of processes of deduction and analysis. In the 
documentary, the significance of events is a non-issue. In the hierarchy of law enforcement, the judgment of the patrol 
officer precedes — and is often supplanted by — the juridical function of the court. 
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not knowing is incompatible with an experience that locates meaning in the attribution of intent 
(Boltanski) or in the triumph of bourgeois rationality (Mandel). The patrol officer, however, 
polices the routes of circulation in search of abnormality not mystery. As a functionary of the 
normative order, he is called to a scene of dispute to judge not to analyze, and in his judgment — 
which is not dependent upon knowing what is going on — he determines who deserves the help he 
has been empowered to provide. In classic crime fiction, the authority of the detective is never in 
question: he is the one who possesses the analytical faculties required to make sense of an event 
that either resists meaning at the surface or obscures its relation to the rational order. “Clues have 
to be discovered because tracks have been covered” (Mandel 42). Value is not in question. The 
narrative of detection proceeds from an a priori certainty regarding the contours and laws of 
reality. It is an exercise in ontology and epistemology in the performance, through repetition, of 
mastery. It is elementary. The patrol officer enjoys no such de facto assumption of authority which 
becomes, for him, a performative aspect of the job — from the blinding lights and deafening sirens 
of the cop car to the badge and handcuffs: authority is in the accoutrements. 
What I have here been calling the aesthetics of the police is bound up with the policing of 
aesthetics, which the Raymonds explore throughout their documentary, epitomized in one officer’s 
claim, delivered from the driver’s seat of a patrol car as it cruises through the streets of the South 
Bronx, that the dice games they regularly break up are “an eyesore.”142 The officer in the patrol 
car is confronted on all sides by façade and appearance, and it is his function to judge the adequacy 
 
142 It is interesting that the “casual labor” that Charlie Banks undertakes in Bless Their Little Hearts almost exclusively 
involves the maintenance of surfaces and façades: the scything of tall grass and weeds on a patch of vacant land by 
the side of the road or the painting over (in white paint) graffiti on the side of a detached garage. At the margins of 
sanctioned labor, the work that is available is dedicated to maintaining the aesthetic surface of the city. 
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of such surfaces in relation to the normative image of community he has been provided.143 In 1982, 
this practice of policing aesthetics found its theoretical exposition in an article by James Q. Wilson 
and George Kelling who called for a police-based form of community relations that emphasized 
“order-maintenance” in distinction with crime fighting.144 What became known as the “broken 
windows” theory of policing conceives the space of the city in emphatically aesthetic terms: the 
perceptible and material phenomena that make up the stuff of the streets harbor a contagious 
potential that must be actively immunized. Wilson and Kelling write: 
That link [between order-maintenance and crime prevention] is similar to the 
process whereby one broken window becomes many. The citizen who fears the ill-
smelling drunk, the rowdy teenager, or the importuning beggar is not merely 
expressing his distaste for unseemly behavior; he is also giving voice to a bit of folk 
wisdom that happens to be a correct generalization — namely, that serious street 
crime flourishes in areas in which disorderly behavior goes unchecked. The 
unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window. Muggers and robbers, 
whether opportunistic or professional, believe they reduce their chances of being 
 
143 South Bronx Police Chief Tony Bouza explains that the police recruit, before he has become “hardened” to the 
reality of his work and the rift that separates him from a society that “doesn’t appreciate him,” harbors an image of 
his community as one that is in need of his protection and preservation, an image that is encouraged in his academy 
training and reflected back to him in the media (The Police Tapes). 
144 Wilson and Kelling’s article, which was published in The Atlantic, “argued that the police role should be expanded 
beyond law enforcement to include active participation in maintaining and/or improving the quality of community life 
through an increased focus on order maintenance” (Vila and Morris 236, my emphasis).  
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caught or even identified if they operate on streets where potential victims are 
already intimidated by prevailing conditions. If the neighborhood cannot keep a 
bothersome panhandler from annoying passersby, the thief may reason, it is even 
less likely to call the police to identify a potential mugger or to interfere if the 
mugging actually takes place. (qtd. in Vila and Morris 238, my emphasis) 
This description of the broken windows theory relies on metonymic displacement and an 
attribution of individual psychological motives to deliberately constructed social types in order to 
evoke an almost Hobbesian image of community. We might also recognize here the logics of 
abjection and contagion: the drunk who offends the senses or the beggar who breeches civil 
restraint infect the space of the social; their very presence acts as an invitation to crime and 
facilitates its spreading, eventually saturating the community in an affective tenor of disgust. 
Roberto Esposito notes that in theories of “immunitary democracy” — from Arnold Gehlen’s 
Hobbesian politics to Niklas Luhmann’s cybernetic functionalism — institutions do the work of 
forging community bonds: they are “charged with exonerating man from the weight with which 
the contingency of events saddles him” (40). In this “exoneration from environmental 
contingency,” the individual “is compelled to close his originary openness, and to circumscribe 
him or herself within his or her own interior” (40-41). The pragmatics of such an institutional 
democracy thus propagates an immunization of the body politic whereby the exterior is 
interiorized. “What is immunization,” asks Esposito, “if not a kind of progressive interiorization 
of exteriority?” (41). In Luhmann, it is the “system” that performs the role transforming the 
“exterior complexity” of environmental conflict into one “that is internal to the system itself” (41).  
 
Unproductive Labor and Heistwork 
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 In a footnote in the Grundrisse to the misconception that capital is not productive,145 Marx 
makes use of a frequently-used example to illustrate the difference between productive and 
unproductive labor: the piano maker (who produces the material commodity) and the piano player 
(who uses that object to produce music). In its most succinct formulation, what sets productive 
labor apart from unproductive labor  — in the “economic sense” — is its production of surplus-
value, or, as Marx says here: “Productive labour is only that which produces capital” (Grundrisse 
305). It makes sense to say that the piano player produces something with his labor — we might 
call it satisfaction, says Marx — or that “the madman who produces delusions is productive,” but 
in neither instance is that labor “productive for capitalization” (305, 306). These two examples 
seem excessive to the way this argument typically develops, in Marx and in his interpreters. As 
Ian Gough notes, “a necessary condition” of productive labor (in the capitalist mode of production) 
is that “it must be useful labour, must produce or modify a use-value — increasingly in a collective 
fashion” (60). Unproductive labor may be both useful and necessary but it is not “productive for 
capitalization” (Grundrisse 306).146 As Gough sees it, productive labor encompasses the work of 
those in industry, agriculture, distribution, and services — although there has been much debate 
about the extent to which “transportation” of goods can count as productive or not — while those 
who may fall under Marx’s category of unproductive laborers include everyone from state 
employees, teachers, doctors, and domestic servants (who produce use-values) to salesmen, 
 
145 A misconception that arises from the mistake of seeing capital “as mere means,” which understands it as “the 
material which confronts labor,” rather than recognizing the processive truth that the “simple production process … 
appears as the self-propelling content of capital” (Grundrisse 305). 
146 “To be a productive worker is therefore not a piece of luck but a misfortune” (Capital I 644). 
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advertisers and “unnecessary supervisory workers”147 (who do not produce use-values) (Gough 
60). Fred Moseley argued that it was an increase in the ratio of unproductive to productive workers 
through the 1960s and 1970s that “reduced the percentage of surplus-value available for capital 
accumulation” in the period, contributing to a “stagnation of capital accumulation” largely 
responsible for the economic crisis at the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s (“Marx’s Concepts” 
185, 184). Gopal Balakrishnan claims that it was neoliberal capitalism’s “prolonged, unsuccessful 
attempt to transcend” the global economic crisis at the end of the 1970s that set the stage for an 
ongoing period of stagnation as the economy has increasingly shifted to financial speculation as 
the purported solution to “deceleration” and “overproduction” (4). “In the 1990s it seemed 
plausible that containerization, post-Fordist production, and supply chains and information 
technology in the new office place were the driving forces of a transition to a ‘New Economy,’ 
one more productive, and in different ways, than anything that had come before it” (7). Yet this 
shift to the new never took place, despite the adaptability of the “productive” sector to forge new 
methods and objects for the pursuit of surplus-value in a global economy that was becoming ever-
more dependent — in the so-called advanced capitalist nations — on its (unproductive) service 
sectors. 
 
147 There is a version of “supervisory” labor that counts as productive in the proper sense, however, as that which 
produces surplus-value. As Marx notes in Capital, Vol. 3, “all labour in which many individuals co-operate necessarily 
requires a commanding will to co-ordinate and unify the process … This is a productive job, which must be performed 
in every combined mode of production” (qtd. in Gough 58). In a future project, I would like to revisit Marx’s notion 
of the commanding will and to think about the its two versions or modes: the productive one and the unproductive 
one, with the former constituting a form of accepted authority and the latter a necessary performance of authority. 
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 The categories of productive/unproductive and the historical long durée critique of capital 
seem more than capable of making sense of the changes in the global economic landscape in the 
wake of the civil rights-era in the United States. For the argument that I will develop in this final 
section, however, I would like to dwell on the concept of unproductive labor and its place within 
this history of the critique of capitalism. It should now be clear that unproductive labor has been 
central to the problem of every object that I have analyzed in this dissertation: the televised 
representations of the urban uprisings in Los Angeles and Detroit, which were as concerned with 
the political ramifications of the black militant and his contestation of justice and right as they 
were with documenting and assessing the breakdown of the circulation of goods and the threats to 
property posed by looting and mass demonstration; Mabel Longhetti’s psychological crisis in A 
Woman Under the Influence as performance and allegory of the crisis of reproductive labor in the 
post-civil rights era; Charlie Banks’s chronic underemployment and unemployment as both cause 
and effect of the dissolution of domestic autonomy in the segregated poor black community of 
Watts in Los Angeles; and, lastly, here in the final chapter, the various conceptions of policework 
as, on the one hand, the institutional means by which the irrationality of a social order — defined, 
as it is, by such contradictions in value as show up in the categorical distinction between productive 
and unproductive labor — is rationalized, the means by which its mysteries and violences are 
neutralized in a specific spatial logic of order, and, on the other hand, the necessary policing of 
the city’s aesthetic presentation of the former as what, precisely, is. 
 Marx’s distinction between productive and unproductive labor takes on Adam Smith’s 
definition of these terms in book two of The Wealth of Nations, where the former is described as 
that which “adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed” and the latter is simply that 
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which does not add such value (191). Smith also recognizes that unproductive labor is not only 
often useful but even necessary to society. 
In the same class must be ranked, some both of the gravest and most important, and 
some of the most frivolous professions; churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of 
letters of all kinds; players, buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-dancers, etc. 
The labour of the meanest of these has a certain value, regulated by the very same 
principles which regulate that of every other sort of labour; and that of the noblest 
and most useful, produces nothing which could afterwards purchase or procure an 
equal quantity of labour. Like the declamation of the actor, the harangue of the 
orator, or the tune of the musician, the work of all of them perishes in the very 
instant of its production. (192) 
As Gough points out, Marx “vehemently rejected” Smith’s emphasis on “the material 
characteristics of the product” as integral to the distinction between the two (52). For Marx, the 
difference did not depend at all on the materiality of the object produced, and, in fact, he says that 
the “same kind of labour may be productive or unproductive” (qtd. in Gough 52). The question of 
the materiality of labor introduces, however, a new problematic into this historico-critical 
distinction between kinds of labor under capitalism: namely, the problem of the value of labor. It 
is clear that Smith wants to introduce a moral difference into the category of unproductive labor, 
to say that even where labor may not be accurately termed productive it may still be good — or, 
in other words, that unproductive labor may still have a certain value  or be most useful — and he 
achieves this by separating the kinds of unproductive labor into two classes: one that is noble and 
important and one that is mean and frivolous. What emerges in this argument is another level of 
value that Smith almost requires to salvage the hierarchy of existing class distinctions. In other 
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words, the devaluation of such professions as “lawyers, physicians, [and] men of letters,” which 
have, in this political economy, been classed as unproductive labor, necessitates a different means 
of valuation by which they may regain their nobility. Even here, however, the problem of 
materiality persists. In Smith, what gets to count as a productive object must endure, it must itself 
be capable of procuring a quantity of labor. What disqualifies the performance of an actor, the 
speech of an orator, and the song of the musician is that the object so produced perishes in the very 
instant of its production. At times, Marx seems to reinforce this picture, as in the example of the 
footnote from the Grundrisse, where the piano player’s music and the madman’s delusions cannot 
count as productive labor. As we have seen, however, Marx’s definition of productive labor does 
not at all depend on materiality nor is there any indication that materiality itself requires temporal 
endurance, as it does in Smith — we might recall, for example, the collective will maintained by 
the productive supervisor. Marx notes that “other economists” grant the unproductive worker a 
form of productivity, as when the piano player can be said to “stimulate production; partly by 
giving a more decisive, lively tone to our individuality, and also in the ordinary sense of awakening 
a new need for the satisfaction of which additional energy becomes expended in direct material 
production” (Grundrisse 305-306). Although he insists that even in this example, it is already 
evident that “only such labour is productive as produces capital” (306) — presumably because the 
unproductive worker can only be considered productive when his labor engages somehow in the 
relation of labor power and surplus-value — we can recognize what Antonio Negri means when 
he says that labor “has become a problem” not only for contemporary (Marxist) theory but for 
praxis, as well (9). 
 Negri does not say when labor became a problem, and his reading of Job as a parable of 
human labor already suggests that there is no other side of this problematic horizon, even if the 
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work seems to speak to a specific postwar, post-Marxist strain of theoretical pessimism. The fate 
of labor is inextricable from the fate of value. In fact, we can see how labor’s value is already 
problematic for Smith, and this persists in Marx, despite his emphasis on the historical specificity 
of certain categories of his analysis. For Negri, “it is impossible to quantify production on [labor’s] 
basis” and “one is no longer able to distinguish what is productive from what is not” (10). As a 
result, value “has become immeasurable at the same time that all measure fails” (10). 
 There is little critical literature on Peter Yates’s film adaptation of the George V. Higgins 
novel The Friends of Eddie Coyle (1973), but those few articles and reviews that have evaluated 
the classic crime film are unanimous in their praise of its idiosyncratic presentation of the bleak 
and brutal world of professional crime. A recent retrospective take by Robert Hanks for Sight and 
Sound notes that “Eddie Coyle’s descent has a noir-ish inevitability, but none of the existential 
glamour — just the dismal fact that criminals spend much of their lives making excuses and 
pleading for favours, and they have few friends” (98). Another recent piece that goes more in depth 
contends that the film “effectively captures the imagery of the working-class underbelly” of Boston 
in the early 1970s (Caro). The film is notable, the author argues, for its presentation of the 
economic “rot” and “decay” that characterized the post-civil rights “American metropolitan 
landscape,” where one did what one must to survive. Kent Jones notes that in “the miserable 
economy of power in Boston’s rumpled gray underworld, Eddie and his ‘friends’ are all 
expendable, and the ones left standing play every side against the middle, their white-knuckle 
terror carefully concealed under several layers of nonchalance and resignation” (Jones). It is this 
expendability of the criminals in this narrative that contributes to the “impression of dog-eat-dog 
brutality” that most stands out in “this seemingly artless film” for Jones. We might, however, 
wonder at the surface-and-depth play of terror and resignation that Jones suggests. In its seemingly 
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artless way, the film never provides formal means to a character’s interiority, unless the rot and 
decay of the landscape are intended as an allegorical complement to the moral blight of the criminal 
underclass. In which moments of nonchalance are we to discover the terror of, say, Eddie (Robert 
Mitchum)? What is more astonishing about the film, perhaps, is how it renders some of 
Hollywood’s favorite topoi — violence, police, and crime — in ways that are palpably banal. The 
affective surplus that is usually mined from scenes of conflict or desire in order to amplify the 
sensory load for the viewer is here dissipated or blunted.148 If Jones is right that what is most 
characteristic about the film’s criminals is their expendability, this must be understood in relation 
to its peculiar aesthetic in which the affective highs and lows of “white-knuckled terror” or “dog-
eat-dog brutality” appear on screen as moments of banal exchange or negotiation. In other words, 
what is so brutal and terrifying about how a life of crime is represented in this film is not the 
adrenaline rush of gun sales or shootouts between the cops and robbers, it is the absence of any 
means of transcending the mundane structures of valuation that inform working-class existence in 
the post-civil rights era. In contrast with most Hollywood productions on crime and policing, not 
only is crime not glorified in The Friends of Eddie Coyle, it is reduced to its barest economic 
forms: reconnaissance, negotiation, trade, and accumulation. As we saw in the other figures of 
post-civil rights labor that I have analyzed in this dissertation, heistwork must be taken primarily 
as a problem, especially in its irreducibility to the prevailing capitalist circuits of exchange. 
 
 
148 A connection may be made here with A Woman Under the Influence, which, despite its melodramatic excesses, 
also communicates through the breakdown of formerly transcendent forms. In that film, when Mabel asks for her 
father to stand up for her, he is incapable of understanding the figurative meaning of her plea for help (from the 
powerless to one who is supposed to have power). 
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